Mr.Mom
Who is this John Nichols you cite? Ok - sorry I found him - I would like to read more of his work.
Who is this John Nichols you cite? Ok - sorry I found him - I would like to read more of his work.
Wednesday's Child said:You are kidding right? How can you have any idea that Bolton will be completely ineffective. Do you know anything of the man's background other than he is abrasive and loud - much like Ms. Parrish?
It's a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law because, over the long term, the goal of those who think that international law really means anything are those who want to constrict the United States
there's no such thing as the United Nations.
If the UN secretary building in New York lost 10 storeys, it wouldn't make a bit of difference.
We should also make clear that diplomatic normalization with the U.S. is only going to come when North Korea becomes a normal country.
Wednesday's Child said:Attempts to reform the U.N.???? You mean reforms like the Oil for Food Scandal? It's a bit late for that reform.
WC said:Annan is simply another climber in a suit. Sorry I have to disagree with your lofty opinion and he has never instituted reforms to speak of. If this is wrong, I would ask you to please name one.
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It’s impossible to escape the conclusion that the United Nations, with Annan firmly in charge, will continue to spiral downward into further failures and eventual irrelevance.
U.N. Reform Should Start with Annan’s Resignation
Mired in scandal, plagued by corruption, and facing irrelevance, the United Nations is in desperate need of repair. In response, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan last week unveiled his long-awaited proposal for reforming the troubled world body. His plan is bold and ambitious. Some propositions have real merit. Others are hopelessly objectionable or ridiculously impractical. More broadly, Annan’s proposals raise weighty, far-reaching questions about our world that could keep a collection of philosophers occupied for a generation.
Unsurprisingly, however, the Secretary General’s report ignores the most desperately needed reform of all: Annan’s own resignation.
Annan has become the chief symbol of the need for U.N. reform. In over eight years as Secretary General, he has presided over the unmatched $20 billion U.N.-Iraq Oil for Food scandal, stood by as U.N. peacekeepers traded food for sex with young girls in more than a dozen missions around the world, and oversaw multiple U.N. agencies as they were wounded by charges of embezzlement and sexual harassment. In a survey last year, U.N. employees reported an organization riddled with nepotism, cronyism and corruption. And through these tribulations, Annan’s first reaction has usually been to try to keep the bad news quiet.
This week, just days after Annan announced his reform agenda, the U.N. Commission investigating the scandal-ridden Oil for Food program issued a report critical of the way the Secretary General handled an apparent conflict-of-interest involving his son and a program contractor. An earlier report revealed that the program’s head ― who was hand-picked by Annan ― had likely taken bribes from Saddam Hussein’s government while U.N. officials skirted key purchasing rules to select Oil for Food vendors.
The Secretary General and his backers argue that many of the U.N.’s management failings predate Annan’s ascension, and while this is certainly true, it’s equally apparent that the problems have worsened considerably on his watch. Indeed, it appears that Annan’s administration has devolved into the most corrupt and mismanaged in the U.N.’s history. For an organization with a long record of such problems, that’s a dubious distinction.
Indeed, it’s the primary reason Annan cannot be allowed to lead the U.N. reform effort. Annan’s commitment to cleaning up the bureaucracy and fixing the U.N.’s many problems is simply not credible. His reassurances about reform irreconcilably conflict with his long ignominious record at the organization’s helm.
Nevertheless, if the United Nations is to retain any semblance of relevance, much less achieve the lofty objectives articulated in its Charter, it must become more accountable and transparent. The rats infesting the U.N. bureaucracy must be cast overboard. And the world body must open itself to heightened scrutiny from its own members and, more importantly, the public at-large. After all, the world body’s survival may well be at risk.
With the stakes so high, there’s only one way to begin U.N. reform that holds open the chance of future success: new leadership must be put in place. And that starts with Kofi Annan’s resignation.
But Annan firmly rejected such talk as he reacted to this week’s critical report on Oil for Food. Asked if he would resign, Annan, the career diplomat who seems never at a loss for the right tactful phrase, responded, “Hell no.” And none of the 191 members of the United Nations have called for Annan’s ouster.
In light of this obstinance, it’s impossible to escape the conclusion that the United Nations, with Annan firmly in charge, will continue to spiral downward into further failures and eventual irrelevance as the Secretary General’s reform proposals prove futile and ineffectual.
?If an ambassador comes to the UN with a spirit of give and take, and of listening to others, then that ambassador will succeed, he added
A throw away article?
Because you disagree doesn't make the essay false.
Myth: Saddam Hussein's regime raised over $21.3 billion in illicit revenue by subverting the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP).
Fact: This figure was initially provided on November 15, 2004 at a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations that is conducting one of the five congressional inquiries into the OFFP. The Subcommittee distributed a chart that showed that while Iraq was under UN Sanctions, between 1991 - 2003, the Saddam Hussein regime obtained illicit revenues of $21.3 billion. The chart clearly indicates that the OFFP was responsible for a small share of this total and that most of the illicit revenue came from other sources.
Since then, the $21.3 billion figure has been used inaccurately by Members of Congress, the media, and even President Bush. All have said at various times that it represents what the Hussein regime obtained by circumventing the OFFP. Most notably, Senator Norm Coleman (R-MN), who chairs the Senate Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations, has used the figure incorrectly multiple times, without being challenged. In his December 1, 2004, op-ed in The Wall Street Journal, Sen. Coleman wrote, "At our hearing on Nov. 15, we presented evidence that Saddam accumulated more than $21 billion through abuses of the Oil-for-Food Program and UN sanctions." Yet Sen. Coleman has linked the entire $21 billion number to Oil-for-Food during various interviews with FOX News, CNN, and CNBC.
