Why Americans should give thanks for the British Empire
- Thread starter Blackleaf
- Start date
Can you prove that, love? Can you prove that WWII would have been lost were it not for the Yanks?
All the evidence in the world would not penetrate that thick skull of yours. Your revisionist view of history is hysterical Blackhead. It was not just the Yanks, but the Canadians, Aussies and in particular, the Gurkas that pulled your sorry azzes out of the fire.
It's time you stopped trying to deny well-known, established history. You're clearly in denial, here. At the onset of WWII, as every school pupil knows, the Royal Navy ruled the waves. Britain had a vast, vast naval force. It was the largest naval force on Earth and had been for 200 years. Britannia ruled the waves.
As for your silly claim that the Jap Navy was somehow the largest in the world in 1939 - It was only the third-largest in the world at the beginning of the Pacific War in December 1941.
ROYAL NAVY
At the beginning of the War, the Royal Navy was the most powerful in the world. It had the largest number of ships and a network of naval bases and coaling stations around the globe.
Before mobilisation the strength of the Navy was 9,762 officers and 109,170 ratings. In January 1939 there were in addition 51,485 men in the Royal Fleet Reserve, 10,038 in the Royal navy Reserve (mainly serving in the Merchant Navy), 2,049 in the Royal Navy Auxiliary Sick Berth and Wireless Auxiliary reserves, and 6,180 in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.
Battleships: 15 (2 Nelson, 1 Hood, 2 Renown, 5 Royal Sovereign, 5 Queen Elizabeth) Under construction: 9 (5 King George V)
Aircraft carriers: 7 (1 Ark Royal, 2 Courageous, 1 Furious, 1 Eagle, 1 Hermes, 1 Argus) Under construction: 6
Heavy cruisers: 15 (2 Exeter, 13 County)
Light cruisers: 41 (2 Edinburgh, 8 Southampton, 4 Artehusa, 3 Sydney (Australian), 5 Leander (2 New Zealand), 2 Emerald, 3 Effingham, 8 Despatch, 2 Cardiff, 3 Caledon, 1 Adelaide (Australian) Under construction: 9
Anti-aircraft cruisers: 8 (8 Cairo) Under construction: 16
Minelayer cruisers: 1 (Adventure) Under construction: 1
Modern destroyers: 113 Under construction: 24
Old destroyers: 68
Modern submatines: 52 Under construction: 11
Old submarines: 12
Escorts: 54 (4 Australia, 2 Indian) Under construction: 80
Fleet minesweepers: 44 Under construction: 10
Monitors: 2
Fleets 1939 - British Royal Navy, French Navy and German Kriegsmarine
Prove it. It's no good just SAYING it.
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And the Japanese STILL chased you out of the Pacific!
Man your navy must have been the most incompetent navy before and during WWII.
Man your navy must have been the most incompetent navy before and during WWII.
Is that what they told you in your American history lessons?
I was always taught that the vast Royal Navy set up its own British Pacific Fleet in 1944 consisting of 6 fleet carriers, 4 light carriers, 9 escort carriers and 2 aircraft maintenance carriers, with a total of more than 750 aircraft, 4 battleships, 11 cruisers, 35 destroyers, 14 Frigates, 44 smaller warships, 31 submarines, and 54 large vessels in the fleet train. The BPF alone was larger than the entire navies of most countries.
The aircraft carriers were: Colossus, Formidable, Glory, Illustrious, Implacable, Indefatigable, Indomitable, Venerable, Vengeance, Victorious, Pioneer and Unicorn.
The escort carriers were: Arbiter, Chaser, Fencer, Ruler, Reaper, Slinger, Speaker, Striker and Vindex.
I've asked for proof that Britain would not have won the war without US intervention - and I haven't got any.
There's a lot of revisionism going on here, but it's not from me.
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You're asking for proof based on a hypothetical situation? You're more of an idiot than I thought.
It's not your fault, your a product of the establishment you live in, you have my sympathies.
