We can't afford a nuclear Iran
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UN resolution 38-25
nov 22 1983
resolves that it is the right of every state to choose its economic and social system in accord with the will of the people, without outside interferance .
votes--excluding abstentions
131 nation--FOR
1 nation-AGAINST ie the united states of hypocrisy
the farce is that one nation that keeps trying to scupper all progress
your dearly beloved america
sitting on their extremely large mcdonalds asses--cushy-- and somewhat fatty as well-- complaining about the ineffficacy of the institution they work so hard day and night to try to undermine
hows the weather out there in the maritimes today
nov 22 1983
resolves that it is the right of every state to choose its economic and social system in accord with the will of the people, without outside interferance .
votes--excluding abstentions
131 nation--FOR
1 nation-AGAINST ie the united states of hypocrisy
the farce is that one nation that keeps trying to scupper all progress
your dearly beloved america
sitting on their extremely large mcdonalds asses--cushy-- and somewhat fatty as well-- complaining about the ineffficacy of the institution they work so hard day and night to try to undermine
hows the weather out there in the maritimes today
Re: RE: We can't afford a nuclear Iran
You sarcastic? As if! But I didn't take it that way either.
I know and the UN often puts forth Conventions as though they haven't thought through all the details. A Convention about Sports Apartheid after the initial Convention on Supression and Punishment was signed 10 yrs earlier?
cortezzz said:
You sarcastic? As if! But I didn't take it that way either.
I know and the UN often puts forth Conventions as though they haven't thought through all the details. A Convention about Sports Apartheid after the initial Convention on Supression and Punishment was signed 10 yrs earlier?
Re: RE: We can't afford a nuclear Iran
Now you know theory and how one choses to prove or illustrate are not always the same?
Like Huntington for example, I like his theories about domestic institutions, but not international.
Anyway, it's good reading for the insomniac.
cortezzz said:
Now you know theory and how one choses to prove or illustrate are not always the same?
Like Huntington for example, I like his theories about domestic institutions, but not international.
Anyway, it's good reading for the insomniac.
Re: RE: We can't afford a nuclear Iran
That resolution doesn't make a lot of sense.
The governments of developing nations need their structural loans, so it probably wouldn't fly in many cases anyway.
cortezzz said:
That resolution doesn't make a lot of sense.
The governments of developing nations need their structural loans, so it probably wouldn't fly in many cases anyway.
RE: We can't afford a nuc
Cabal" Blocked 2003 Nuclear Talks With Iran
By Gareth Porter
Inter Press Service
Tuesday 28 March 2006
Washington - The George W. Bush administration failed to enter into negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme in May 2003 because neoconservative zealots who advocated destabilisation and regime change were able to block any serious diplomatic engagement with Tehran, according to former administration officials.
The same neoconservative veto power also prevented the administration from adopting any official policy statement on Iran, those same officials say.
Lawrence Wilkerson, then chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, says the failure to adopt a formal Iran policy in 2002-2003 was the result of obstruction by a "secret cabal" of neoconservatives in the administration, led by Vice Pres. Dick Cheney.
"The secret cabal got what it wanted: no negotiations with Tehran," Wilkerson wrote in an e-mail to IPS.
The Iranian negotiating offer, transmitted to the State Department in early May 2003 by the Swiss ambassador in Tehran, acknowledged that Iran would have to address U.S. concerns about its nuclear programme, although it made no specific concession in advance of the talks, according to Flynt Leverett, then the National Security Council's senior director for Middle East Affairs.
It also raised the possibility of cutting off Iran's support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and converting Hezbollah into a purely socio-political organisation, according to Leverett. That was an explicit response to Powell's demand in late March that Iran "end its support for terrorism".
In return, Leverett recalls, the Iranians wanted the United States to address security questions, the lifting of economic sanctions and normalisation of relations, including support for Iran's integration into the global economic order.
Leverett also recalls that it was drafted with the blessing of all the major political players in the Iranian regime, including the "Supreme Leader", Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Realists, led by Powell and his Deputy Richard Armitage, were inclined to respond positively to the Iranian offer. Nevertheless, within a few days of its receipt, the State Department had rebuked the Swiss ambassador for having passed on the offer.
Exactly how the decision was made is not known. "As with many of these issues of national security decision-making, there are no fingerprints," Wilkerson told IPS. "But I would guess Dick Cheney with the blessing of George W. Bush."
As Wilkerson observes, however, the mysterious death of what became known among Iran specialists as Iran's "grand bargain" initiative was a result of the administration's inability to agree on a policy toward Tehran.
