Free will versus determinism

[mentalfloss]

BTW, when did I say you didn't make that choice?

You didn't make that choice

....

Regardless of whether or not your new version of determinism suits your flimsy argument, one claim that you've staunchly made is that responsibility and determinism (the classic definition) are compatible. Do you stand by that claim?

 

[peacegirl]

....

Regardless of whether or not your new version of determinism suits your flimsy argument, one claim that you've staunchly made is that responsibility and determinism (the classic definition) are compatible. Do you stand by that claim?

Yes mentalfloss, it fits my FLIMSY argument. And if you don't think this is right, and you want to leave because of it, it's really okay. And people wonder why I have an attitude? Hmmm. :roll:

 

[karrie]

I know others have done it before, but I'll do it again. I extend an invitation to you peacegirl, to venture out of your thread and converse with the members here on subjects other than your father's work.

 

[Dexter Sinister]

...when did I say you didn't make that choice?

Last paragraph of post #478.

All along I've been saying you are the one that makes the choice.

While insisting I don't have a choice, it's fully deterministic. That's wanting it both ways.

 

[peacegirl]

Last paragraph of post #478.
While insisting I don't have a choice, it's fully deterministic. That's wanting it both ways.

All along I have said that we have the ability to contemplate to decide which option is preferable, but because we can only move in one direction, choice is an illusion. That is not wanting it both ways.

 

[mentalfloss]

Yes mentalfloss, it fits my FLIMSY argument. And if you don't think this is right, and you want to leave because of it, it's really okay.

I wouldn't leave because determinism and responsibility are not compatible. I needed you to at least commit to something consistent and there is indeed a relevant logic that you've already put forth regarding classical determinism and responsibility.

The following is an excerpt from Roderick M. Chisholm which provides the original foundational logic for this sort of compatibilism given by G.E. Moore (which is identical to the remarks that you've put forth) as well as the successful rebuttal.

I need to preface by mentioning that this follows the example of one man shooting another man.
---

One proceeds as follows: The expression

a) He could have done otherwise,

it is argued, means no more nor less than

b) If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise.

The truth statement (b), it is then pointed out is consistent with determinism (and with divine providence); for even if all that man's actions were causally determined, the man could still be such that, if he had chosen otherwise, then he would have done otherwise. What the murderer saw, let us suppose along with his beliefs and desires, caused him to fire the shot; yet he was such that if, just then, he had chosen or decided not to fire the shot, then he would not have fired it. All of this is certainly possible.

And therefore, the argument proceeds if (b) is consistent with determinism and if (a) and (b) say the same thing, then (a) is also consistent with determinism; hence we can say that the agent could have done otherwise even though he was caused to do what he did do; and therefore determinism and moral responsibility are compatible.

Is the argument sound? The conclusion follows from the premises, but the catch, I think, lies in the first premise -- the one saying that statement (a) tells us no more nor less than what statement (b) tells us. For it could also be possible that (b) could be true while (a) is false.

That is to say, our man might be such that, if had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise and yet also such that he could not have done otherwise. Suppose, after all, that our murder could not have chosen, or could not have decided, to do otherwise. Then the fact that he happens also to be a man such that, if he had chosen not to shoot he would not have shot, would make no difference. For if he could not have chosen not to shoot, then he could not have done anything other than just what it was that he did do.

In a word: from our statement (b), we cannot make an inference to (a) unless we can also assert:

(c) He could have chosen to do otherwise.

And therefore, if we must reject this third statement (c) - and we must if we are to hold to any deterministic principle - then, even though we may be justified in asserting (b), we are not justified in asserting (a). If the man could not have chosen to do otherwise, then he would not have done otherwise--even if he was such that, if he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise.

I would say, therefore, that the ascription of responsibility conflicts with a deterministic view of action.

 

[Dexter Sinister]

All along I have said that we have the ability to contemplate to decide which option is preferable, but because we can only move in one direction, choice is an illusion. That is not wanting it both ways.

I can contemplate my options and make a choice on that basis, but choice is an illusion? That's just incoherent. You don't read and understand what people say, either. I, for instance, very explicitly stated that I don't know which side of the free will versus determinism debate has it right, I've never seen a convincing argument either way, and then you go off attributing my objections to Lessans' analysis to my fear that determinism might be true. Spare me your pop psychology analyses, you don't understand enough about me or human psychology to justify a claim like that. I object to Lessans' analysis because he hasn't made a convincing argument, that's all, fear doesn't enter into it. He might be right, I don't know if he is or not, and frankly I'm finding it increasingly difficult to care. Regardless of what he claims, he has not marshaled the evidence to justify accepting it, all he's got is anecdote and speculation, and that's not good enough.