Where's your proof that Britain would not have gone on to win WWII were it not America joining the conflict?
Many historians are of the belief that Britain would still have gone on to win the war without the US joining the conflict.
You and your mates, however, believe that America "saves British butts." I just want to see some good reasoning behind your dubious logic rather than just you claiming it. It's no good you just saying it.
Oh the battles between the RN and IJN are still told about to this very day!
After the IJN put the HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales to the bottom the RN tore azz out of their and did not come back until it was practically over.
We are saying many nations came to the aid of the Briddish. Your armies were pushed into the English Channel. Canada, the Anzacs, India, the US... the list goes on and on. Churchill was begging for help.
Who is to say? lol (right back at you)
You bailed from the Pacific.
And the Germans ****ed up by not destroying them. Why Adolf allowed thousands of British, French and Belgian soldiers to get away scot free to be used again later in the war is still a mystery.
Show me the historical evidence of that.
They pushed you into the sea. You were combat ineffective.
You weren't there. It is simple.
Thanks you for losing the 'war'?
Perhaps the whole thing was just another false flag for the ones that were doing the 'grunt work'? If 'escape' was the goal then why is money that is equal to about how much income-tax that is collected is sent to the country that 'lost the war'? (Canada is no different except for the war part, we were just 'granted' independence' but the same thing happens here, just about the amount that is collected in income-tax is sent overseas, probably first to the Bank of England and then to their owners.
How many times did North America come to your 'rescue' in the last 100 years, comrade black is the leaf.?
Perhaps the whole thing was just another false flag for the ones that were doing the 'grunt work'? If 'escape' was the goal then why is money that is equal to about how much income-tax that is collected is sent to the country that 'lost the war'? (Canada is no different except for the war part, we were just 'granted' independence' but the same thing happens here, just about the amount that is collected in income-tax is sent overseas, probably first to the Bank of England and then to their owners.
How many times did North America come to your 'rescue' in the last 100 years, comrade black is the leaf.?
And what happened to all those hundreds of thousands of troops? They were escorted back to the safety of England to be used again in the war, and the Krauts missed their chance to kill them all and cause Britain a serious mishap. The Germans allowing all the troops to get away scot free was a massive mistake, one that came back to haunt them because it boosted Britain in North Africa.
I want the actual historical proof that the Royal Navy was knocked out of the Pacific War. After all, you said it was, and you seem quite knowledgeable in such matters. I just want the actual material which says so, something which denies that the British Pacific Fleet was to be used in an invasion of Japan.
Digging holes on the briddish beaches while the Anzacs, then US whipped them in N. Africa.
The RN was chased from the Pacific. They showed up when it was practically over.
It's not a mystery at all, he hoped to avoid the destruction of Europe you common propagandist drunkard and the outright holocausic murder of millions of innocent people to feed the banking Lizards the blood they must have. one hundred million barely sufficed to satiate thier lust.
The war in Africa was to play a key role in the overall success of the Allies in World War Two. Within the Africa scenario, In the initial stages of World War Two, the Allies did not do well. The Battle of Britain gave British people hope after the despair of Dunkirk, but the first real ‘taste’ of success was to come in Africa with Montgomery’s victory over Rommel’s Afrika Korps.
The British Army was in Egypt to protect the Suez Canal. The use of this canal allowed a vast amount of time to be cut for journeys taken from Europe to the Far East. If Britain controlled the Suez then Nazi Germany and the other Axis powers could not use it.
Also if the Allies could build up bases in North Africa there was always the potential to launch an attack on what Churchill called the “soft underbelly of Europe” – Italy or Yugoslavia. Hitler also feared this.
By 1941, the Italian army had been all but beaten and Hitler had to send German troops to North Africa to clear out Allied troops. The German force was lead by Erwin Rommel – one of the finest generals of the war.
In March 1941, Rommel attacked the Allies in Libya. By May 1941, they had been pushed back into Egypt and only Tobruk held out against the “Desert Fox”.
