Hi friends,
First of all, I reject wikipedia as a substantive source on anything except dates of birth and death. It's just a matter of intellectual honesty. Sorry, but that's just me.
Instead, this is the type of analysis that I am interested in: International Assessment and Strategy Center > Research > Nuclear Proliferation: The Next Wave If someone wants to go deep in the tall grass with me, wikipedia is not the source to be used.
I asked that I not be forced to go to get the IAEA report. I asked that my word be taken. Obviously, my word wasn't good enough. So I have taken the time to go to the source:
"F. Summary26. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has30. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate."
cooperated with the Agency in improving safeguards measures at FEP and in providing the Agency
with access to the IR-40 reactor for purposes of design information verification. Iran has not, however,
implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, on the early
provision of design information.
27. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its work on heavy water related
projects as required by the Security Council.
28. Contrary to the requests of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has neither
implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the
remaining issues of concern which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military
dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Regrettably, the Agency has not been able to engage Iran in
any substantive discussions about these outstanding issues for over a year. The Agency believes that it
has provided Iran with sufficient access to documentation in its possession to enable Iran to respond
substantively to the questions raised by the Agency. However, the Director General urges Member
States which have provided documentation to the Agency to work out new modalities with the Agency
so that it could share further documentation with Iran, as appropriate, since the Agency’s inability to
do so is rendering it difficult for the Agency to progress further in its verification process.
29. It is critical for Iran to implement the Additional Protocol and clarify the outstanding issues in
order for the Agency to be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in Iran.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf
I apologize for being testy. After all I am an American, and we are not a very happy breed.
Which is exactly what I wrote. Iran is in compliance with the mandatory parts of the NPT, but not fully compliant with all additional voluntary confidence building NPT protocols. Specifically Iran is in violation of the additional voluntary confidence building NPT protocol which requires the IAEA be involved during the planning stages of a new nuclear facility.
NPT 101: Is Iran violating the nuclear treaty? - CSMonitor.com
NPT 101: Why Iran sees nuclear 'hypocrisy' - CSMonitor.com
While Iran has complied with all the other voluntary and mandatory parts of the NPT, they refuse to ratify this one additional voluntary confidence building protocol. These additional protocols are voluntary and Iran is not obligated to observe them, unless they agree to them. Iran has ratified and observes most of the voluntary confidence building protocols. Countries can punish Iran with sanctions for not observing all additional voluntary confidence building protocols, but that doesn't mean that Iran has violated the mandatory parts of the NPT.
According to the additional voluntary confidence building protocol that Iran did not ratify, they must inform the IAEA during the planning stages of any nuclear facility. Last year, Iran informed the IAEA of the location of a new nuclear facility during the construction phase. At the time, Iran had started digging a hole in the ground and were still about a year before they would be ready to start installing equipment. Its ridiculous to claim a partially dug hole in the ground is proof that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapon program or that Iran has violated any of the mandatory parts of the NPT. Moving on...
As a NPT signatory Iran has the right to enrich uranium up to 20%. 20% enriched uranium cannot be used directly to make a nuclear weapon and must be further refined. There is no evidence that Iran has crossed this 20% enrichment line or intends to cross this line at any time in the future. While Iran possesses the technology to refine uranium above this limit, they would have to reconfigure their enrichment equipment to achieve it. That would take weeks to months. Iran's enrichment facilities are closely monitored by the IAEA (as per one of the additional confidence building NPT protocols) and any attempt to reconfigure their equipment to refine above this limit would be noticed immediately, giving the world weeks or months to react.
All NPT signatory countries have a sovereign right to peaceful nuclear technology without foreign interference. Even the UNSC has no authority to interfere in a country's peaceful NPT compliant nuclear research.
The IAEA has a UN mandate is to monitor and assist a country's nuclear program. The IAEA must report NPT violations to the UNSC. But the IAEA must also provide advice and guidance and facilitate the exchange of peaceful nuclear technology between countries which are NPT compliant. Even the IAEA has no authority or mandate to interfere with a country's peaceful nuclear program which includes enriching uranium up to the 20% threshold and building nuclear facilities.
I don't believe in double standards. The NPT must apply to all nations equally or it will cease to be relevant. Effectively the IAEA and the UNSC have overstepped their authority by interfering in Iran's NPT compliant activities.
Countries which currently violate the mandatory parts of the NPT are: US, UK, France, Russia, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea
US, UK, France, Russia, China are supposed to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals and stop research in this area. Instead they've modernized and upgraded their nuclear arsenals and have no intention of eliminating their arsenals.
While India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea are not NPT signatories, they are supposed to face punitive actions by NPT signatories if they violate the mandatory parts of the NPT. Also NPT signatories must not assist non-NPT signatory nuclear programs or engage in nuclear technology related trade with these countries including trade in peaceful nuclear technology.
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