And as long as I'm here, it also seems relevant to point out that real life seldom offers options where the most satisfying choice is clear, and Lessans doesn't seem to understand that. His view of reality is far too simple, idealized, and naive, reality just isn't the way he wants it to be.

 

[Omicron]

Actually, I know all about how to answer this question, but first you have to answer me why red looks like red.

 

[peacegirl]

I wouldn't leave because determinism and responsibility are not compatible. I needed you to at least commit to something consistent and there is indeed a relevant logic that you've already put forth regarding classical determinism and responsibility.

The following is an excerpt from Roderick M. Chisholm which provides the original foundational logic for this sort of compatibilism given by G.E. Moore (which is identical to the remarks that you've put forth) as well as the successful rebuttal.

I need to preface by mentioning that this follows the example of one man shooting another man.
---

One proceeds as follows: The expression

a) He could have done otherwise,

it is argued, means no more nor less than

b) If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise.

The truth statement (b), it is then pointed out is consistent with determinism (and with divine providence); for even if all that man's actions were causally determined, the man could still be such that, if he had chosen otherwise, then he would have done otherwise. What the murderer saw, let us suppose along with his beliefs and desires, caused him to fire the shot; yet he was such that if, just then, he had chosen or decided not to fire the shot, then he would not have fired it. All of this is certainly possible.

And therefore, the argument proceeds if (b) is consistent with determinism and if (a) and (b) say the same thing, then (a) is also consistent with determinism; hence we can say that the agent could have done otherwise even though he was caused to do what he did do; and therefore determinism and moral responsibility are compatible.

Is the argument sound? The conclusion follows from the premises, but the catch, I think, lies in the first premise -- the one saying that statement (a) tells us no more nor less than what statement (b) tells us. For it could also be possible that (b) could be true while (a) is false.

That is to say, our man might be such that, if had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise and yet also such that he could not have done otherwise. Suppose, after all, that our murder could not have chosen, or could not have decided, to do otherwise. Then the fact that he happens also to be a man such that, if he had chosen not to shoot he would not have shot, would make no difference. For if he could not have chosen not to shoot, then he could not have done anything other than just what it was that he did do.

In a word: from our statement (b), we cannot make an inference to (a) unless we can also assert:

(c) He could have chosen to do otherwise.

And therefore, if we must reject this third statement (c) - and we must if we are to hold to any deterministic principle - then, even though we may be justified in asserting (b), we are not justified in asserting (a). If the man could not have chosen to do otherwise, then he would not have done otherwise--even if he was such that, if he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise.

I would say, therefore, that the ascription of responsibility conflicts with a deterministic view of action.

I am not in disagreement. If man's will is not free, he cannot be held responsible for his actions, period. But we are talking about an act that has not yet occured. It's true that after an act occurs, the shooter could not have done otherwise. But before he shoots, he could do otherwise if he finds not shooting to be preferable to shooting. This is what the author is trying to show; that we can create an environment where the shooter is compelled not to shoot as a motion in the direction of greater satisfaction.

I can contemplate my options and make a choice on that basis, but choice is an illusion? That's just incoherent. You don't read and understand what people say, either. I, for instance, very explicitly stated that I don't know which side of the free will versus determinism debate has it right, I've never seen a convincing argument either way, and then you go off attributing my objections to Lessans' analysis to my fear that determinism might be true. Spare me your pop psychology analyses, you don't understand enough about me or human psychology to justify a claim like that. I object to Lessans' analysis because he hasn't made a convincing argument, that's all, fear doesn't enter into it. He might be right, I don't know if he is or not, and frankly I'm finding it increasingly difficult to care. Regardless of what he claims, he has not marshaled the evidence to justify accepting it, all he's got is anecdote and speculation, and that's not good enough.

He has much more than anecdone and speculation because these principles are universal and they work. I know you are trying to be neutral. I hope eventually you are convinced that Lessans was right because of the undeniable proof of determinism, nothing else.

And as long as I'm here, it also seems relevant to point out that real life seldom offers options where the most satisfying choice is clear, and Lessans doesn't seem to understand that. His view of reality is far too simple, idealized, and naive, reality just isn't the way he wants it to be.