A draft National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) on Iran calling for diplomatic engagement had been in the process of interagency coordination for more than a year, according to a source who asks to remain unidentified.
But it was impossible to get formal agreement on the NSPD, the source recalls, because officials in Cheney's office and in Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith's Office of Special Plans wanted a policy of regime change and kept trying to amend it.
Opponents of the neoconservative policy line blame Condoleezza Rice, then the National Security Adviser, for the failure of the administration to override the extremists in the administration. The statutory policymaker process on Iran, Wilkerson told IPS in e-mail, was "managed by a national security adviser incapable of standing up to the cabal..."
In the absence of an Iran policy, the two contending camps struggled in 2003 over a proposal by realists in the administration to reopen the Geneva channel with Iran that had been used successfully on Afghanistan in 2001-2002. They believed Iran could be helpful in stabilising post-conflict Iraq, because the Iraqi Shiite militants who they expected to return from Iran after Hussein's overthrow owed some degree of allegiance to Iran.
The neoconservatives tried to block those meetings on tactical policy grounds, according to Leverett. "They were saying we didn't want to engage with Iran because we didn't want to owe them," he recalls.
Nevertheless, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad was authorised to begin meeting secretly in Geneva with Iranian officials to discuss Iraq. The neoconservatives then tried to sandbag the talks by introducing a demand for full information on any high-ranking al Qaeda cadres who might be detained by the Iranians.
Iran regarded that information as a bargaining chip to be given up only for a quid pro quo from Washington. The Bush administration, however, had adopted a policy in early 2002 of refusing to share any information with Iran on al Qaeda or other terrorist organisations.
On May 3, as the Iranian "grand bargain" proposal was on its way to Washington, Tehran's representative in Geneva, Javad Zarif, offered a compromise on the issue, according to Leverett: if the United States gave Iran the names of the cadres of the Mujahideen e Kalq (MEK) who were being held by U.S. forces in Iraq, Iran would give the United States the names of the al Qaeda operatives they had detained.
The MEK had carried out armed attacks against Iran from Iraqi territory during the Saddam regime and had been named a terrorist organisation by the United States. But it had capitulated to U.S. forces after the invasion, and the neoconservatives now saw the MEK as a potential asset in an effort to destabilise the Iranian regime.
The MEK had already become a key element in the alternative draft NSPD drawn up by neoconservatives in the administration.
The indictment of Iran analyst Larry Franklin on Feith's staff last year revealed that, by February 2003, Franklin had begun sharing a draft NSPD that he knew would be to the liking of the Israeli Embassy.
(Franklin eventually pled guilty to passing classified information to two employees of an influential pro-Israel lobbying group and was sentenced to 12 and a half years in prison.)
Reflecting the substance of that draft policy, ABC News reported on May 30, 2003 that the Pentagon was calling for the destabilisation of the Iranian government by "using all available points of pressure on the Iranian regime, including backing armed Iranian dissidents and employing the services of the Mujahideen e Kalq..."
Nevertheless, Pres. Bush apparently initially saw nothing wrong with trading information on MEK, despite arguments that MEK should not be repatriated to Iran. "I have it on good authority," Leverett told IPS, "that Bush's initial reaction was, 'But we say there is no such thing as a good terrorist'." Nevertheless, Bush finally rejected the Iranian proposal.
By the end of May, the neoconservatives had succeeded in closing down the Geneva channel for good. They had hoped to push through their own NSPD on Iran, but according to the Franklin indictment, in October 1983, Franklin told an Israeli embassy officer that work on the NSPD had been stopped.
But the damage had been done. With no direct diplomatic contact between Iran and the United States, the neoconservatives had a clear path to raising tensions and building political support for regarding Iran as the primary enemy of the United States.
--------
Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy analyst. His latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in June 2005.
-------
J
Cabal" Blocked 2003 Nuclear Talks With Iran
By Gareth Porter
Inter Press Service
Tuesday 28 March 2006
Washington - The George W. Bush administration failed to enter into negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme in May 2003 because neoconservative zealots who advocated destabilisation and regime change were able to block any serious diplomatic engagement with Tehran, according to former administration officials.
The same neoconservative veto power also prevented the administration from adopting any official policy statement on Iran, those same officials say.
Lawrence Wilkerson, then chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, says the failure to adopt a formal Iran policy in 2002-2003 was the result of obstruction by a "secret cabal" of neoconservatives in the administration, led by Vice Pres. Dick Cheney.
"The secret cabal got what it wanted: no negotiations with Tehran," Wilkerson wrote in an e-mail to IPS.
