https://www.google.com/maps/place/B...81:0xa1d181ec8c10!8m2!3d53.709807!4d27.953389
Spear through NATO's heart, wow.
Surrounding Kiev more or less, wow.
Lukashenko To Putin: Belarus Is Ready to Unite
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https://www.google.com/maps/place/B...81:0xa1d181ec8c10!8m2!3d53.709807!4d27.953389
Spear through NATO's heart, wow.
Surrounding Kiev more or less, wow.
The people would all have to vote so the will of the majority rules rather than the Queen alone tells the people which way things are going to go.
Are you saying the Crimea vote was rigged??
How about if Alaska wanted to rejoin Russia, would you stop them by force??
Are you saying the Crimea vote was rigged??
How about if Alaska wanted to rejoin Russia, would you stop them by force??
NATO crumbled the USSR or did coal miners refusing to work grind the USSR to a halt? We're these miners in Russia proper?
You fotgot a link, you words by themselves are as valuable as any vapor, nithing.
https://www.counterpunch.org/1998/01/15/how-jimmy-carter-and-i-started-the-mujahideen/
Q: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs [“From the Shadows”], that American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan 6 months before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the national security adviser to President Carter. You therefore played a role in this affair. Is that correct?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.
Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and looked to provoke it?
Brzezinski: It isn’t quite that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.
Q: When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight against a secret involvement of the United States in Afghanistan, people didn’t believe them. However, there was a basis of truth. You don’t regret anything today?
Brzezinski: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war. Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.
Q: And neither do you regret having supported the Islamic [integrisme], having given arms and advice to future terrorists?
Brzezinski: What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?
Q: Some stirred-up Moslems? But it has been said and repeated: Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today.
Brzezinski: Nonsense! It is said that the West had a global policy in regard to Islam. That is stupid. There isn’t a global Islam. Look at Islam in a rational manner and without demagoguery or emotion. It is the leading religion of the world with 1.5 billion followers. But what is there in common among Saudi Arabian fundamentalism, moderate Morocco, Pakistan militarism, Egyptian pro-Western or Central Asian secularism? Nothing more than what unites the Christian countries.
https://www.counterpunch.org/1998/01/15/how-jimmy-carter-and-i-started-the-mujahideen/
Q: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs [“From the Shadows”], that American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan 6 months before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the national security adviser to President Carter. You therefore played a role in this affair. Is that correct?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.
Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into war and looked to provoke it?
Brzezinski: It isn’t quite that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.
Q: When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight against a secret involvement of the United States in Afghanistan, people didn’t believe them. However, there was a basis of truth. You don’t regret anything today?
Brzezinski: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war. Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.
Q: And neither do you regret having supported the Islamic [integrisme], having given arms and advice to future terrorists?
Brzezinski: What is most important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?
Q: Some stirred-up Moslems? But it has been said and repeated: Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today.
Brzezinski: Nonsense! It is said that the West had a global policy in regard to Islam. That is stupid. There isn’t a global Islam. Look at Islam in a rational manner and without demagoguery or emotion. It is the leading religion of the world with 1.5 billion followers. But what is there in common among Saudi Arabian fundamentalism, moderate Morocco, Pakistan militarism, Egyptian pro-Western or Central Asian secularism? Nothing more than what unites the Christian countries.
Is that the wind blowin through the dead jasmine in your mind?
Which hash did you smoke too much of in the early 80's? CIA red seal or KGB black?
Two decades ago, Soviet miners were a force to be reckoned with
By Kathy Lally June 30, 2011
MOSCOW — By the end of June 1991, coal miners were fast becoming the heroes of the Soviet Union. They had always suffered. Mining was so dangerous throughout the empire that the casualty rate was 24 times higher than in the United States.
Their industry was emblematic of all that was wrong with the Soviet system. Not only was the well-being of workers largely ignored, coal mining was staggeringly inefficient, so wasteful that it cost more to produce a ton of coal than it was worth.
Two years earlier, the miners had begun to rebel. In July 1989, miners in the coal-rich Kuzbass region of Siberia could no longer endure the misery, the low pay, the stores with nothing to buy — shelves so bare that they had trouble finding soap to wash off the grime when they emerged from their deep, dirty tunnels.
That month they went on strike, encouraging miners from across Russia and into Ukraine to stand up together and demand reforms of their industry, their government, their country.
By 1991, the miners had become a movement, and that spring, they organized a two-month strike in the Kuzbass, with 300,000 miners closing down a third of Soviet coal mines at one point. That forced Mikhail Gorbachev, under heavy pressure from conservatives in the Soviet leadership to retreat from the path of reforms, to stay the course.