Attributing the whole $21.3 billion to circumvention of the OFFP is incorrect on its face. First, the OFFP did not begin until 1996, fully 5 years after the beginning of sanctions on Iraq. Second, the same chart used by the Subcommittee to graphically represent the number shows that only $6.5 billion was related to the OFFP, as only three of the categories in the chart can be directly attributed to the OFFP. They are:
* Kickbacks on Humanitarian goods-- $4.4 billion
* Oil surcharges-- $241 million
* Substandard Goods--$2.1 billion
The other categories in the chart, including oil smuggling, fall outside the purview of the Office of the Iraq Program, the UN entity that administered the OFFP. Of particular note is the $13.6 billion the chart attributes to oil smuggling. There has been a wide misperception that the UN was in charge of policing for the regime's oil smuggling. This is incorrect. The responsibility for preventing smuggling into and from Iraq rested with Member States, specifically with the Multinational Interception Force, mandated by the Security Council in 1991 and led by and predominantly made up of the Fifth Fleet of the U.S. Navy. Additionally, the category the subcommittee calls "substandard goods" is a new category that has not been included in previous estimates of Saddam's illicit revenue, and might warrant further scrutiny.
Furthermore, the recent report issued by the Iraq Survey Group headed by Charles Duelfer notes that nearly ¾ of the illicit revenue (or $8 billion) obtained by the Hussein regime during the sanctions period came from illegal trading with its neighbors (see chart). A third source, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), reached the same conclusion. The GAO, in its "Observations on the Oil for Food Program" report highlights (submitted as testimony to the Committee on Foreign Relations on April 7, 2004), noted that the 661 Committee did not have oversight of the majority of missing revenues ($5.7 billion) that were attributed to smuggling. Instead, the GAO found that investigations concerning 661 Committee responsibility should focus on the remaining $4.4 billion attributable to kickbacks on humanitarian aid contracts and surcharges on oil sales.
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Myth: Oil smuggling was just one of many problems under the OFFP that the UN failed to prevent.
Fact: The UN had neither the authority nor the resources to prevent smuggling. The UN Security Council oversaw the OFFP, and the UN Secretariat's Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) implemented the Council's work on the ground in Iraq. Specifically, it was the role of the Security Council's 661 Committee to monitor all contracts awarded under the OFFP (all members of the UN Security Council, including the U.S., were members of the 661 Committee). The task of policing oil smuggling fell to the Multinational Interception Force (MIF) - which was led by and predominantly made up of the Fifth Fleet of the U.S. Navy.
The MIF was created following the imposition of sanctions in 1990 and was responsible for preventing smuggling from and into Iraq via the Gulf region. Copies of waivers issued by both the current Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration show that the U.S. was aware that Iraq was trading oil with its neighbors, in violation of the UN sanctions, as far back as 1991. Many observers believe successive U.S. administrations allowed the illegal oil trades to continue because stopping them could endanger the support of Iraq's neighbors for UN sanctions.
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Myth: The UN never did anything to raise concerns about potential kickbacks and surcharges in the OFFP.
Fact: In many instances, officials from the Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) made the UN Security Council's 661 Committee aware of potential irregularities in contracts. The 661 Committee was composed of all members of the UN Security Council and had sole discretion over approving the OFFP contracts.
Below are a few examples:
* UN oil overseers first alerted the Security Council's 661 Committee on November 17, 2000 that the oil pricing formulas proposed by Iraq for the month of December did not represent "fair market value," because the oil appeared to be considerably under-priced. As a result of the alert provided by UN officials, on December 15, the 661 Committee directed oil overseers to advise buyers of Iraqi oil that they should pay no surcharges on oil sales since this would be considered illegal. According to various accounts including the report of the Iraq Survey Group led by Charles Duelfer, this action sparked by diligence on the part of OIP effectively ended Saddam's practice of using oil surcharges to acquire illicit revenue.
* In early March, 2001, the issue of oil surcharges was further reported by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council.
* Regarding oil surcharges, the 661 Committee did not reach consensus as to how to address the problem until October, 2001, when the Committee decided to introduce a "retroactive pricing mechanism" for Iraqi oil in an attempt to eliminate the surcharges on oil.
* Throughout 2001 and 2002, hundreds of contracts for humanitarian goods to be sold to Iraq were queried by UN experts for potential over-pricing. At least 70 cases were reported to the 661 Committee and not a single case was placed on hold for pricing issues. Most of these contracts were ultimately approved. Though the U.S. and the UK held up 5,000 contracts over concerns that Iraq was attempting to purchase "dual-use" goods that could be used to build weaponry, no contract that the OIP experts flagged for potential pricing irregularities was blocked by the 661 Committee. (View examples of contracts flagged by OIP over pricing concerns.)
As Fairfield University professor, Joy Gordon, wrote in the December, 2004 issue of Harper's Magazine,
"The Oil-for-Food Program was not some concoction of Kofi Annan's. It was created by a vote of the members of the Security Council. And every aspect of how the program ran - what goods were allowed, the monitoring procedures, the transfer of funds, everything - was explicitly established by the members of the Security Council. Kofi Annan did not have a vote; but the United States and Britain did, and they approved of every resolution and decision that determined how the Oil-for-Food Program worked. Whatever critics may say, 'the UN bureaucracy' did not design a program that handed over cash to Saddam Hussein."
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My writing is not even worth throwing down the toilet?