What do you mean? Refuse to sign what?
I'm sure you mean Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and not section 15 of the Constitution Act:
15. The Command-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Militia, and of all Naval and Military Forces, of and in Canada, is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen.
It's still clear you don't understand how this works. If Alberta were to pass their own legislation using the notwithstanding clause in the Charter, it would mean over-riding section 15. That would mean that equal treatment before and under the law, and equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination, is no longer treated in Alberta as a fundamental right, under whatever scope they write into the legislation.
If they wrote this legislation, and they nullified this fundamental right, then your argument is destroyed. They have no standing to claim anything regarding discrimination, because they have just nullified it by legislating that it is now operating notwithstanding...Further, they cannot successfully write legislation that over-rides Federal jurisdiction. Supreme Court will overturn it. They cannot successfully write a law to eliminate Federal collection of income tax, which is ultimately the source of the funds allocated in the equalization program. Supreme Court will overturn it.
As an example, Alberta used the notwithstanding clause to include an opposite sex only definition into it's Marriage Act. Their use of the notwithstanding clause allowed them to suspend fundamental rights relating to equality. In the end the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament alone had the authority to define marriage.
Epic fail. Durp.
It's abundantly clear that you do not have a clue about what the notwithstanding clause is.
Was I rude or ignorant in my posts to you?
Here are some links.
Equalization Program in Canada: Overview and Contemporary Issues | Mapleleafweb.com
Equalization payments - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Centre for Constitutional Studies - The Debate over Canada's Equalization Program
First Ministers' conference - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Equalization under then-Prime Minister Paul Martin
Over the years, Canada’s various federal governments have devoted considerable attention to the equalization program and its shortcomings. As mentioned above, the generic solution, and the Atlantic Accords were established in response to provincial grievances, protecting specified provinces from drastic decreases in payments for a limited period. Despite these efforts however, the provinces remain more divided than ever. At the 2004 First Ministers Conference, then Prime Minister Paul Martin met with the Premiers as part of his election promise to negotiate changes to the Canadian equalization program.[xxi] With the atmosphere only slightly less antagonistic than the earlier Conference on Health Care, the delicate formalities were brusquely disrupted when Newfoundland & Labrador Premier, Danny Williams, “stormed home in a huff.”[xxii] Williams accused Martin of reneging on his election promise to allow Newfoundland & Labrador to retain 100 percent of their oil and gas revenues – without decreasing their equalization payments in any way. Across the country, objections were raised over Williams’ “double dipping” and his demands to have the best of both worlds.[xxiii] On the defense, Martin maintained his offer was more than what he had promised: a generous “eight-year deal that would give the province 100 per cent of offshore oil revenues, but would include a cap to keep Newfoundland & Labrador from surpassing the per capita tax revenue of Ontario.”[xxiv] Williams responded by ordering all Canadian flags to be hauled down from his province’s buildings, furiously retorting: “Paul Martin has turned his back on the people of Newfoundland & Labrador when they need him most...Our pride can’t be bought… They're slapping us in the face. I'm not willing to fly that flag anymore in the province.''[xxv]
Equalization under Prime Minister Stephen Harper
In June 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper incited a flurry of controversy with his wobbly stance on the future of the equalization program.[xxviii] The issue in dispute was once again the treatment of non-renewable resources in the calculation of equalization payments. Initially, Harper’s election promise was to exclude all resource revenues and adopt a 10 province standard;[xxix] after five months in parliament as a minority government however, Harper refused to confirm any action before fully considering the recent report (Achieving National Purpose: Putting Equalization Back on Track) submitted by an expert panel in 2006 (commissioned by Harper’s predecessor, Paul Martin in 2004.)[xxx]
The 2006 report was considered a balanced compromise and recommended the following:
Increase funding to the equalization program by $900 million annually.
Use 50 per cent of provincial resource revenues in the formula to determine each province's real fiscal capacity; this would include non-renewable resource revenue.
Amend the national standard to include all ten provinces.
Nullify the side deals with Nova Scotia, Newfoundland & Labrador
A cap should be implemented to ensure that no province ends up with fiscal capacity higher than that of the lowest non-receiving province.
The system requires greater transparency and simplicity.
A similar report was dedicated to funding the Territories:
“Improving Territorial Formula Financing and Strengthening Canada’s Territories.”
http://www.aucc.ca/_pdf/english/programs/cepra/hobson_paper-1.pdf
Pg 29-30
REGIONAL DISPARITY AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982
Section 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982, entitled “Equalization and Regional
Disparities”, is of particular relevance here. It contains two parts, which read as follows:
(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial
legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their
legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the
government of Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians.
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of
making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have
sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services
at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.
These provisions seem to have two sorts of effects on federal responsibilities and
obligations.
First, section 36(1) explicitly recognizes the pursuit of equity as a national
objective that is the joint responsibility of the federal government and the provinces.
This is important since much of what both the federal and provincial levels of governments do has a significant equity dimension. Thus, to the extent that the federal government has an
interest in the equitable delivery of provincial programs, section 36(1) could be used to
justify federal involvement in provincial programs through the spending power. Section
36(1) also enshrines equality of opportunity as an added dimension of equity. That is, it
goes beyond a commitment to the provision of reasonably comparable public services at
reasonably comparable levels of taxation; it commits also to equality of economic
opportunity through regional development policy.
Second, section 36(2) imposes an obligation on the federal government to pursue
equalization objectives, or at least commits it to the principle of making equalization
payments. The section does not restrict what is meant by an equalization payment; it
could include any sort of federal-provincial transfer that has equalizing consequences. As
discussed later, Canada’s Equalization system, that provides for payments from the
federal government to the poorer provinces, contributes explicitly to this objective. Other
transfer schemes, however, do so implicitly. If taken literally, section 36(2) could have
serious implications not only for the structure of the formal Equalization scheme itself,
but for other major federal-provincial transfers as well.
It should be noted that is not clear
to what extent section 36(2) is legally binding, or justifiable, on the federal
government—it is stated as a general principle rather than as a specific obligation.