The Iranian negotiating offer, transmitted to the State Department in early May 2003 by the Swiss ambassador in Tehran, acknowledged that Iran would have to address U.S. concerns about its nuclear programme, although it made no specific concession in advance of the talks, according to Flynt Leverett, then the National Security Council's senior director for Middle East Affairs.
It also raised the possibility of cutting off Iran's support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and converting Hezbollah into a purely socio-political organisation, according to Leverett. That was an explicit response to Powell's demand in late March that Iran "end its support for terrorism".
In return, Leverett recalls, the Iranians wanted the United States to address security questions, the lifting of economic sanctions and normalisation of relations, including support for Iran's integration into the global economic order.
Leverett also recalls that it was drafted with the blessing of all the major political players in the Iranian regime, including the "Supreme Leader", Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Realists, led by Powell and his Deputy Richard Armitage, were inclined to respond positively to the Iranian offer. Nevertheless, within a few days of its receipt, the State Department had rebuked the Swiss ambassador for having passed on the offer.
Exactly how the decision was made is not known. "As with many of these issues of national security decision-making, there are no fingerprints," Wilkerson told IPS. "But I would guess Dick Cheney with the blessing of George W. Bush."
As Wilkerson observes, however, the mysterious death of what became known among Iran specialists as Iran's "grand bargain" initiative was a result of the administration's inability to agree on a policy toward Tehran.
A draft National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) on Iran calling for diplomatic engagement had been in the process of interagency coordination for more than a year, according to a source who asks to remain unidentified.
But it was impossible to get formal agreement on the NSPD, the source recalls, because officials in Cheney's office and in Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith's Office of Special Plans wanted a policy of regime change and kept trying to amend it.
Opponents of the neoconservative policy line blame Condoleezza Rice, then the National Security Adviser, for the failure of the administration to override the extremists in the administration. The statutory policymaker process on Iran, Wilkerson told IPS in e-mail, was "managed by a national security adviser incapable of standing up to the cabal..."
In the absence of an Iran policy, the two contending camps struggled in 2003 over a proposal by realists in the administration to reopen the Geneva channel with Iran that had been used successfully on Afghanistan in 2001-2002. They believed Iran could be helpful in stabilising post-conflict Iraq, because the Iraqi Shiite militants who they expected to return from Iran after Hussein's overthrow owed some degree of allegiance to Iran.
The neoconservatives tried to block those meetings on tactical policy grounds, according to Leverett. "They were saying we didn't want to engage with Iran because we didn't want to owe them," he recalls.
Nevertheless, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad was authorised to begin meeting secretly in Geneva with Iranian officials to discuss Iraq. The neoconservatives then tried to sandbag the talks by introducing a demand for full information on any high-ranking al Qaeda cadres who might be detained by the Iranians.
Iran regarded that information as a bargaining chip to be given up only for a quid pro quo from Washington. The Bush administration, however, had adopted a policy in early 2002 of refusing to share any information with Iran on al Qaeda or other terrorist organisations.
On May 3, as the Iranian "grand bargain" proposal was on its way to Washington, Tehran's representative in Geneva, Javad Zarif, offered a compromise on the issue, according to Leverett: if the United States gave Iran the names of the cadres of the Mujahideen e Kalq (MEK) who were being held by U.S. forces in Iraq, Iran would give the United States the names of the al Qaeda operatives they had detained.
The MEK had carried out armed attacks against Iran from Iraqi territory during the Saddam regime and had been named a terrorist organisation by the United States. But it had capitulated to U.S. forces after the invasion, and the neoconservatives now saw the MEK as a potential asset in an effort to destabilise the Iranian regime.
The MEK had already become a key element in the alternative draft NSPD drawn up by neoconservatives in the administration.
The indictment of Iran analyst Larry Franklin on Feith's staff last year revealed that, by February 2003, Franklin had begun sharing a draft NSPD that he knew would be to the liking of the Israeli Embassy.
(Franklin eventually pled guilty to passing classified information to two employees of an influential pro-Israel lobbying group and was sentenced to 12 and a half years in prison.)
Reflecting the substance of that draft policy, ABC News reported on May 30, 2003 that the Pentagon was calling for the destabilisation of the Iranian government by "using all available points of pressure on the Iranian regime, including backing armed Iranian dissidents and employing the services of the Mujahideen e Kalq..."
Nevertheless, Pres. Bush apparently initially saw nothing wrong with trading information on MEK, despite arguments that MEK should not be repatriated to Iran. "I have it on good authority," Leverett told IPS, "that Bush's initial reaction was, 'But we say there is no such thing as a good terrorist'." Nevertheless, Bush finally rejected the Iranian proposal.