Of course we don't always know which will be the most satisfying choice. Most of the time we don't because we don't have all the facts, but where does this conflict with 'greater satisfaction'? Just because a choice is not clear doesn't change the direction we are compelled to go, which is to pick the choice that comes closest to what we believe will give us the most satisfaction. If we find out that our choice was wrong, and we should have chosen the other, we rectify it by correcting our mistake the next time. The point here is that even when we aren't sure which choice is best, we try to figure out what we think would be best, in the direction of 'greater satisfaction.'

 

[mentalfloss]

....
..one claim that you've staunchly made is that responsibility and determinism (the classic definition) are compatible.Do you stand by that claim?

Yes mentalfloss.. And if you don't think this is right, and you want to leave because of it, it's really okay. And people wonder why I have an attitude? Hmmm. :roll:

After showing classical determinism and responsibility are incompatible, you change your position.

If man's will is not free, he cannot be held responsible for his actions, period.

You support the notion that determinism - classical determinism mind you - is compatible with responsibility. You later deny your previous claim and assert determinism and responsibility are not compatible. You go even further to say that man can only be held responsible if his actions are free.

If you feel so compelled for me to actually take the initiative to understand your mantra any further, you need to at least try and absolve yourself from committing such obvious logical contradictions. And obviously, as many posters have already mentioned, it would help to abstain from doing so in the future as well.

So, would you like to confirm which assertion is true here? In other words, can you reaffirm whether classical determinism is compatible with responsibility or not? Which is it?

 

[peacegirl]

After showing classical determinism and responsibility are incompatible, you change your position.

I think you are misunderstanding what is meant by 'responsibility'. As I stated to s_lone, responsibility for an action only means that you were the one that did the act. You can't blame what you did on something other than yourself because nothing other than yourself can force you to do something against your will. Therefore, you wanted to do it, for whever reason. That's all this means. It does not mean that once you do something to hurt another, that you are responsible; you are not responsible because you were moving in the direction of greater satisfaction, over which you had no control.

You support the notion that determinism - classical determinism mind you - is compatible with responsibility. You later deny your previous claim and assert determinism and responsibility are not compatible. You go even further to say that man can only be held responsible if his actions are free.

I think you are confusing what I meant by responsibility, as I mentioned earlier. We are not responsible for our actions because our will is not free, but the two-sided equation prevent the justification to choose hurting others as a preferable alternative.

If you feel so compelled for me to actually take the initiative to understand your mantra any further, you need to at least try and absolve yourself from committing such obvious logical contradictions. And obviously, as many posters have already mentioned, it would help to abstain from doing so in the future as well.

I'm trying my best to show you where there is no contradiction whatsoever.

So, would you like to confirm which assertion is true here? In other words, can you reaffirm whether classical determinism is compatible with responsibility or not? Which is it?

It does not matter whether it's classical determinism or the proposed definition, once an action occurs, we are not responsible.

 

[JLM]

i think you are misunderstanding what is meant by 'responsibility'. As i stated to s_lone, responsibility for an action only means that you were the one that did the act. You can't blame what you did on something other than yourself because nothing other than yourself can force you to do something against your will. Therefore, you wanted to do it, for whever reason. That's all this means. it does not mean that once you do something to hurt another, that you are responsible for the act; you are not because you were moving in the direction of greater satisfaction to hurt this person, over which you had no control.

Well, which way is it going to be?



?

[/quote]

 

[mentalfloss]

I think you are misunderstanding what is meant by 'responsibility'. As I stated to s_lone, responsibility for an action only means that you were the one that did the act. You can't blame what you did on something other than yourself because nothing other than yourself can force you to do something against your will. Therefore, you wanted to do it, for whever reason. That's all this means. It does not mean that once you do something to hurt another, that you are responsible for the act; you are not because you were moving in the direction of greater satisfaction to hurt this person, over which you had no control.

Umm.. Your version of responsibility here is the same version of responsibility that Moore used to try and make classical determinism compatible with responsibility. Simply because you use a modifier like compulsion or satisfaction, does not change the implication of the rebuttal as those terms are simply a sublet of the second premise:

b) If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise.

And we've heard you reiterate this many times. Regardless of why he would have chosen otherwise, he would have done so otherwise. And if your new version of determinism is simply tacking on this compulsion or satisfaction, it is still within that logic constraint in its attempt to validate classical determinism with responsibility.

You can try and twist the words any which way you want, but in order to validate any form of determinism(new or old), you need to somehow show that determinism is compatible with responsibility. The modifier of compulsion or satisfaction doesn't cut it, so you'll somehow have to invalidate Chisholm's proof that determinism and responsibility are not compatible.