In June 1941, General Wavell started “Operation Battleaxe” to help Tobruk. It failed as the Allied force was simply too small to defeat the Afrika Korps. Churchill sacked Wavell and replaced him with General Claude Auchinleck. He planned an attack on Rommel for November 1941 with the same aspiration of helping Tobruk. The attack succeeded and Rommel was forced into a retreat.
By January 1942, Rommel had re-organised his forces and hit back – with success. He was stopped when he reached Gazala.
Rommel’s skill was fighting with the bare minimum. Germany at this time had soldiers on three fronts – France, Russia and North Africa. The German army was spread over a vast area and 2\3rds of the army was based in Russia with a proportionate amount of equipment including vital oil supplies.
In May 1942, Rommel began a new attack. He was later to comment that although the British forces had more weaponry than him, they used such equipment in a poor way – “bit by bit”
In June 1942, Tobruk fell. 35,000 Allied troops were taken prisoner. This was more men than Rommel had at his disposal.
Auchinleck retreated to El Alamein and in July 1942 the first battle took place. Rommel’s attack faltered only because he ran out of supplies, especially fuel. German supply routes were being hindered by newly formed special forces units – the SAS and Long Range Desert Group. Both these forces did great damage to Rommel’s supply lines and played a major part in halting Rommel’s advance.
Despite success, Auchinleck was sacked and replaced by 2 generals. General Alexander was put in overall command and Bernard Montgomery was put in charge of the Eighth Army (the Desert Rats). `Monty` took time to consolidate his forces and by October 1942 he had 230,000 men and 1400 tanks whereas Rommel had 80,000 men and 500 tanks.
“The battle which is about to begin will be one of the most important battles in history. It will be the turning point of the war.” Montgomery
The Second Battle of El Alamein started on October 23rd 1942 with a massive bombardment of German lines by 800 big guns. This was followed by bombing by planes before the tanks were sent into battle. Rommel was forced to retreat under this devastating assault and started to do so on November 3rd 1942. This time he was not given the time to re-group his force as the Allies did not give him the time to do so. Equally as important was the Americans (who joined the campaign in May 1942) landing in Algeria which meant that Rommel was trapped between the British forces and the advancing American forces. Rommel wanted to evacuate troops before the inevitable happened but Hitler expressly forbade it. Rommel was flown out of North Africa but 130,000 Germans surrendered and by May 1943 the war in North Africa was over.
Why was it so important?
The Africa Korps contained some of Hitler’s finest soldiers and a vast amount of first class equipment was lost by the Germans including the newly designed battle tanks.
Also this victory did expose the south of Italy to invasion and the Allies duly invaded Sicily which would be used as a springboard for an invasion of mainland Italy and from there parts of Germany in the south could be bombed to bring more devastation to Hitler’s Germany. The victory at El Alamein also showed that Hitler’s army was not invincible.
War in North Africa - History Learning Site
You keep saying that but you've not provided any evidence for that yet.
I've already told you that the vast British Pacific Fleet was to be involved in an invasion of Japan, until the Nips surrendered.
You really have to stop listening to American "historians." They're terrible for revisionism. What you Yanks get taught is a load of old bunkum.
I've noticed you failed to mention the Yanks getting kicked out of the Philippines (yet you are too keen to mention Dunkirk and Malaya and Singapore). At least the British were able to blame the French for Dunkirk. Who do the Yanks blame for being kicked out of the Philippines?
The British Pacific Fleet - Misinterpreting the past
The British aircraft carriers HMS Indomitable (R92), HMS Indefatigable (R10), HMS Unicorn (I72), HMS Illustrious (R87), HMS Victorious (R38 ) and HMS Formidable (R67) at anchor
I have just finished H. P. Willmott's PhD thesis, published as Grave of a Dozen Schemes. It is a comprehensive analysis of the background to the despatch of the British Pacific Fleet to the final months of the war against Japan.
It is highly researched, very detailed, excellently argued, and completely wrong in its conclusions.