By the end of May, the neoconservatives had succeeded in closing down the Geneva channel for good. They had hoped to push through their own NSPD on Iran, but according to the Franklin indictment, in October 1983, Franklin told an Israeli embassy officer that work on the NSPD had been stopped.
But the damage had been done. With no direct diplomatic contact between Iran and the United States, the neoconservatives had a clear path to raising tensions and building political support for regarding Iran as the primary enemy of the United States.
--------
Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy analyst. His latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in June 2005.
-------
J
Re: RE: We can't afford a nuclear Iran
Folks is an American term for people, how quaint, if you where closer you would get a kick out of me. You claim that we call for the end of free western society, this is a lie, especially since we call for enhancement of those freedoms. You paint us as cowards, that's pathetic, if there are any cowards here you represent them best of all, you constantly parrot common conventional horseshit because you're afraid to think for yourself, you take the easy road every time, your lazy and illinformed thinking does nothing to further the discussion of the subject. Like all parrots you repeat what you've heard with no understanding of what the sounds mean.You can fetch a paper but you'll never read.
Retired_Can_Soldier said:
Folks is an American term for people, how quaint, if you where closer you would get a kick out of me. You claim that we call for the end of free western society, this is a lie, especially since we call for enhancement of those freedoms. You paint us as cowards, that's pathetic, if there are any cowards here you represent them best of all, you constantly parrot common conventional horseshit because you're afraid to think for yourself, you take the easy road every time, your lazy and illinformed thinking does nothing to further the discussion of the subject. Like all parrots you repeat what you've heard with no understanding of what the sounds mean.You can fetch a paper but you'll never read.
Re: RE: We can't afford a nuclear Iran
Iran are driven by extremist, usa are driven by extremist,israel are drivent by extremist, palestinians are driven by extremist, and even our own governement are extremist, so what is new??
First of all, iran are about 10 years away from really making a nuclear bomb,so there is nothing to worry about for the next 10 years.
Going in a war against iran,which is what they want us to do is playing their games, which is driven us into a nightmare, way worst than iraq.
Canadian with a hyphen said:
Iran are driven by extremist, usa are driven by extremist,israel are drivent by extremist, palestinians are driven by extremist, and even our own governement are extremist, so what is new??
First of all, iran are about 10 years away from really making a nuclear bomb,so there is nothing to worry about for the next 10 years.
Going in a war against iran,which is what they want us to do is playing their games, which is driven us into a nightmare, way worst than iraq.
Ok ... found my chocolate, but damn, Jay, that is one impressive box of treats! Has me drooling on the keyboard!Jay said:
RE: We can't afford a nuc
The sight of that box of chocolate bon bons was sucessfully supressed until you brought it up again, chocolates are dangerous, I support chocolate registration and prison sentences for violations.
The sight of that box of chocolate bon bons was sucessfully supressed until you brought it up again, chocolates are dangerous, I support chocolate registration and prison sentences for violations.
Re: RE: We can't afford a nuclear Iran
Yes the great thinkers on the left (who claim to think for themselves) are going to enhance our freedoms by taxing us to death and killing off our corporations, end lobbying and stomp on free speech, disarm us and have the feds run everything etc, etc....Dark Beaver doesn't know what freedom means but be careful when your near him though....he might kick you over it
darkbeaver said:Retired_Can_Soldier said:
Folks is an American term for people, how quaint, if you where closer you would get a kick out of me. You claim that we call for the end of free western society, this is a lie, especially since we call for enhancement of those freedoms. You paint us as cowards, that's pathetic, if there are any cowards here you represent them best of all, you constantly parrot common conventional horseshit because you're afraid to think for yourself, you take the easy road every time, your lazy and illinformed thinking does nothing to further the discussion of the subject. Like all parrots you repeat what you've heard with no understanding of what the sounds mean.You can fetch a paper but you'll never read.
Yes the great thinkers on the left (who claim to think for themselves) are going to enhance our freedoms by taxing us to death and killing off our corporations, end lobbying and stomp on free speech, disarm us and have the feds run everything etc, etc....Dark Beaver doesn't know what freedom means but be careful when your near him though....he might kick you over it
Yea Beav and lets put a special tax on Chocolates. I don't like chocolate so I say let them eat Cake or pay a sur-charge.
Re: RE: We can't afford a nuclear Iran
You are somewhat mistaken here, Beav. I am quite aware of the monstrousity that was the Shah's regime, the SAVAK, and some of their worst practises, and yes, I know they were backed by the USA. And that was WRONG, in a very big way. The unfortunate thing is that the average Persian is now much, much worse off. Just ask the author Nafisi, who stands very much on the left side of the spectrum, but now lives in the United States.
