By MARTIN SIEFF
UPI Senior News Analyst
WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 (UPI) -- Conventional Wisdom has so far paid almost no attention to the strategic consequences of Stephen Harper's victory with the Conservative Party in Canada on Monday. Conventional Wisdom as usual is wrong. Harper's victory is likely to have very rapid significant consequences for the development of hemispheric ballistic missile defense, with a far greater longer-term strategic potential for Canadian-U.S. relations.
Harper this week led his Conservative Party back to power after almost two decades in the political wilderness. The Canadian general election's results allowed the Conservatives or Tories to form a minority government, succeeding the previous one of Liberal Party leader Paul Martin.
Because the Conservatives are the only one of Canada's five major political parties anywhere to the right of the political spectrum in U.S. terms, and because previous minority governments have governed cautiously and, like Martin's, tended to last not more than a year or two, there is a general tendency to assume that Harper will be unable to have a significant impact on long-term Canadian policies and that he will, in particular, be unable to or even unwilling to fulfill his pledge to make Canada a partner in ballistic missile defense with the United States.
However, Harper's decision to break the longstanding political consensus in Canada to steer clear of BMD appears to have won him a significant boost in support in what proved to be a tight race. And in contrast to domestic issues, where the potential majority of the other parties joined against him could block significant legislative initiatives by his new government, it may prove far easier for him to push ahead with BMD cooperation with Washington.
First, the debate during the election campaign indicated it was relatively popular with the Canadian public. And second, it may prove far easier to push ahead with that than to implement his domestic agenda. For taking administrative decisions to increase military cooperation with the United States would not require piloting new legislation through the House of Commons, the main chamber of the Canadian parliament, in Ottawa. Harper's prospects for doing that remain poor.
"Of the four other major parties, the Tories can count on support from none. Yet the Liberals can depend on the kindred New Democratic Party, the Bloc Quebecois, and the Greens for occasional support on social and environmental policy," Stephen Johnson of the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based conservative think tank, wrote in an analysis Wednesday.
Third, initial cooperation with the United States on BMD would not cost the Canadian taxpayer a cent under the terms that President George W. Bush offered Prime Minister Martin last February.
Fourth, Harper admires the president personally and has made clear that in may respects he wants to emulate Bush's political style. He took a significant risk in breaking the cozy old consensus in Ottawa to proclaim his support for BMD, and he has also studied how effectively Bush pursued the strategy after he was first elected on only a plurality vote in November 2000 of governing boldly and confidently, sitting high in the saddle and acting as if he had broad popular majority support for his policies. That paid off when the president was reelected to a second term four years later with more votes than any other president ever received in American political history. Taking a bold stand on BMD cooperation with the United States in the cause of protecting the Canadian people offers the same kind of payoff for Harper.
Fifth, Martin paid a far higher price than he ever expected for flip-flopping on BMD cooperation with the United States. First, he accepted Bush's offer, then under pressure from critics within and outside his own Liberal Party, he changed his mind. That quieted his party critics but left him looking foolish and indecisive on major national security issue before the Canadian people. By sticking to his guns and pushing ahead rapidly with BMD cooperation now, Harper may well cement his own leadership credentials with the public and stand out in contrast with Martin.
From the American side, Harper's decision has no immediate physical advantages, but its long-term diplomatic and strategic advantages may be profound.
The U.S. multi-tier BMD system being developed to protect the nation against nuclear armed ballistic missiles that could be fired by so-called "rogue states" like North Korea or Iran does not need Canadian cooperation or geographical locations to be effective. The radar detection web being fashioned in Alaska, California, on U.S. Navy Aegis-class warships in the Pacific and involving orbiting space-based assets takes care of all that.
Nor did the Bush administration seek or need any active Canadian involvement in BMD development: Washington had been looking for a moral declaration of support.
But by joining hands with the United States on BMD, Harper at one stroke has resurrected the tremendous tradition of strategic cooperation between the United States and Canada that guaranteed hemispheric defense through World War II and the long decades of the Cold War. And he also establishes a precedent of strategic cooperation that should make progress far easier in stepping up joint security work against Islamist extremists in Canada, believed to especially concentrated and well-organized in Quebec.
Also, with Britain and Australia already playing active, highly important roles in their BMD partnerships with the United States, Harper's decision goes far to making BMD cooperation a defining policy characteristic of the leading Anglosphere nations. This is especially the case since India signed off on far-reaching BMD cooperation with the United States only last year.
Furthermore, Martin's flip-flop on BMD had thrown into some doubt the question as to whether or how he would renew North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) accord when it comes up for renewal in May 2006. Harper, as Stephen Johnson noted, is far more likely to renew it without destructive or damaging amendments or quibbles.
Finally, Canada's accession to the cause of BMD comes within a year of India and Japan both signing on to vastly expanded cooperation with the United States on it, and after the new Conservative government in Poland has also made clear its enthusiasm for participation in BMD development. While new Christian Democrat Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany is hampered by the coalition partnership nature of her government with the Social Democrats, victory points to the possibility of future German participation in the BMD programs too.
In other words, around the advanced industrial democratic world, ballistic missile defense is now almost universally a vote-winner and support for it has characterized victorious and resurgent conservative parties in Asia and America, in North and South. Harper's victory confirms that trend.
