It Turns Out Ahmadinejad Was the Truthful One
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Not yet...but I am going soon. I see you have been keeping busy posting at every thread.
Iran: Clandestine Aims of the US National Intelligence Estimate
Global Research, December 6, 2007
tehrantimes.com/
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=158570
Clandestine aims of NIE report
by Parviz Esmaeili, Tehran Times, 6 December 2007
The latest U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear program was released on Monday and caused various reactions.
The report by the U.S. intelligence community is the consensus view of all 16 U.S. spy agencies, including the CIA.
Unfortunately, in Iran many people hastily responded positively, and even some government officials expressed the view that the report was favorable to Iran.
This case is similar to the recent report by International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, which was called totally positive.
However, like always, ElBaradei's report gave short shrift to Iran's cooperation and the transparency of its nuclear activities but highlighted the alleged ambiguities cited by Western intelligence agencies and their unsubstantiated accusations.
In any case, the issue is not over the contents of ElBaradei's report, because the IAEA director general's claim that the process of Iran's cooperation with the agency is slowing down should have given Iranian officials a signal to be more cautious in evaluating the Arab diplomat's five-page report.
Now the U.S. intelligence agencies' report is being treated in the same hasty and offhand manner as ElBaradei's report was.
Although it is expected that the heavy challenges of the past few years would have made our diplomacy more proficient, it seems that the rashness in adopting stances, the novice diplomatic moves, and the misanalysis of the nature of such reports will cause some problems for us in the future.
What is the content of the U.S. intelligence report?
The intelligence agencies' report can interestingly be divided into evaluations with "high confidence" and "moderate confidence".
The conclusions that are made with high certainty are:
"In fall 2003 (September), Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program."
Attention: The abovementioned time is exactly after an agreement was made with three European countries, and Iran suspended its uranium enrichment activities.
Moreover, contrary to what was declared in ElBaradei's recent report (which indicated the Islamic Republic's nuclear program had been peaceful), the U.S. intelligence report referred to an IAEA report that was issued on September 24, 2005 in which ElBaradei had violated the agency's regulations by stating that the UN Security C
Global Research, December 6, 2007
tehrantimes.com/
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=158570
Clandestine aims of NIE report
by Parviz Esmaeili, Tehran Times, 6 December 2007
The latest U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear program was released on Monday and caused various reactions.
The report by the U.S. intelligence community is the consensus view of all 16 U.S. spy agencies, including the CIA.
Unfortunately, in Iran many people hastily responded positively, and even some government officials expressed the view that the report was favorable to Iran.
This case is similar to the recent report by International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, which was called totally positive.
However, like always, ElBaradei's report gave short shrift to Iran's cooperation and the transparency of its nuclear activities but highlighted the alleged ambiguities cited by Western intelligence agencies and their unsubstantiated accusations.
In any case, the issue is not over the contents of ElBaradei's report, because the IAEA director general's claim that the process of Iran's cooperation with the agency is slowing down should have given Iranian officials a signal to be more cautious in evaluating the Arab diplomat's five-page report.
Now the U.S. intelligence agencies' report is being treated in the same hasty and offhand manner as ElBaradei's report was.
Although it is expected that the heavy challenges of the past few years would have made our diplomacy more proficient, it seems that the rashness in adopting stances, the novice diplomatic moves, and the misanalysis of the nature of such reports will cause some problems for us in the future.
What is the content of the U.S. intelligence report?
The intelligence agencies' report can interestingly be divided into evaluations with "high confidence" and "moderate confidence".
The conclusions that are made with high certainty are:
"In fall 2003 (September), Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program."
Attention: The abovementioned time is exactly after an agreement was made with three European countries, and Iran suspended its uranium enrichment activities.
