You mean open and honest like Israel? Perhaps you can post a link to the online tours of Israel's nuclear facilities.
Here is the link to the online tours of Iran's nuclear facilties:
ISIS NuclearIran › Nuclear Sites
Please don't tell anyone about this link, as its a secret... Just between you, me and the Iranians.
The whole Iran is secretive "about their little nuke plan" fairey tale is about as accurate as the fables we were told about Iraq's WMD stockpiles. Most of Iran's nuclear facilities are open to the public.... or at least they were until someone started assassinating their scientists. I can understand why Iran might not want to list the names and addresses of their nuclear scientists and restrict access to the places where these people work. Openness has proven to be hazardous to the health or Iranian nuclear scientists and their families.
You obviously are a believer, so let me bring you up to speed.
>>>
In 1992, following media allegations about undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, Iran invited IAEA inspectors to the country and permitted those inspectors to visit all the sites and facilities they asked to see. Director General Blix reported that
all activities observed were consistent with the peaceful use of atomic energy.[73][74] The IAEA visits included undeclared facilities and Iran's nascent uranium mining project at Saghand. In the same year, Argentine officials disclosed that their country had canceled a sale to Iran of civilian nuclear equipment worth $18 million, under US pressure.
[75]
In 1995, Iran signed a contract with Russia to resume work on the partially complete Bushehr plant,
[76] installing into the existing Bushehr I building a 915
MWe VVER-1000
pressurized water reactor, with completion expected in 2009. There are no current plans to complete the Bushehr II reactor.
In 1996, the U.S. convinced the People's Republic of China to pull out of a contract to construct a uranium conversion plant. However, the Chinese provided blueprints for the facility to the Iranians, who advised the IAEA that they would continue work on the program, and IAEA Director Mohammad El Baradei even visited the construction site.
[77]
According to a report by the Argentine justice in 2006, late 1980s and early 1990s the US pressured Argentina to terminate its nuclear cooperation with Iran, and from early 1992 to 1994 negotiations between Argentina and Iran took place with the aim of re-establishing the three agreements made in 1987–88.
[63]
2002–2006
Seen here in this
ISNA footage is
Gholam Reza Aghazadeh and
AEOI officials with a sample of
Yellowcake during a public announcement on 11 April 2006, in
Mashad that Iran had managed to successfully complete the fuel cycle by itself.
On 14 August 2002,
Alireza Jafarzadeh, a spokesman for an Iranian dissident group National Council of Resistance of Iran, publicly revealed the existence of two nuclear sites under-construction: a uranium enrichment facility in
Natanz (part of which is underground), and a
heavy water facility in
Arak. It has been strongly suggested that intelligence agencies already knew about these facilities but the reports had been classified.
[78]
The IAEA immediately sought access to these facilities and further information and co-operation from Iran regarding its nuclear program.
[79] According to arrangements in force at the time for implementation of Iran's safeguards agreement with the IAEA,[80] Iran was not required to allow IAEA inspections of a new nuclear facility until six months before nuclear material is introduced into that facility. At the time, Iran was not even required to inform the IAEA of the existence of the facility. This 'six months' clause was standard for implementation of all IAEA safeguards agreements until 1992, when the IAEA Board of Governors decided that facilities should be reported during the planning phase, even before construction began. Iran was the last country to accept that decision, and only did so
26 February 2003, after the IAEA investigation began.[81]
France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the
EU-3) undertook a diplomatic initiative with Iran to resolve questions about its nuclear program. On 21 October 2003, in Tehran, the Iranian government and EU-3 Foreign Ministers issued a statement known as the Tehran Declaration
[82] in which Iran agreed to co-operate with the IAEA, to sign and implement an Additional Protocol as a voluntary, confidence-building measure, and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities during the course of the negotiations. The EU-3 in return explicitly agreed to recognize Iran's nuclear rights and to discuss ways Iran could provide "satisfactory assurances" regarding its nuclear power program, after which Iran would gain easier access to modern technology.
Iran signed an Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003, and agreed to act as if the protocol were in force, making the required reports to the IAEA and allowing the required access by IAEA inspectors, pending Iran's ratification of the Additional Protocol.
The IAEA reported 10 November 2003,
[83] that "it is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored." Iran was obligated to inform the IAEA of its importation of uranium from China and subsequent use of that material in uranium conversion and enrichment activities. It was also obligated to report to the IAEA experiments with the separation of plutonium. A comprehensive list of Iran's specific "breaches" of its IAEA safeguards agreement, which the IAEA described as part of a "pattern of concealment," can be found in the 15 November 2004, report of the IAEA on Iran's nuclear program.
