Sections 2(a) and 15(1)
I think not, I have no doubt that the Supreme Court of Canada gave consideration to Section 15(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 (I believe that's a provision of the Constitution — right?); nonetheless, for a moment, allow me to give my own interpretation of how one should accomodate religious freedom, given a balance between these two integral components of the Constitution Acts.
:arrow: In Relation to Section 2(a)
First and foremost, I would like to make it clear that in my opinion, the rights and freedoms set forth in Section 2 should take precedence over those in subsequent sections; however, that is an entirely subjective point-of-view and, therefore, let's say for a moment that I would be entirely incorrect on that assertion.
If Sections 2(a) and 15(1) are to be applied equally, then one must consider the provisions of each; Section 2(a) guarantees the freedom of religion and conscience, and Section 15(a) guarantees equality before the law. Now, I would assert that a certain balance must be stricken between the two.
Section 2(a), as a guarantor of fundamental freedoms (subject to Section 1, but perhaps that is an issue for another discussion), must be weighed particularly carefully when considering a case. Freedom of religion should be accomodated in Canada wherever possible, and where it is not possible but the religion is reasonable, it should be made possible.
In relation to the wearing of kirpans, I would assert that this would be an area where we are quite capable of accomodating Section 2(a), in its entirety. Now, of course, this would not grant Sikh citizens the right to use the kirpan in any capacity whatsoever, but rather to hold it in their possession as a tenet of their religious freedom and expression.
:arrow: Section 15(1)
I would assert that while we should accomodate the possession of the kirpan in public, it must be made perfectly clear that outside the scope of its sole possession, any other use of the kirpan in contradiction of the Criminal Code of Canada whatsoever should be deemed entirely illegal.
We could perhaps define certain guidelines to be followed in relation to the recognition of the right of Sikh citizens to possess the kirpan in public; these could include restrictions on the handling of the ceremonial dagger, restrictions on publicly displaying or performing the kirpan, and establish the right of the Government of Canada, perhaps under the authority of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, to place restrictions on the possession of the kirpan under exigent circumstances.
For example, we could determine that Sikhs are to be quite staunchly restricted from unsheathing their kirpans under any circumstances in a public location whatsoever and that, furthermore, if such a ceremonial dagger were unsheathed then Criminal Code of Canada provisions in relation to the unlawful possession of a weapon could be immediately invoked.