Moreover, contrary to what was declared in ElBaradei's recent report (which indicated the Islamic Republic's nuclear program had been peaceful), the U.S. intelligence report referred to an IAEA report that was issued on September 24, 2005 in which ElBaradei had violated the agency's regulations by stating that the UN Security C
Out of curiosity what is Iran's current ability to produce weapons grade uranium or plutonium? Are the current centrifuges sufficient or do they need a different technology? Without building new centrifuges how quickly could they produce enough uranium to build 1 bomb, 10 bombs 100 bombs 1000 bombs or a million bombs. India, Pakistan and North Korea built the bomb without us knowing so can we really be so confident that Iran isn't building one? Why are some on the left so egger to jump to the defense of a holocaust denier? A man who thinks there are no homosexuals in Iran because his police do a good job of killing them all.
Iran's known centrifuges... in their current configuration are not capable of refining fissionable material to the point where they could produce nuclear bomb quality material.
Centrifuges are not 100% efficient. A single centrifuge can only increase purity by a tiny amount. To increase the purity beyond the ability of a single centrifuge requires hooking the output of one centrifuge into the input of another centrifuge. The more centrifuges joined together sequentially, the greater the resulting purity. To make reactor grade material, requires hundreds of centrifuges hooked together sequentially. To produce weapons grade material requires thousands of centrifuges hooked together sequentially.
Iran has thousands of centrifuges configured to produce a high volume of reactor grade material rather than a small volume of weapon grade material. If Iran took all their centrifuges and put them in a single chain, and if they knew what they were doing, and if the centrifuges were modified to handle the higher purity... then its likely Iran could produce small amounts of weapons grade material. But the IAEA would notice that.
If Iran ever did produce enough refined uranium for a bomb, they could probably build a primitive uranium bomb without too much trouble. The major obstacle for making a nuclear weapons is mastering refining technology.
Another problem is coming. Once Iran has their reactor up and running they will be able to make plutonium. Plutonium from a reactor already starts out at a high purity (relative to naturally occuring fissionable uranium). The number of centrifuges required to refine plutonium would likely be less (I'm speculating). However it would be a different process since plutonium has different properties (and therefore problems) than uranium. Iran will likely want to refine plutonium for fuel for their reactor, since its cheaper than uranium. That activity would also be NPT compliant up to a certain level of purity.
Iran voluntarily allows the IAEA to monitor their facilities. If they were to reconfigure their centrifuges to produce weapon grade material, the IAEA would notice provided they are allowed to monitor Iran's facilities. IAEA monitoring is a voluntary NPT protocol which Iran began complying with after they acquired centrifuge technology.
IAEA monitoring can make sure Iran isn't trying to produce nuclear weapons, if they are aware of all of Iran's nuclear facilities. In return for allowing the IAEA to monitor their program, the IAEA is mandated to assist Iran by helping them procure equipment and material for their peaceful program. At least that's what the NPT and the IAEA's mandate say.
Instead, the IAEA under pressure from the US and other nations has tried to block Iran's peaceful nuclear program in violation of the NPT and the IAEA's mandate.
Anti-Iranian propaganda has tried to twist voluntary protocols to sound like mandatory ones and to make a peaceful program sound like clandestine nuclear weapon production.
But the information we know about Iran doesn't prove Iran's intentions are peaceful. Iran could be using the same nuclear technology in secret to produce nuclear weapons. But neither the IAEA or anyone else has any proof that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapon program. What we know is what Iran has declared and what the IAEA has found. So far everything known, declared and found support Iran's claims that they have a peaceful nuclear program.
Centrifuges are not 100% efficient. A single centrifuge can only increase purity by a tiny amount. To increase the purity beyond the ability of a single centrifuge requires hooking the output of one centrifuge into the input of another centrifuge. The more centrifuges joined together sequentially, the greater the resulting purity. To make reactor grade material, requires hundreds of centrifuges hooked together sequentially. To produce weapons grade material requires thousands of centrifuges hooked together sequentially.
Iran has thousands of centrifuges configured to produce a high volume of reactor grade material rather than a small volume of weapon grade material. If Iran took all their centrifuges and put them in a single chain, and if they knew what they were doing, and if the centrifuges were modified to handle the higher purity... then its likely Iran could produce small amounts of weapons grade material. But the IAEA would notice that.
