- Weak links between elected legislators and their constituents. When List PR is used, and particularly when seats are allocated in one single national district, as in Namibia or Israel, the system is criticized for destroying the link between voters and their representatives. Where lists are closed, voters have no opportunity to determine the identity of the persons who will represent them and no identifiable representative for their town, district or village, nor can they easily reject an individual representative if they feel that he or she has performed poorly in office or is not the kind of person they would want representing them – e.g., warlords in countries such as Bosnia or Afghanistan. Moreover, in some developing countries where the society is mainly rural, voters’ identification with their region of residence is sometimes considerably stronger than their identification with any political party or grouping. This criticism, however, may relate more to the distinction between systems in which voters vote for parties and systems in which they vote for candidates.
- Excessive entrenchment of power within party headquarters and in the hands of senior party leaderships—especially in closed-list systems. A candidate’s position on the party list, and therefore his or her likelihood of success, is dependent on currying favour with party bosses, while their relationship with the electorate is of secondary importance. In an unusual twist to the List PR system, in Guyana parties publish their list of candidates not ranked but simply ordered alphabetically. This allows party leaders even more scope to reward loyalty and punish independence because seats are only allocated to individuals once the result of the vote is known.
- The need for some kind of recognized party or political groupings to exist. This makes List PR particularly difficult to implement in those societies which do not have parties or have very embryonic and loose party structures, for example, many of the island countries of the Pacific. While technically possible to allow independent candidates to run under various forms of PR, it is difficult and introduces a number of additional complications, particularly as relates to wasted votes.
No system is perfect. But proportional representation has far fewer defects than the blatantly undemocratic plurality system Canada now has. Nations like Germany have a combined system to take care of your concern about weak links between the electorate and their elected representatives, that way there is both direct representation and a more equitable distribution of seats based on percentage.
As for excessive entrenchment of power in party HQs, don't we have that now in Canada? I fail to see that prop rep would in any way change the stranglehold the party executives of the major Canadian parties now have on their parties.
As for new parties - one only has to look at the stratified political scene in the US to realize just how difficult it is to start a new party in a plurality system. The fact that it has happened in Canada in recent years is more due to Canada's regional diversity that its voting system.
I not that you have listed any advantages of the plurality system and suspect that is primarily because there aren't any worth mentioning other than its simplicity and the ability to actually vote for a name (a minor advantage so for as I can see given the fact that most party members act like robots and do as they are told by the party leaders).