Russia’s leader, Boris Yeltsin, allied himself with the miners and credited them for forcing Gorbachev to agree on negotiating a new union treaty among the 15 republics of the Soviet Union, one that would replace the enforced union of 1922 with a voluntary agreement. Power would be vested in the republics — Russia, Ukraine and the others — rather than in the Soviet government.
“The miners have turned out to be the initiators of the destruction of the old command-administrative system,” Yeltsin said that May, “and creators of a new system of economic management.”
June 30, 1991, brought yet another reminder of their cause and condition: A fire roared through a mine in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, killing 31 miners. Gorbachev sent a telegram: “I express deep regrets over the tragedy at the mine. I share the grief of the families and relatives of the minters who were killed.”
Telegrams were no longer enough. The miners stayed behind Yeltsin, giving him the strength, he would later say, to stand up to the hard-liners, to rally Russians behind him, to free Russia and bring about the demise of the Soviet Union.
Today, little is heard from the miners. When he became President in 2000, Vladimir V. Putin slowly but powerfully quelled outspoken voices. Huge crowds of demonstrators, lengthy strikes, are almost unimaginable. And even when voices are raised, few hear them: Tightly controlled television does not dwell on the plight of unhappy workers.
The miners’ glory was fleeting. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought them freedom, but the economy was wrecked. In early 1995, growing disillusioned, already remembering the Soviet years with nostalgia, 500,000 miners struck to demand wages that had gone unpaid for months.
The industry, relying on aged equipment and outmoded methods, remained dependent on subsidies. Moscow debated what to do, facing the difficult choice of closing unprofitable mines and throwing thousands out of work — or increase the subsidies and prolong the agony.
International institutions, including the World Bank, offered help. It did little good. In 1998, World Bank officials said at least $240 million provided to modernize the industry has disappeared, either unwisely used or stolen. The corruption that had already entrenched itself was sapping the economy.
That summer, a determined band of 300 miners camped outside the Russian White House, banging their helmets on the pavement, demanding Yeltsin’s resignation and a job that paid. Those who still had jobs feared they would not last. Mines were closing and a workforce of 1 million miners in the early 1990s had shrunk to half that by 1998.
The miners banged their helmets, and the government ignored them.
In 2002, most of the Siberian coal mines were sold off and the miners were no longer government employees. Working for different owners, the miners no longer had a common antagonist. Problems became regional, not national.
In November 2007, 100 miners were killed in a methane fire in Ukraine, long since a different country. In May 2010, methane explosions in a Kuzbass mine in Western Siberia killed 91 miners.
National television stations reported on the accident. They reported that Putin ordered a mine official to resign. They did not report on what followed, when 300 people gathered to protest the conditions and the government’s unemotional response. They did not see riot police disperse the miners, or know that more than 20 were arrested.
The only knew that, once more, miners were dying.
Which hash did you smoke too much of in the early 80's? CIA red seal or KGB black?
Two decades ago, Soviet miners were a force to be reckoned with
By Kathy Lally June 30, 2011
MOSCOW — By the end of June 1991, coal miners were fast becoming the heroes of the Soviet Union. They had always suffered. Mining was so dangerous throughout the empire that the casualty rate was 24 times higher than in the United States.
Their industry was emblematic of all that was wrong with the Soviet system. Not only was the well-being of workers largely ignored, coal mining was staggeringly inefficient, so wasteful that it cost more to produce a ton of coal than it was worth.
Two years earlier, the miners had begun to rebel. In July 1989, miners in the coal-rich Kuzbass region of Siberia could no longer endure the misery, the low pay, the stores with nothing to buy — shelves so bare that they had trouble finding soap to wash off the grime when they emerged from their deep, dirty tunnels.
That month they went on strike, encouraging miners from across Russia and into Ukraine to stand up together and demand reforms of their industry, their government, their country.
By 1991, the miners had become a movement, and that spring, they organized a two-month strike in the Kuzbass, with 300,000 miners closing down a third of Soviet coal mines at one point. That forced Mikhail Gorbachev, under heavy pressure from conservatives in the Soviet leadership to retreat from the path of reforms, to stay the course.
Russia’s leader, Boris Yeltsin, allied himself with the miners and credited them for forcing Gorbachev to agree on negotiating a new union treaty among the 15 republics of the Soviet Union, one that would replace the enforced union of 1922 with a voluntary agreement. Power would be vested in the republics — Russia, Ukraine and the others — rather than in the Soviet government.