If Iran ever did produce enough refined uranium for a bomb, they could probably build a primitive uranium bomb without too much trouble. The major obstacle for making a nuclear weapons is mastering refining technology.
Another problem is coming. Once Iran has their reactor up and running they will be able to make plutonium. Plutonium from a reactor already starts out at a high purity (relative to naturally occuring fissionable uranium). The number of centrifuges required to refine plutonium would likely be less (I'm speculating). However it would be a different process since plutonium has different properties (and therefore problems) than uranium. Iran will likely want to refine plutonium for fuel for their reactor, since its cheaper than uranium. That activity would also be NPT compliant up to a certain level of purity.
Iran voluntarily allows the IAEA to monitor their facilities. If they were to reconfigure their centrifuges to produce weapon grade material, the IAEA would notice provided they are allowed to monitor Iran's facilities. IAEA monitoring is a voluntary NPT protocol which Iran began complying with after they acquired centrifuge technology.
IAEA monitoring can make sure Iran isn't trying to produce nuclear weapons, if they are aware of all of Iran's nuclear facilities. In return for allowing the IAEA to monitor their program, the IAEA is mandated to assist Iran by helping them procure equipment and material for their peaceful program. At least that's what the NPT and the IAEA's mandate say.
Instead, the IAEA under pressure from the US and other nations has tried to block Iran's peaceful nuclear program in violation of the NPT and the IAEA's mandate.
Anti-Iranian propaganda has tried to twist voluntary protocols to sound like mandatory ones and to make a peaceful program sound like clandestine nuclear weapon production.
But the information we know about Iran doesn't prove Iran's intentions are peaceful. Iran could be using the same nuclear technology in secret to produce nuclear weapons. But neither the IAEA or anyone else has any proof that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapon program. What we know is what Iran has declared and what the IAEA has found. So far everything known, declared and found support Iran's claims that they have a peaceful nuclear program.
Earth_as_one,
Thank you for your response. Your post seems knowledge able and well thought out. I hope for the worlds sake you are right. Given Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric and that many courtiers were able to secretly develop the bomb I’m not nearly as confident as you.
As for the requirement of needing thousands of centrifuges to produce the bomb is that true? Can you use feedback in order to get a greater purity conversion out of a single centrifuge. I agree that at the end of the day your won’t be able to produce as much but how much needs to be produced? What is the output capacity for each centrifuge? What is the initial purity of uranium? How much does each centrifuge increase the purity by?
As for peaceful applications of centrifuges it is my understanding that centrifuges separate the heavier material from the lighter material. If the heavier material is for the reactors what do they do with the lighter material? Do they just throw it away? Is this economical?
Thank you for your response. Your post seems knowledge able and well thought out. I hope for the worlds sake you are right. Given Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric and that many courtiers were able to secretly develop the bomb I’m not nearly as confident as you.
As for the requirement of needing thousands of centrifuges to produce the bomb is that true? Can you use feedback in order to get a greater purity conversion out of a single centrifuge. I agree that at the end of the day your won’t be able to produce as much but how much needs to be produced? What is the output capacity for each centrifuge? What is the initial purity of uranium? How much does each centrifuge increase the purity by?
As for peaceful applications of centrifuges it is my understanding that centrifuges separate the heavier material from the lighter material. If the heavier material is for the reactors what do they do with the lighter material? Do they just throw it away? Is this economical?
This seems to back up your claim
As a side not the following is interesting reading.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zippe-type_centrifuge
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_program_of_Iran
As a side not the following is interesting reading.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zippe-type_centrifuge
I remember the headline. I posted something here about it at the time. 3.5% is barely refined enough to run a reactor. But it crosses a threshold.
Iran has a lot more centrifuges now. I would expect they have increased purity and quantity.
The next threshold is 20%
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enriched_uranium
Iran's reactor does not require more than 20% enriched uranium. As far as I know, 20% is also less than what is required to make a bomb. Iran remains NPT compliant as long as it doesn't possess any material purer than 20%.
The other issue is tracking Iran's uranium from source to destination. Iran doesn't need to import uranium.
