In the immediate aftermath of a stormy Sunday in the seas off Crimea, it felt that Russia had played a high gamble, and lost.
Whatever local military advantage they may have gained from a direct military confrontation with Ukraine, the immediate consequences were surely larger. There would be more sanctions, serious ones, a further downward strain on the economy and the rouble.
But the decision by President Poroshenko’s administration to propose martial law shortly after midnight seemed to play into the Kremlin’s hands.
Ukraine convened an emergency meeting of what it called its war cabinet on Sunday after it accused Russia of having fired on three of its vessels in the Black Sea, injuring at least six sailors.
Russia's Federal Security Service, or FSB, confirmed that it had seized what it called three Ukrainian "warships," saying they had trespassed into Russian territorial waters. It said that "weapons were used to force the Ukrainian warships to stop" and that three Ukrainian service members were treated for minor injuries, TASS, the official Russian news agency, reported Sunday night.
The Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry said it had mobilized all naval personnel and had sent all of its ships to sea after what it described as two gunboats and a tugboat came under attack off the coast of Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014.
Russia disputes Ukraine’s version of events: that three of its boats were attacked, fired on and seized without reason as they attempted to access Ukrainian-controlled ports in the Azov Sea. Russia insists that the route of the three Ukrainian vessels was a provocation, and that they had encroached on its maritime territory.
But there were obvious issues with the Russian account. First, the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait are, according to a 2003 treaty, shared waters, with free navigation guaranteed to both Ukrainian and Russian ships. Second, the distress signal received from the Ukrainian boat was approximately 1 kilometre outside of Russian national waters. And, third, a similar party of Ukrainian vessels completed the same trip just a month ago.
Recordings of interchanges between Russian and Ukrainian navy servicemen, released by Ukrainian media, suggest anything other than an orderly interception. In one, a Ukrainian officer is heard desperately radioing an SOS for help. In another, what appear to be Russian officers are heard threatening to shoot to kill, and demanding the Ukrainian crew appear on deck with their hands up.
Russia and Ukraine have been in de facto conflict since at least 2014 — through the aftermath of the Maidan revolution, the toppling of pro-Moscow President Viktor Yanukovych, the annexation of Crimea, and a four-year war in the east that has cost upwards of 10,300 lives.
But this is the first instance where Russia has admitted firing on Ukrainian military objects.
The flashpoint around the Azov Sea, located to the east of Crimea, is itself relatively new. It dates from 2016, around the time Russia began building a bridge between annexed Crimea and the Russian mainland. The Azov Sea is significant for Ukraine in that two important industrial ports are located in the shoreline to the east of Crimea still controlled by Kiev. Access to it is via the Kerch Straight, now intersected by the bridge.
Tensions have been building for several months, with Ukraine complaining Russian border guards have been harassing its commercial boats in an attempt to impose a de facto blockade. As of today the blockade is a fully declared one, with Russia having parked a tanker across the one open part of the Kerch Bridge for “security” reasons. It is unclear when, if ever, shipping lanes will be re-opened.
The Russian seizure of three ships is a severe blow to Ukraine’s navy, and represents about a quarter of its fleet. Little is known of the fate of the 23 servicemen involved, or the six men reported injured (three, according to Russia). But the circumstances in some sense are a replay of the events in Crimea in 2014, during which Russia took over several vessels.
There are several reasons why Russia may have decided to act now while, for example, it didn’t a month ago.
First are the anniversaries of the Maidan revolution and 1932-33 Holodomor famine, when millions of Ukrainians died from a starvation attributed to the Soviet leadership. The publicity from these may well have been an irritating side-factor. Second, Western statements of support and promises of military reinforcement may have encouraged the Kremlin to revert to a traditional policy of acting asymmetrically — making opponents think twice before engaging in further. Third, a worrying decline in the president's rating may have encouraged his administration to reintroduce the Ukrainian bogeyman.
Another theory that has been presented by Ukraine-supporting publicists in the West was that this is an attempt to undermine Petro Poroshenko’s administration and create instability ahead of the presidential elections next March.
But that version seems flawed. If the military turn does one thing, it is to embolden the Poroshenko administration, which has been flagging in the polls far behind the front-runner, former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The threat from Russia is a key part of Poroshenko’s three-prong election offer, plastered on posters across the country: Army, Language, Faith.
It does not take a very cynical mind to connect the president's difficult electoral situation to the proposal to introduce martial law.
No military law was introduced after the much more violent events of 2014 and 2015. Then the possible damage to the Ukrainian economy and cooperation with the International Monetary Fund put the breaks on such a development. Ukraine has argued that this time things are different, with Russia openly admitting to military engagement.
During a short address in his security council, Poroshenko said the imposition of martial law would be limited to 60 days, and would not affect civil liberties. In other words, presidential elections might not be postponed as many had feared, but political rallies will be banned in the meantime.
Much of the damage has already been done. On the one hand, Moscow will be delighted by the renewal of its narrative of a “junta” being in charge in Kiev. On another, Ukrainians will wake up to the clear probability of a military tool being used for short-term electoral advantage.
What effect that will have on its democracy in the long run is anyone’s guess. But it's unlikely to be a good one.