“The miners have turned out to be the initiators of the destruction of the old command-administrative system,” Yeltsin said that May, “and creators of a new system of economic management.”
June 30, 1991, brought yet another reminder of their cause and condition: A fire roared through a mine in the Donetsk region of Ukraine, killing 31 miners. Gorbachev sent a telegram: “I express deep regrets over the tragedy at the mine. I share the grief of the families and relatives of the minters who were killed.”
Telegrams were no longer enough. The miners stayed behind Yeltsin, giving him the strength, he would later say, to stand up to the hard-liners, to rally Russians behind him, to free Russia and bring about the demise of the Soviet Union.
Today, little is heard from the miners. When he became President in 2000, Vladimir V. Putin slowly but powerfully quelled outspoken voices. Huge crowds of demonstrators, lengthy strikes, are almost unimaginable. And even when voices are raised, few hear them: Tightly controlled television does not dwell on the plight of unhappy workers.
The miners’ glory was fleeting. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought them freedom, but the economy was wrecked. In early 1995, growing disillusioned, already remembering the Soviet years with nostalgia, 500,000 miners struck to demand wages that had gone unpaid for months.
The industry, relying on aged equipment and outmoded methods, remained dependent on subsidies. Moscow debated what to do, facing the difficult choice of closing unprofitable mines and throwing thousands out of work — or increase the subsidies and prolong the agony.
International institutions, including the World Bank, offered help. It did little good. In 1998, World Bank officials said at least $240 million provided to modernize the industry has disappeared, either unwisely used or stolen. The corruption that had already entrenched itself was sapping the economy.
That summer, a determined band of 300 miners camped outside the Russian White House, banging their helmets on the pavement, demanding Yeltsin’s resignation and a job that paid. Those who still had jobs feared they would not last. Mines were closing and a workforce of 1 million miners in the early 1990s had shrunk to half that by 1998.
The miners banged their helmets, and the government ignored them.
In 2002, most of the Siberian coal mines were sold off and the miners were no longer government employees. Working for different owners, the miners no longer had a common antagonist. Problems became regional, not national.
In November 2007, 100 miners were killed in a methane fire in Ukraine, long since a different country. In May 2010, methane explosions in a Kuzbass mine in Western Siberia killed 91 miners.
National television stations reported on the accident. They reported that Putin ordered a mine official to resign. They did not report on what followed, when 300 people gathered to protest the conditions and the government’s unemotional response. They did not see riot police disperse the miners, or know that more than 20 were arrested.
The only knew that, once more, miners were dying.
I was working about 90 hrs/wk back then and newspapers were two weeks old before we saw any.
Afghan black marble, do I need to explain what the white streaks were??
The time your article is referencing is when NATO aligned businesses made their way into the former USSR looking for loot to steal whole crashing what little industry was left. They were there to finish the job rather than heal anything. There are a few things in there I want to check before I say any more.
The years were when the IMF was in charge of the place. Tanking it was their agenda and your post shows how NATO tried to do it. You trying for the Darwin Award??
So you were a junkie then? Are you still a junkie?
NATO had nothing to do with the labour strikes that broke the back of the USSR.
My article has no mention of NATO. That's a hallucination on your part.
As for timeline :
July 1989, miners in the coal-rich Kuzbass region of Siberia could no longer endure the misery, the low pay, the stores with nothing to buy — shelves so bare that they had trouble finding soap to wash off the grime when they emerged from their deep, dirty tunnels.
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. . . . bad get worse when the IMF moves in. . . anyway, back to the 21st century.
Spear through the heart . . . Brussels . . . . It will become to be known as 'The Domino War' where only one fell and it was over.
Spear through the heart . . . Brussels . . . . It will become to be known as 'The Domino War' where only one fell and it was over.
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If one explosion gets them both it is close enough for this thread. Should I start one that is about their structure, it's a long dry subject.
No thanks. You babble incessantly.
The primary difference between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank lies in their respective purposes and functions. The IMF exists primarily to stabilize exchange rates, while the World Bank's goal is to reduce poverty.
The primary difference between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank lies in their respective purposes and functions. The IMF exists primarily to stabilize exchange rates, while the World Bank's goal is to reduce poverty.
Belarus and Russia have always been close all farm equipment and most heavy vehicles are made there for Russia
Belarus Says It Will Remain Close Strategic Allies With Russia
Belarus: Russia's Close But Restive Ally
Russia, Belarus hold joint war games - apnews.com
Belarus Says It Will Remain Close Strategic Allies With Russia
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Belarus: Russia's Close But Restive Ally
Russia, Belarus hold joint war games - apnews.com