I’d say you don’t know what I’m talking about but I’m just assuming that you don’t know what I’m talking about, so I might be wrong, just like you might be wrong.
I’m talking about Trump flip-flopping for the last 10 months. I have no idea what you think I’m thinking.
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Anyway, & I know this too might sound crazy, but maybe…just maybe…those currently being targeted by Hamas in Gaza are not all who you think they are. Maybe some are, & maybe several aren’t, but we can always wait and review their court transcripts when they become publicly available I guess, in the nature of due process, etc…
Now maybe…just maybe…the head of the U.S. military's CENTCOM might just have some access to some information that neither of us does. I know, crazy Hasbara talk, but maybe…a day after Trumps announcement about Hamas temporarily policing…some new information has come to light? Maybe it’s a Whoopsies moment? We might just have to wait & see.
Maybe others have also taken a step back and looked at the situation and went, “Hmmm…” with respect to the difference in definitions of the terms “collaborator” and “dissident”.
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Maybe it’s something else. The interesting ones are the ones that are not being shot dead in the street, but the ones that are being dragged out into the public Square or intersection, and then shot in the legs and left there. What do you think is happening there? What is that statement about?
What you posted was word salad.
I’d say you don’t know what I’m talking about but I’m just assuming that you don’t know what I’m talking about, so I might be wrong, just like you might be wrong.
I’m talking about Trump flip-flopping for the last 10 months. I have no idea what you think I’m thinking.
View attachment 31620
Anyway, & I know this too might sound crazy, but maybe…just maybe…those currently being targeted by Hamas in Gaza are not all who you think they are. Maybe some are, & maybe several aren’t, but we can always wait and review their court transcripts when they become publicly available I guess, in the nature of due process, etc…
Now maybe…just maybe…the head of the U.S. military's CENTCOM might just have some access to some information that neither of us does. I know, crazy Hasbara talk, but maybe…a day after Trumps announcement about Hamas temporarily policing…some new information has come to light? Maybe it’s a Whoopsies moment? We might just have to wait & see.
Maybe others have also taken a step back and looked at the situation and went, “Hmmm…” with respect to the difference in definitions of the terms “collaborator” and “dissident”.
View attachment 31621
View attachment 31622
Maybe it’s something else. The interesting ones are the ones that are not being shot dead in the street, but the ones that are being dragged out into the public Square or intersection, and then shot in the legs and left there. What do you think is happening there? What is that statement about?
Trump isn't CENTCOM. CENTCOM can chirp all they want but Hamas is the Govt of Gaza and its their responsibility to have al Qassam police ALL the thugs. This is completely normal in post war transitions.
All nations have treason laws, drug law, theft, fraud, rape and vice laws just like Gaza and in Gaza Hamas is the Govt and al-Qassam now in a policing role. Its their nation not Bibi's, Trump's or General Electric of the lightbulb brigade.
Stop eating the hasbara word salad that is only confusing you. The Isis assholes aren't a "rival gang" thats like calling Hells Angel's rivals of the Govt of Canada. Stop believing the hasbara.
You seem to believe al-Qassam were to drop their weapons instantly. That never happens or was to happen
.You're looking for Phase 2 long before Phase 1 is complete. Hamas doesn't fully disarm until Israel has fully withdrawn.
Here's what to expect
The second phase of the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire agreement—part of U.S. President Donald Trump's broader 20-point peace plan—builds on the initial 60-day truce by aiming for a permanent end to hostilities, but it remains highly contentious and largely unimplemented as of October 15. This phase, which could begin after the first phase's hostage releases and partial Israeli withdrawals conclude, centers on several interconnected elements designed to reshape Gaza's security and governance landscape.
Key provisions include a full Israeli military withdrawal from the territory (currently occupying about 53-58% of Gaza), contingent on verifiable progress toward demilitarization. Hamas would be required to disarm and lay down its weapons, with the Gaza Strip undergoing comprehensive demilitarization under independent international monitoring to dismantle tunnels, weapons facilities, and other offensive infrastructure—estimated to include a 350-400 mile underground network. However, Hamas has explicitly rejected unilateral disarmament as "out of the question," viewing it as a non-negotiable internal Palestinian matter, and no concrete mechanisms (such as cantonment, where weapons are surrendered at supervised sites) have been agreed upon. To bridge this gap temporarily, the plan allows Hamas to function as a Palestinian police force for a limited period to maintain order and prevent chaos, while an International Stabilisation Force (ISF)—comprising U.S., Arab (e.g., Egypt, Jordan), and global partners—deploys to train and vet new Palestinian security personnel, enforce the ceasefire, and avert a power vacuum that could empower rival militants.
In parallel, the phase envisions the release of all remaining living Israeli male hostages (civilians and soldiers) in exchange for additional Palestinian prisoners, solidifying a "sustainable calm" and permanent ceasefire. This would enable unrestricted humanitarian aid, trade, and reconstruction efforts in Gaza, including a proposed special economic zone with trade incentives to "rebuild and energize" the strip—efforts projected to cost over $50-70 billion and generate 55 million tons of rubble over a decade or more.
The broader transition focuses on shifting governance from Hamas to a temporary technocratic and apolitical administration, overseen by an international "Board of Peace" (potentially chaired by Trump and involving figures like former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair). This interim body would manage daily operations, with a gradual handover to a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) from the West Bank, incorporating input from Gaza's civil society and possibly rehabilitated former Hamas members in non-security roles (e.g., as doctors or engineers).
However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has firmly opposed PA involvement, citing its unfitness to govern, while the PA itself remains deeply unpopular among Palestinians due to corruption allegations and irrelevance in Gaza. Without reconciliation mechanisms or broad buy-in, experts warn this could lead to exclusionary policies, anarchy, or Hamas's resurgence—exacerbated by its recent street-level reassertion of control amid the fragile truce.
Overall, the phase's success hinges on resolving these gaps through ongoing U.S.-led negotiations, but deep mistrust, domestic Israeli politics, and Hamas's refusal to concede power make full implementation uncertain, potentially derailing the deal and resuming conflict.
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