The IAEA must watch the entire fuel cycle and Iran has to account for every gram of fissionable material from mining, through processing, burning and finally longterm storage. Diverted material or unaccounted for material could be a violation of the NPT.
Iran would be stupid to try to build a nuke. Most likely Syria will possess nukes before Iran.
Iran has a lot more centrifuges now. I would expect they have increased purity and quantity.
The next threshold is 20%
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enriched_uranium
Iran's reactor does not require more than 20% enriched uranium. As far as I know, 20% is also less than what is required to make a bomb. Iran remains NPT compliant as long as it doesn't possess any material purer than 20%.
The other issue is tracking Iran's uranium from source to destination. Iran doesn't need to import uranium.
The IAEA must watch the entire fuel cycle and Iran has to account for every gram of fissionable material from mining, through processing, burning and finally longterm storage. Diverted material or unaccounted for material could be a violation of the NPT.
Iran would be stupid to try to build a nuke. Most likely Syria will possess nukes before Iran.
``There is tons of literature about how he came to power and none of it involve the CIA or America.``
We've gone thru this radical right wing myth before but since you brought it up:
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/217.html
CIA = reich wing power broker and friend of the Republicans
We've gone thru this radical right wing myth before but since you brought it up:
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/217.html
CIA = reich wing power broker and friend of the Republicans
`` On April 11, 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully enriched uranium.``
We discussed this last year as well: he said it was low grade uranium which has no military capability.
How about posting that retort, again?
We discussed this last year as well: he said it was low grade uranium which has no military capability.
How about posting that retort, again?
Low grade uranium has no military capability? To a military who inflicted death sentences - Gulf War syndrome - on anyone who came in contact with the effects of depleted uranium - an existence denied for more than ten years? Sometimes, you wonder who your friends really are.
Woof!
Woof!
s243a asked good questions. I am grateful for his contribution. I also didn't know that Iran was using Zippe centrifuges. Thanks for the insight s243a.
Back on track. This thread claims Ahmadinejad has been truthful. I'm not convinced. I just believe no proof of an Iranian NPT violation exists. But absense of proof is not proof of absence.
I suspect Syria is the country to watch. They can developing nukes with Iran's help. Iran can develop ICBMs. At some point these two countries will possess ICBMs and Nukes between them. At which point they will be able to put a Syrian nuke on an Iranian ICBM. That has to be the master plan. But the purpose for these nations to acquire nuke ICBMs won't be to launch a pre-emptive strike, but prevent Israel from using their nukes. The final battle will be between militants armed with man-portable munitions and Israeli tanks and attack helicopters. Israel has to win every battle. Their adversaries need only win once.
Back on track. This thread claims Ahmadinejad has been truthful. I'm not convinced. I just believe no proof of an Iranian NPT violation exists. But absense of proof is not proof of absence.
I suspect Syria is the country to watch. They can developing nukes with Iran's help. Iran can develop ICBMs. At some point these two countries will possess ICBMs and Nukes between them. At which point they will be able to put a Syrian nuke on an Iranian ICBM. That has to be the master plan. But the purpose for these nations to acquire nuke ICBMs won't be to launch a pre-emptive strike, but prevent Israel from using their nukes. The final battle will be between militants armed with man-portable munitions and Israeli tanks and attack helicopters. Israel has to win every battle. Their adversaries need only win once.
Really, does the figurehead of the day or the governing party really matter? That's not the power. It's just the mouthpiece for whomever it is who REALLY pulls the strings.
Woof!
I’m trying to gauge by Iranian centrifuge technology how many centrifuges it would take Iran to produce weapons grad Uranium. I used a simple difference model:
Impurity(n+1)=Impurity
*0.965
Purity=1-Impurity
I’m using fractions instead of percent so 0.035 is equivalent to 3.5%
n is how many hundreds of centrifuges Iran builds
I just used an excel spreadsheet. I could work out the formula later. The results are given bellow:
With this model it would take Iran 700 centrifuges to produce a great enough purity for their reactor (requires 20% purity) and it would take them 6700 centrifuges to produce weapons grade purity. So for peaceful purposes the would get just over 1/10th of the way there.