[84] Iran attributes its failure to report certain acquisitions and activities on US obstructionism, which reportedly included pressuring the IAEA to cease providing technical assistance to Iran's uranium conversion program in 1983.
[85][86] On the question of whether Iran had a hidden nuclear weapons program, the IAEA's November 2003 report states that it found
"no evidence" that the previously undeclared activities were related to a nuclear weapons program, but also that it was unable to conclude that Iran's nuclear program was exclusively peaceful.
Nuclear program of Iran - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
>>>
BTW, have you read the NPT? I have. The original 1970 treaty is fairly straight forward and only 5 pages
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf
The additional voluntary confidence building protocols are a little more complex, but the key word there is "VOLUNTARY". Those protocols don't apply until after a country agrees to them, but Iran's critics would have you believe they are retroactive and mandatory...
The IAEA has never found any evidence which proves Iran has a nuclear weapon program. All the IAEA has said is that they only found evidence in Iran of a peaceful nuclear program, but cannot conclude that Iran's nuclear program was "exclusively peaceful." What a ridiculous statement. Of course they can't. They could prove any country's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful, nor is that part of their mandate. Its impossible to prove a negative. That's the same requirement the manipulated masses believed Iraq had to meet regarding their WMD stockpiles. Until Iraq proved the non-existence of WMD stockpiles, the manipulated masses just assumed Iraq had them. The manipulated masses believed that not finding WMDs in Iraq proved they were hiding them.
Not finding WMDs is inconclusive. They could exist or they might not exist. Finding WMDs is conclusive.
Now the same game is being played with Iran and their non-existent nuclear weapons program. The onus is on Iran the accused to prove innocence, rather than the accusers (the US, Israel and their minions at the IAEA) to prove guilt. Our court systems recognize that innocent people can't always prove their innocence, but proof of guilt is always conclusive. Unfortunately the same logic seems lost on the manipulated masses when applied to regimes the US and Israel don't like very much.
Tell you what D. Until you can prove a negative, any negative, like their is no God for example, then I'll believe that Iran should not have to prove they don't have a nuclear weapons program. The onus is on the US, Israel and the IAEA to prove its existance. So far they've proved that Iran doesn't declare their facilities until six months before the building is complete and before the first equipment is installed. That would make them compliant with the mandatory parts of the NPT and the voluntary protocols that they signed, but in violation of a voluntary NPT protocol that Iran did not sign. Yeah? so what? Iran doesn't have to abide by agreements they didn't sign.
Recently the US revealed the existence of a laptop that a US spy allegedly stole from a Iranian nuclear scientist which the kept secret for years. On this computer which the US held for years is evidence that the Iranian scientist played with a really low quality nuclear weapon simulator. (software) Even if true... (and you'd have to trust the US to be telling the truth regarding Iran and this evidence isn't total BS) ...it still doesn't prove Iran secretly has secret industrial scale factories enriching uranium to weapons grade and testing facilities required to design and build a prototype nuclear weapon.
So far I have yet to see any evidence which conclusively proves that Iran has a nuclear weapons program or has violated any NPT agreements. If anyone had proof it would be all over the news and all we have are allegations.
As per the NPT and the additional protocols that Iran signed, Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear technology including enrichment to 20% HEU.
As per the NPT and the additional protocols that Iran signed, the IAEA has an obligation to assist Iran's peaceful nuclear program. The IAEA and the UNSC actions regarding Iran violate the NPT.
As per the NPT and the additional protocols that Iran signed, Iran only has to declare the existence of a facility six months before the first equipment is installed and allow IAEA inspections. So far, Iran has complied with its obligations in this respect.
Iran doesn't involve the IAEA in the planning stages of nuclear facilities, because they never signed that additional protocol.
Israel never signed the NPT or any additional protocol. As per the NPT, no countries are allowed to assist Israel's nuclear program, yet the US, France, the UK, South Africa and probably many other nations have violated the NPT to assist Israel.
I don't care for Iran's theocracy or the oppressive government. But I also don't like double standards, nor do I just belive every lie and deception made by world leaders and the talking heads on the idiot box. What people believe and think they know about Iran's nuclear program tells me if they are just one of the millions of idiots who belong to the legions of the manipulated masses or someone capable of independent critical thought.