 

[peacegirl]

Umm.. Your version of responsibility here is the same version of responsibility that Moore used to try and make classical determinism compatible with responsibility. Simply because you use a modifier like compulsion or satisfaction, does not change the implication of the rebuttal as those terms are simply a sublet of the second premise:

b) If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise.

It is true that if he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done otherwise, but he did not choose to do otherwise because it gave him greater satisfaction at that moment to do what he did. The fact that he could have chosen otherwise is not what makes his choice compatible with responsibility. It's a moot point. In other words, if he finds it preferable to shoot a gun at someone, he is not responsible for this act once the act occurs. The world knows this and would never hold him responsible or blame him in any way. What prevents this act and makes him choose not to shoot the gun is the fact that, under the changed conditions (do you know what the changed conditions are?), he can no longer justify what he is about to do.

And we've heard you reiterate this many times. Regardless of why he would have chosen otherwise, he would have done so otherwise. And if your new version of determinism is simply tacking on this compulsion or satisfaction, it is still within that logic constraint in its attempt to validate classical determinism with responsibility.

You need to bear in mind how conscience works. The only effective change is that we won't desire hurting someone with a first blow when we can no longer find the necessary justification in which to act on our desire. Responsibility is not really the issue.

You can try and twist the words any which way you want, but in order to validate any form of determinism(new or old), you need to somehow show that determinism is compatible with responsibility. The modifier of compulsion or satisfaction doesn't cut it, so you'll somehow have to invalidate Chisholm's proof that determinism and responsibility are not compatible.

We cannot hold man responsible if his will is not free. How can we hold him responsible if he could not help himself? The reason people get so upset about the thought of determinism is because it was assumed that if we stopped blaming man for doing those things considered wrong, he would take advantage of this knowledge at every turn. But this is not the case. You really need to read the two-sided equation because you are missing the second half entirely.

 

[mentalfloss]

I agree, we don't need to blame someone for them to be responsible for their actions. As you said, all that is required for responsibility is that you were the one that did the act. I am typing - I am responsible for typing at this point in time. Who would 'blame' me for simply typing? Conversely, who would praise me simply for typing? That makes no sense.

You agreed to this principle yourself..

As I stated to s_lone, responsibility for an action only means that you were the one that did the act.

And as such responsibility is not a moot point because you yourself admit to the notion that the one who acts is by necessity responsible for that act. If you concede that all that is required for responsibility of an action item is identifying the agent that committed the act, then you must stay true to the claim that responsibility must be compatible with determinism in order for it to have merit.

The only way to do that is to use the presupposition that Moore came to. But that, then again, brings you back to the logical fallacy outlined by Chisholm. I suggest you read through it again.

 

[peacegirl]

I agree, we don't need to blame someone for them to be responsible for their actions. As you said, all that is required for responsibility is that you were the one that did the act. I am typing - I am responsible for typing at this point in time. Who would 'blame' me for simply typing? Conversely, who would praise me simply for typing? That makes no sense.

You agreed to this principle yourself..

The only reason he mentioned responsibility was to distinguish the classical definition from his proposed definition. In the classical definition we can use the excuse that something made me to do it, even though I didn't want to. With Lessans' definition, if someone does something to hurt someone, he can't use the excuse that something made him do it, because of the fact that nothing in this world can make you do anything unless you want to do it. You are not hurting anyone by typing, therefore blame doesn't come into the picture. Blame only comes into the picture when we believe someone did something wrong (i.e. something that hurt someone) that is then worthy of blame and judgment. Lessans writes:

Let me repeat this crucial point because it is the source of so much confusion: Although man’s will is not free there is absolutely nothing, not environment, heredity, God, or anything else that causes him to do what he doesn’t want to do. The environment does not cause him to commit a crime, it just presents conditions under which his desire is aroused consequently he can’t blame what is not responsible, but remember his particular environment is different because he himself is different otherwise everybody would desire to commit a crime. Once he chooses to act on his desire whether it is a minor or more serious crime he doesn’t come right out and say, "I hurt that person not because I was compelled to do it against my will but only because I wanted to do it" because the standards of right and wrong prevent him from deriving any satisfaction out of such honesty when this will only evoke blame, criticism, and punishment of some sort for his desires. Therefore, he is compelled to justify those actions considered wrong with excuses, extenuating circumstances, and the shifting of guilt to someone or something else as the cause, to absorb part if not all the responsibility which allowed him to absolve his conscience in a world of judgment and to hurt others in many cases with impunity since he could demonstrate why he was compelled to do what he really didn’t want to do.