The interesting question is why is it wrong?
For those who don't know (such as most of the American official historians if you go by their writings), The Royal Navy and its Commonwealth divisions made a huge contribution to the defeat of Japan despite American Admiral King's desperate attempts to keep them out of his private war. The combined orders of battle of the British Eastern Fleet (just finished invading Burma and en-route to invading Malaya), and the British Pacific Fleet (assembling in Australia or fighting off the coast of Japan) at the time of the Japanese surrender was about 700 ships (with more en-route from Europe). This included 6 battleship, 35 aircraft carriers, 23 cruisers, 42 submarines, and over 200 destroyers and escorts. The only reason that it was this low was because the RN was still mostly responsible for major Allied activities in the Atlantic, Arctic Circle, Baltic, Mediterranean, and Indian Oceans. Far more vessels would have been available for the invasion of Japan.
Wilmott's description of the torturous process of getting all the British, Commonwealth and American players to agree on the assembly and dispatch of this force is overwhelmingly detailed. The problems of the repeated failure of the Germans to collapse, and then the suprisingly quick collapse of the Japanese thereafter, is also adequately covered. I have no problems with most of this. What I do have problems with is the conclusions he makes.
Wilmott's main argument is that Britain should not have bothered with this effort, or at least should not have tried to make both the Pacific and Indian Ocean efforts, because it was beyond British power to do so. The factor's he raises are economic exhaustion, lack of ships - particularly fleet train, lack of manpower, and lack of sensible reasons for bothering given that Empire was a thing of the past. He argues all of this with the assumptions of hindsight , and from the safety of a modern academic consensus.
How then is it possible that the Royal Navy had so many ships there at the end, with more on the way? How was it possible that the British successfully invaded Burma, and were preparing to invade Malaya, even while expanding the British fleet operating off the Japanese coast? How could they be doing everything he had assumed was impossible, and succeeding, if it had really been impossible? Why is he arguing so hard against conclusions that his own statistics make evident?
Could it be that he believes what he is saying so strongly, that he is just doing his best to argue around the evidence? Could it be that he is trying to cement his place in academic circles by arguing what is politically correct regardless of the evidence? Or could it be that he knows he is making bad arguments, but also knows he has to do so if he stands any chance of getting a high mark for his PhD from academics who have pre-conceived notions of what they want to hear?
Whatever the reason, the problem is one common to far too many modern academic works. (This was published in 1996 but came out of research originally done in the early 80's.) The author appears to have approached the work with a pre-conceived notion of how things ought to have been viewed, and then forced the facts into that prospective by hook or by crook. (Even if a few slipped out of control in the process.)
The fact is, that the real debate was between Churchill's geo-political preference for British efforts in the Far East to be concentrated on Malaya, the East Indies, Borneo, the China Sea and Hong Kong in the lead up to the invasion of Japan: and the Chief of Staff Committee's strategic preference to just make a contribution to the naval actions in the Pacific as a cheaper and quicker alternative. (Both considered the efforts wasted on Burma pretty pointless considering that China was never of much value in the war, and both were amused that the eventual speed of Japanese collapse made the Chinese fantasy redundant.) This debate went on for several months.
Wilmott is justified in calling a lot of this debate hot air. He is less justified in claiming that hindsight makes it clear that Churchill's perspective was wrong. He is unconvincing in the argument that everyone should have known that Britain lacked interest in what would happen in Asia in the future. He was, by his own figures, simply wrong to state that Britain lacked the capacity to try.
The debate did take too long, but that might be because things kept changing. Eisenhower's failures in North West Europe, and Germany's surprise survival into a new year, meant that Allied forces could not begin redirection to the east in October 1944 as had been planned. On the other hand Japan's suicidal offensive against India in 1944 opened the opportunity for a faster and cheaper re-conquest of Burma than anyone would have imagined. Similarly Allied plans for offensives through Borneo to Formosa (Taiwan) were initially agreed, then dropped when MacArthur preferred the Philippines, and were then renewed with the Allies agreeing to a British-Australian offensive instead. Only to be dropped again when it became clear that Japan was unexpectedly on its last legs.
