Harper's right: We won't win just by staying
There is no conventional victory in non-conventional warfare. Our task is to make the insurgents' influence irrelevant
LEWIS MACKENZIE
From Thursday's Globe and Mail
March 5, 2009 at 12:00 AM EST
I will never get used to the disconnect between reality and what masquerades as political debate in our House of Commons.
The latest example involves all the partisan posturing over Afghanistan embellished with an apparent dearth of knowledge of things military regarding the Prime Minister's “we're not going to win this war just by staying” comments – on, heaven forbid, CNN.
The usual result of a CNN appearance by any Canadian is elevation to instant celebrity status. But, in this case, the entrails of Mr. Harper's comments regarding the Afghan insurgency continue to be dissected for political gain rather than allowing them to shed some light on a grossly misunderstood campaign.
Past words of encouragement by the Prime Minister to our soldiers while visiting them in Afghanistan – we don't cut and run – have to be understood in the context of the moment and not as literal policy. Anyone who has had the privilege of leading and motivating soldiers understands that. Equally important is the responsibility to be honest when explaining the mission to the country's centre of gravity – the public – while the soldiers do the dirty work for the rest of us.
There is no conventional victory in non-conventional warfare. There is no tickertape parade to mark the defeat of an enemy, nor is there a signing of a surrender document in a railway car in some faraway place. Insurgencies rarely totally disappear. The objective is to reduce them to a manageable scale where they have little impact on the day-to-day lives of the victim country's population. Much like organized crime in a large American city – or, for that matter, a Canadian city, given the influence of street gangs in the past decade. Violent crime exists, and there are areas in some cities you should avoid; but the level of crime does not cause the average citizen to ask: “For safety's sake, perhaps the better option is to join the bad guys.”
The objective in a counterinsurgency is to isolate the insurgents from the support they coerce from the general population through fear and intimidation and to cause their influence to be irrelevant. While the military has a key role to play in achieving this isolation, opportunistic and even frequent victories over the insurgents will not, on their own, guarantee “victory.”
Advantage has to be taken of the fact that, in many cases, particularly in Afghanistan, a significant number of the insurgents can be weaned from the insurgency if they are convinced that their families would be more secure opposing the insurgency rather than supporting it. In too many areas of southern Afghanistan, this is not the case, as there are insufficient NATO, non-NATO and Afghan security forces on the ground to offer the local population a comfortable level of security. Battles are won by our counterinsurgency forces, but 24/7 security of the “liberated” areas is impossible.
Compounding the frustration of those nations that joined the Afghan army and police in fighting the insurgents is the Afghans' diminishing confidence in President Hamid Karzai and his government. Accusations of corruption and incompetence are grist for opponents of the United Nations-sanctioned mission. But it's quite remarkable what the country has achieved by way of representative government since the Taliban were ousted in 2001.
Starting from zero, a mere eight years of experimentation with elections and governance have produced some pretty impressive results – results that will be sacrificed on the altar of international indifference unless we move to put as much emphasis on governance and development as we have on fighting. That won't happen without security, but security without trust in the government and measurable improvements in the quality of life of ordinary Afghans will be a wasted effort. This is not brain surgery.
Anyone who has a passing knowledge of how to reduce an insurgency sings from the same sheet of music. Yet, we have provided less than 30 per cent of the accepted formula that dictates how many soldiers you need to offer security to a local population and ignored for years the critical role played by good governance and development in isolating the insurgents.
I have repeated ad nauseam that “victory” for the NATO forces will be our departure from Afghanistan with an Afghan security force capable of dealing with a much reduced counterinsurgency threat. Many nations are functioning today with insurgents trying to disrupt their populations with little effect while life and business continue as usual: Spain/ETA, Colombia/FARC and Peru/Shining Path provide at least three convincing examples.
Acknowledging that the Afghan insurgency will never be defeated in the near term is merely reality. But it can be made irrelevant, and must be. Canada has played, and will continue to play, more of a role than most in this undertaking.
Retired major-general Lewis MacKenzie was the first commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.