However with better centrifuge technology like the Zippe it would take a lot fewer centrifuges. Also I wonder if they can use feedback to reduce the number of centrifuges required.
Impurity(n+1)=Impurity
*0.965Purity=1-Impurity
I’m using fractions instead of percent so 0.035 is equivalent to 3.5%
n is how many hundreds of centrifuges Iran builds
I just used an excel spreadsheet. I could work out the formula later. The results are given bellow:
Code:
N Impurity Purity
1 0.965 0.035
2 0.931225 0.068775
3 0.898632125 0.101367875
4 0.867180001 0.132819999
5 0.836828701 0.163171299
6 0.807539696 0.192460304
7 0.779275807 0.220724193
8 0.752001153 0.247998847
9 0.725681113 0.274318887
10 0.700282274 0.299717726
11 0.675772395 0.324227605
12 0.652120361 0.347879639
13 0.629296148 0.370703852
14 0.607270783 0.392729217
15 0.586016306 0.413983694
16 0.565505735 0.434494265
17 0.545713034 0.454286966
18 0.526613078 0.473386922
19 0.50818162 0.49181838
20 0.490395263 0.509604737
21 0.473231429 0.526768571
22 0.456668329 0.543331671
23 0.440684938 0.559315062
24 0.425260965 0.574739035
25 0.410376831 0.589623169
26 0.396013642 0.603986358
27 0.382153165 0.617846835
28 0.368777804 0.631222196
29 0.355870581 0.644129419
30 0.34341511 0.65658489
31 0.331395581 0.668604419
32 0.319796736 0.680203264
33 0.30860385 0.69139615
34 0.297802716 0.702197284
35 0.287379621 0.712620379
36 0.277321334 0.722678666
37 0.267615087 0.732384913
38 0.258248559 0.741751441
39 0.24920986 0.75079014
40 0.240487514 0.759512486
41 0.232070451 0.767929549
42 0.223947986 0.776052014
43 0.216109806 0.783890194
44 0.208545963 0.791454037
45 0.201246854 0.798753146
46 0.194203214 0.805796786
47 0.187406102 0.812593898
48 0.180846888 0.819153112
49 0.174517247 0.825482753
50 0.168409144 0.831590856
51 0.162514824 0.837485176
52 0.156826805 0.843173195
53 0.151337867 0.848662133
54 0.146041041 0.853958959
55 0.140929605 0.859070395
56 0.135997069 0.864002931
57 0.131237171 0.868762829
58 0.12664387 0.87335613
59 0.122211335 0.877788665
60 0.117933938 0.882066062
61 0.11380625 0.88619375
62 0.109823031 0.890176969
63 0.105979225 0.894020775
64 0.102269952 0.897730048
65 0.098690504 0.901309496
66 0.095236336 0.904763664
67 0.091903065 0.908096935With this model it would take Iran 700 centrifuges to produce a great enough purity for their reactor (requires 20% purity) and it would take them 6700 centrifuges to produce weapons grade purity. So for peaceful purposes the would get just over 1/10th of the way there.
However with better centrifuge technology like the Zippe it would take a lot fewer centrifuges. Also I wonder if they can use feedback to reduce the number of centrifuges required.
This might help:
re: Gas Centrifuges
50,000 could be enough centrifuges to make 50 bombs a year, if they were cascaded properly. But the IAEA has verified that Iran's centrifuges have been configured for making reactor fuel, not nuclear weapons.
re: Gas Centrifuges
50,000 could be enough centrifuges to make 50 bombs a year, if they were cascaded properly. But the IAEA has verified that Iran's centrifuges have been configured for making reactor fuel, not nuclear weapons.
Last edited:
Thanks for the links earth_as_one. What do you think of the following quote:
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1016/more-on-iran-timeline
This is interesting:
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1073/iranian-centrifuge-developments
Posted May 12, 2006
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1073/iranian-centrifuge-developments