Politically, there is no doubt that had the Allies, or just Britain and Australia, militarily ousted the Japanese from Malaya, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Chinese coast: the decades of violence throughout Asia that followed would have been very different. Churchill's plans may not have been better than what we got, but they would certainly have been different.
Similarly there is no eason to accept that Britain was going to withdraw 'East of Suez' soon after the war at the time decisions were being made. In hindsight it is clear that the British voter was sick of the cost of being the world's policeman, and delighted that the Americans seemed dumb enough to want to take it up. But the Allied documents at the time make it clear that no such plans were in the allied 'mind'. Indeed, American plans to go home as soon as the war in Europe was over argued exactly the opposite.
Then there is the issue of 'power'. Britain, and most of her Dominions and colonies, were at the stage of exhaustion in 1944-5 that any state reaches after 6 years of intense war. (The US was lucky to get out in only 4 years, when the cracks in manpower for the army were only starting to rear their heads.) Nonetheless the way that Wilmott argues that Britain lacked the 'power' for such operations is also self-defeating. After dozens of paragraphs over hundreds of pages about the British lack of troop lift shipping available for the Far East, Wilmott notes in a small aside that such ships can't be spared because Britain is responsible for moving 70,000 US troops per month across the Atlantic. The fact that Britain lacked resources in one theatre because she is making up for American lack of resources in another theatre is studiously ignored.
The truth is of course that the Allies - all of them - lacked the resources to do everything they wanted to do at any time. Britain could have sent plenty of resources to the east had she not being transporting the Americans, supplying the Russians, and feeding the Dutch. Similarly Australia had plenty of resources, food and troops for supporting British Commonwealth operations, except they were deployed to feed, house and support American operations. Indeed according to the US Chiefs of Staff in 1943, America lacked the power to invade Japan without a British fleet, Australian troops, and a Russian Army intervening on the mainland in Asia. (The US COS had a brief hubris in late 1944 when they decided they could manage alone, but by mid 1945 they were busy requesting Britain get 50 aircraft carriers assembled to support 120 of theirs for the invasion... and an army corps please... don't forget landing ships... how about some bombers...)
The simple fact of the matter is that had Britain concentrated its Pacific Fleet resources in the Indian Ocean and Australia to follow the 'middle strategy', it would have been little more costly than the immense effort of projecting a fleet through the central Pacific to the Japanese islands. Malaya, the East Indies, Borneo, possibly Thailand, all might have been liberated before the Japanese surrender by the same shipping efforts that put British carriers at Okinawa and Japan.
Wilmott follows the British COS line that a political solution in Asia was less important than a prestige deployment of British units for the invasion of Japan. He quotes American documents suggesting that the lack of such a presence would have been 'unforgivable' to Americans. He claims that it was vital. Again, he is playing hindsight, and again, he is getting it wrong. How much did Admiral King want the RN sticking it's nose in to his private war? How often did the US COS, in their hubris period, say they didn't need help? How much credit do the history books give the British Pacific Fleet? How many American books fail to mention it?
By contrast how much stability might have been achieved had the British Commonwealth effort gone the other way? Would the Malayan Emergency have happened? Would Indonesia have invaded West Papua and East Timor later? How much stability if Japan had surrendered before Russia entered the war? Would China have gone Communist? Would there have been a Korean or Vietnam war? If you really want to go with hindsight, then Churchill's political forward thinking looks considerably more impressive than the limited strategic viewpoint of the British COS.
Hindsight is almost as fun a game as 'what if', but both are dangerous. People have to be judged on the information and realities of the time, not academic theories based on a misinterpretation of hindsight decades later. Books that twist the facts to come to the conclusions that seem most comfortable or acceptable to people with their own barrows to push are always dangerous.
They are also not history books. They are rationalisations.
rethinking history: The British Pacific Fleet - Misinterpreting the past
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