There is already an Islamic division, and Iran has been the biggest instigator of murder and terrorism since the Islamic Revolution. And for the record- but off the record- most of the people hate their regime. Iran murdered over 10,000 protesters before Donald Trump bombed them. The problem is that Iran has had over 50 years to create a regime of zealotry and murder. It's baked into every institution. So they had no problem murdering 10,000 of their own people for protesting, just as they have had no problem funding terrorism and instability around the world. If Israel ceased to exist, they would just go back to killing each other on a much grander scale.
Is that the current Western storyline? It doesnt work. No flow from chapter to chapter.
Partially accurate on core facts about the regime’s record of repression, popular opposition, and terrorism sponsorship, but with hyperbole, imprecise numbers/timelines, and speculative leaps.
Iranintl
The Islamic Revolution was in 1979 (~47 years before late 2026), so “over 50 years” is a modest stretch. The regime has institutionalized ideological control through bodies like the IRGC, Basij, judiciary, and security apparatus, which routinely suppress dissent.
US State Department reporting has designated Iran the leading state sponsor of terrorism for decades (since the mid-1980s), citing sustained funding, training, weapons, and direction for groups including Hezbollah, Hamas/PIJ, Houthis, and Iraqi/Syrian Shia militias. This has contributed to regional instability, attacks on US/Israeli targets, and broader violence.
Iranintl
On domestic support: Independent surveys (e.g., GAMAAN) and reports of leaked internal Iranian polling consistently show majority opposition to the Islamic Republic—often 70%+ favoring regime change or structural transition, with support for the revolutionary principles/Supreme Leader in the low teens, and high dissatisfaction (including claims around 90%+ in some internal or related data). Opposition is stronger among youth, urban, and educated populations. The “most people hate their regime” claim aligns with available evidence; open polling inside Iran is constrained, so figures carry uncertainty, but the pattern is clear and longstanding.
Iranintl
Protest death tolls: Pre-2025/26 episodes include hundreds to ~1,500 in 2019–20 and ~500–550 in the 2022–23 Mahsa Amini/Woman, Life, Freedom protests. The late-2025 into 2026 protests saw far higher reported killings by security forces. Estimates vary widely by source and methodology: verified named lists or careful tallies in the thousands (e.g., 4,000+ identified by some rights groups as a minimum), higher activist/medical-network figures of 7,000–20,000+, and some claims exceeding 30,000. Official Iranian acknowledgments have been lower (around 3,000+ in some statements, including security personnel). “Over 10,000” falls within the range of higher independent estimates for that crackdown. US/Israeli strikes occurred in this period (nuclear facilities in mid-2025; broader operations in early 2026), so the temporal claim of killings “before Donald Trump bombed them” tracks with the sequence of major 2025–26 unrest followed by kinetic action.
Wikipedia
“Islamic division” exists in the broader Sunni-Shia schism and Iran’s own multi-ethnic makeup (Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Baluch, Arabs, etc., with Sunni minorities concentrated in certain regions). There are real grievances, discrimination, and localized unrest in minority areas, but Iran has not readily fractured along ethnic lines historically, and national identity plus shared Shia frameworks have provided cohesion for many. The claim that the regime’s institutions are steeped in zealotry and repression is fair given the pattern of lethal force against protesters and the IRGC’s dual domestic/external role.
The final assertion—if Israel disappeared, Iranians (or the broader region) “would just go back to killing each other on a much grander scale”—is speculative and overstated. The regime’s anti-Israel posture is ideological and serves as a foreign-policy and domestic-legitimacy tool, but internal repression, economic failure, ethnic/sectarian tensions, and proxy conflicts (Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon) predate and exist independently of the Israel issue. Removing one external focus would not automatically produce “grander-scale” intra-Islamic slaughter; outcomes would depend on power struggles, institutional continuity or collapse, and external actors. Broader regional history shows plenty of intra-Muslim conflict, but causal claims of this form are not rigorous.
In short: The regime’s track record of domestic lethal repression, low popular legitimacy in available data, institutional hardline character, and leading role in state-sponsored terrorism/proxy violence is well-documented and aligns with much of the assessment. Numbers on 2025–26 deaths are contested and high-end estimates are used; timelines are roughly consistent with reported events; the “killing each other” closer is rhetorical rather than predictive.