And yes, the Americans have certainly behaved abysmally in friendly states, supporting the worst kinds of dictators in South America, supporting the overthrow and murder of Allende, involving themselves in Vietnam, and on and on.
Yet I see America drawing away from the puppet-dictator method of global influence. In Iraq and Afghanistan they have allowed, no...encouraged free and fair elections, and have done their best to live with the results, however untenable. I submit that America would have few problems in Iraq if they had not sought, idealistically, to reshape the nation into something better. Imagine, if you will, if the Americans had merely inserted themselves at the top, made the Iraqi secret police and judicial apparatus their puppy, and allowed them to maintain order in the nation however they saw fit.
Iraq would be stable.
America may be misled, or wrong, or foolish in many ways, but I believe its intentions are good.
To favourably compare Iranian meglomaniacs and end-of-the-world affectionados who murder at a whim, and terrorize their entire populations with the United States is not only unfair, it is dangerous.
darkbeaver said:
You are somewhat mistaken here, Beav. I am quite aware of the monstrousity that was the Shah's regime, the SAVAK, and some of their worst practises, and yes, I know they were backed by the USA. And that was WRONG, in a very big way. The unfortunate thing is that the average Persian is now much, much worse off. Just ask the author Nafisi, who stands very much on the left side of the spectrum, but now lives in the United States.
And yes, the Americans have certainly behaved abysmally in friendly states, supporting the worst kinds of dictators in South America, supporting the overthrow and murder of Allende, involving themselves in Vietnam, and on and on.
Yet I see America drawing away from the puppet-dictator method of global influence. In Iraq and Afghanistan they have allowed, no...encouraged free and fair elections, and have done their best to live with the results, however untenable. I submit that America would have few problems in Iraq if they had not sought, idealistically, to reshape the nation into something better. Imagine, if you will, if the Americans had merely inserted themselves at the top, made the Iraqi secret police and judicial apparatus their puppy, and allowed them to maintain order in the nation however they saw fit.
Iraq would be stable.
America may be misled, or wrong, or foolish in many ways, but I believe its intentions are good.
To favourably compare Iranian meglomaniacs and end-of-the-world affectionados who murder at a whim, and terrorize their entire populations with the United States is not only unfair, it is dangerous.
sounds somewhat apologist
megalomania----just take a look at the stock pile of WMDs the US has
that long list of ---foolish interventions
---it is actually unfair to compare them
irans trangressions are quite minimal compared with --the great satan
just imagine if a foreign power ---engineered a coup in the US---
establishing a vicious dictatorship, tearing up their constitution etc---
that would be-- UNFORGIVABLE wouldnt it
and you gloss over such events when the US does it to others -- ie you cited chile, and iran itself--
all forgaivable as--- foolish-- no bad intentions
its absurd that the depravaties of the US should be compared with the small town antics of iran--
they are far worse
megalomania----just take a look at the stock pile of WMDs the US has
that long list of ---foolish interventions
---it is actually unfair to compare them
irans trangressions are quite minimal compared with --the great satan
just imagine if a foreign power ---engineered a coup in the US---
establishing a vicious dictatorship, tearing up their constitution etc---
that would be-- UNFORGIVABLE wouldnt it
and you gloss over such events when the US does it to others -- ie you cited chile, and iran itself--
all forgaivable as--- foolish-- no bad intentions
its absurd that the depravaties of the US should be compared with the small town antics of iran--
they are far worse
Re: RE: We can't afford a nuclear Iran
You have misunderstood me.
No one can change America's past, and some of it is filthy. The same can be said for any nation on earth.
Iran's "antics" (talk about ME minimalizing terror) will only be "small town" as long as she DOESN'T have nuclear weapons.
cortezzz said:
You have misunderstood me.
No one can change America's past, and some of it is filthy. The same can be said for any nation on earth.
Iran's "antics" (talk about ME minimalizing terror) will only be "small town" as long as she DOESN'T have nuclear weapons.
RE: We can't afford a nuc
You see Uncle Sam as softer do you, well I can't see any difference at all to the long standing policy of carpet bombing and murder, one of us is dreaming and it ain't me.
Of course as Cortez has pointed out you're an apologist you'll blame the victims no matter what, and you'll support every new bombing campaign regardless, why I do believe that if and when they bomb Canada you'll applaud that.
You see Uncle Sam as softer do you, well I can't see any difference at all to the long standing policy of carpet bombing and murder, one of us is dreaming and it ain't me.
Of course as Cortez has pointed out you're an apologist you'll blame the victims no matter what, and you'll support every new bombing campaign regardless, why I do believe that if and when they bomb Canada you'll applaud that.
