Well since the poop crew officially blew it.. let's move on to infants for a bit..
Life and Death Decisions for Disabled                 Infants
                  If we were to approach the issue of life                 or death for a seriously disabled human infant without any prior discussion of                 the ethics of killing in general, we might be unable to resolve the conflict                 between the widely accepted obligation to protect the sanctity of human life,                 and the goal of reducing suffering. Some say that such decisions are                 'subjective', or that life and death questions must be left to God and Nature. Our previous discussions have, however, prepared the ground, and the principles                 established and applied in the preceding three chapters make the issue much less                 baffling than most take it to be.
                 
In Chapter 4 we saw that the fact that a                 being is a human being, in the sense of a member of the species Homo sapiens, is                 not relevant to the wrongness of killing it; it is, rather, characteristics like                 rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness that make a difference. Infants                 lack these characteristics. Killing them, therefore, cannot be equated with                 killing normal human beings, or any other self-conscious beings. This conclusion                 is not limited to infants who, because of irreversible intellectual                 disabilities, will never be rational, self-conscious beings. We saw in our                 discussion of abortion that the potential of a fetus to become a rational,                 self-conscious being cannot count against killing it at a stage when it lacks                 these characteristics - not, that is, unless we are also prepared to count the                 value of rational self-conscious life as a reason against contraception and                 celibacy. No infant - disabled or not - has as strong a claim to life as beings                 capable of seeing themselves as distinct entities, existing over time.
                 
The difference between killing disabled                 and normal infants lies not in any supposed right to life that the latter has                 and the former lacks, but in other considerations about killing.  It is different when the infant is born                 with a serious disability. Birth abnormalities vary, of course. Some are trivial                 and have little effect on the child or its parents; but others turn the normally                 joyful event of birth into a threat to the happiness of the parents, and any                 other children they may have.
It is different when the infant is born                 with a serious disability. Birth abnormalities vary, of course. Some are trivial                 and have little effect on the child or its parents; but others turn the normally                 joyful event of birth into a threat to the happiness of the parents, and any                 other children they may have.
                 Given these facts, suppose that a newborn                 baby is diagnosed as a haemophiliac. The parents, daunted by the prospect of                 bringing up a child with this condition, are not anxious for him to live. Could                 euthanasia be defended here? 
Taking Life: Humans, by Peter Singer