Link
UPI Senior News Analyst
WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 (UPI) -- Conventional Wisdom has so far paid almost no attention to the strategic consequences of Stephen Harper's victory with the Conservative Party in Canada on Monday. Conventional Wisdom as usual is wrong. Harper's victory is likely to have very rapid significant consequences for the development of hemispheric ballistic missile defense, with a far greater longer-term strategic potential for Canadian-U.S. relations.
Harper this week led his Conservative Party back to power after almost two decades in the political wilderness. The Canadian general election's results allowed the Conservatives or Tories to form a minority government, succeeding the previous one of Liberal Party leader Paul Martin.
Because the Conservatives are the only one of Canada's five major political parties anywhere to the right of the political spectrum in U.S. terms, and because previous minority governments have governed cautiously and, like Martin's, tended to last not more than a year or two, there is a general tendency to assume that Harper will be unable to have a significant impact on long-term Canadian policies and that he will, in particular, be unable to or even unwilling to fulfill his pledge to make Canada a partner in ballistic missile defense with the United States.
However, Harper's decision to break the longstanding political consensus in Canada to steer clear of BMD appears to have won him a significant boost in support in what proved to be a tight race. And in contrast to domestic issues, where the potential majority of the other parties joined against him could block significant legislative initiatives by his new government, it may prove far easier for him to push ahead with BMD cooperation with Washington.
First, the debate during the election campaign indicated it was relatively popular with the Canadian public. And second, it may prove far easier to push ahead with that than to implement his domestic agenda. For taking administrative decisions to increase military cooperation with the United States would not require piloting new legislation through the House of Commons, the main chamber of the Canadian parliament, in Ottawa. Harper's prospects for doing that remain poor.
"Of the four other major parties, the Tories can count on support from none. Yet the Liberals can depend on the kindred New Democratic Party, the Bloc Quebecois, and the Greens for occasional support on social and environmental policy," Stephen Johnson of the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based conservative think tank, wrote in an analysis Wednesday.
Third, initial cooperation with the United States on BMD would not cost the Canadian taxpayer a cent under the terms that President George W. Bush offered Prime Minister Martin last February.
Fourth, Harper admires the president personally and has made clear that in may respects he wants to emulate Bush's political style. He took a significant risk in breaking the cozy old consensus in Ottawa to proclaim his support for BMD, and he has also studied how effectively Bush pursued the strategy after he was first elected on only a plurality vote in November 2000 of governing boldly and confidently, sitting high in the saddle and acting as if he had broad popular majority support for his policies. That paid off when the president was reelected to a second term four years later with more votes than any other president ever received in American political history. Taking a bold stand on BMD cooperation with the United States in the cause of protecting the Canadian people offers the same kind of payoff for Harper.
Fifth, Martin paid a far higher price than he ever expected for flip-flopping on BMD cooperation with the United States. First, he accepted Bush's offer, then under pressure from critics within and outside his own Liberal Party, he changed his mind. That quieted his party critics but left him looking foolish and indecisive on major national security issue before the Canadian people. By sticking to his guns and pushing ahead rapidly with BMD cooperation now, Harper may well cement his own leadership credentials with the public and stand out in contrast with Martin.
From the American side, Harper's decision has no immediate physical advantages, but its long-term diplomatic and strategic advantages may be profound.
The U.S. multi-tier BMD system being developed to protect the nation against nuclear armed ballistic missiles that could be fired by so-called "rogue states" like North Korea or Iran does not need Canadian cooperation or geographical locations to be effective. The radar detection web being fashioned in Alaska, California, on U.S. Navy Aegis-class warships in the Pacific and involving orbiting space-based assets takes care of all that.
Nor did the Bush administration seek or need any active Canadian involvement in BMD development: Washington had been looking for a moral declaration of support.
But by joining hands with the United States on BMD, Harper at one stroke has resurrected the tremendous tradition of strategic cooperation between the United States and Canada that guaranteed hemispheric defense through World War II and the long decades of the Cold War. And he also establishes a precedent of strategic cooperation that should make progress far easier in stepping up joint security work against Islamist extremists in Canada, believed to especially concentrated and well-organized in Quebec.
Also, with Britain and Australia already playing active, highly important roles in their BMD partnerships with the United States, Harper's decision goes far to making BMD cooperation a defining policy characteristic of the leading Anglosphere nations. This is especially the case since India signed off on far-reaching BMD cooperation with the United States only last year.
Furthermore, Martin's flip-flop on BMD had thrown into some doubt the question as to whether or how he would renew North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) accord when it comes up for renewal in May 2006. Harper, as Stephen Johnson noted, is far more likely to renew it without destructive or damaging amendments or quibbles.
Finally, Canada's accession to the cause of BMD comes within a year of India and Japan both signing on to vastly expanded cooperation with the United States on it, and after the new Conservative government in Poland has also made clear its enthusiasm for participation in BMD development. While new Christian Democrat Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany is hampered by the coalition partnership nature of her government with the Social Democrats, victory points to the possibility of future German participation in the BMD programs too.
In other words, around the advanced industrial democratic world, ballistic missile defense is now almost universally a vote-winner and support for it has characterized victorious and resurgent conservative parties in Asia and America, in North and South. Harper's victory confirms that trend.
Link