You see it happen all the time, even when a child says, "Look what you made me do" when you know you didn’t make him do anything. Spilling a glass of milk because he was careless, and not wishing to be blamed, the boy searches quickly for an excuse to shift the responsibility to something that does not include him. Why else would the boy blame his own carelessness on somebody or something else if not to avoid the criticism of his parents? It is also true that the boy’s awareness that he would be blamed and punished for carelessness — which is exactly what took place — makes him think very carefully about all that he does to prevent the blame and punishment he doesn’t want. A great confusion exists because it is assumed that if man does something to hurt another he could always excuse his actions by saying, "I couldn’t help myself because my will is not free." This is another aspect of the implications which turned philosophers off from a thorough investigation. In the following dialogue, my friend asks for clarification regarding certain critical points.

"You read my mind. I really don’t know how you plan to solve this enigmatic corollary but it seems to me that this knowledge would give man a perfect excuse for taking advantage of others without any fear of consequences. If the boy knows for a fact that his will is not free, why couldn’t he use this as an excuse in an attempt to shift his responsibility or use any other excuse he feels will sound believable for the same reason?"

"This last question is a superficial perception of inaccurate reasoning because it is mathematically impossible to shift responsibility, to excuse or justify getting away with something, when you know in advance that you will not be blamed regardless of what you do because the world knows your will is not free. Because of this general confusion with words through which you have been compelled to see a distorted reality, it appears at first glance that the dethronement of free will would allow man to shift his responsibility all the more and take advantage of not being blamed to excuse or justify any desires heretofore kept under control by the fear of punishment and public opinion which judged his actions in accordance with standards of right and wrong; but this is a superficial perception of inaccurate reasoning simply because it is mathematically impossible to shift your responsibility, to excuse or justify getting away with something, when you know that you will not be blamed for what you do. In other words, it is only possible to attempt a shift of your responsibility for hurting someone, or for doing what is judged improper, when you are held responsible by a code of standards that criticizes you in advance for doing something considered wrong by others. In fact, the very act of justifying or excusing your behavior is an indication that the person or people to whom you are presenting this justification must judge the behavior unacceptable in some way, otherwise, there would be no need for it.
They are interested to know why you could do such a thing which compels you for satisfaction to think up a reasonable excuse to extenuate the circumstances and mitigate their unfavorable opinion of your action. If you do what others judge to be right is it necessary to lie or offer excuses, or say that your will is not free and you couldn’t help yourself, when no one is saying you could help yourself? Let me elaborate for greater understanding.

"If someone does what everybody considers right as opposed to wrong, that is, if this person acts in a manner that pleases everybody, is it possible to blame him for doing what society expects of him? This isn’t a trick question, so don’t look so puzzled. If your boss tells you that he wants something done a certain way and you never fail to do it that way, is it possible for him to blame you for doing what he wants you to do?"

"No, it is not possible. I agree."

"Consequently, if you can’t be blamed for doing what is right, then it should be obvious that you can only be blamed for doing something judged wrong, is that right?"

"I agree with this."

"These people who are judging you for doing something wrong are interested to know why you could do such a thing, which compels you for satisfaction to lie or think up a reasonable excuse, to extenuate the circumstances and mitigate their unfavorable opinion of your action; otherwise, if they were not judging your conduct as wrong you would not have to do these things, right?"

"You are right again."

"Now if you know as a matter of positive knowledge that no one is going to blame you for what you did, wrong or right, that is, no one is going to question your conduct in any way because you know that they must excuse what you do since man’s will is not free, is it possible for you to blame someone or something else as the cause for what you know you have done, when you also know that no one is blaming you?

"Why are you smiling?"

"You’re the greatest with your mathematical reasoning, and I agree that it is not possible."

"This proves conclusively that the only time man can say, "I couldn’t help myself because my will is not free," or offer any other kind of excuse, is if someone said he could help himself or blamed him in any way so he could make this effort to shift his responsibility, right?"

"You are absolutely correct."

"Which means that only in the world of free will, in a world of judgment, can this statement, "I couldn’t help myself because my will is not free" be made, since it cannot be done when man knows he will not be blamed. Remember, it is only possible to attempt a shift of your responsibility for hurting someone, or for doing what is judged improper, when you are held responsible by a code of standards that criticizes you in advance for doing something considered wrong by others. But once it is realized, as a matter of positive knowledge, that man will not be held responsible for what he does since his will is not free, regardless of what is done (don’t jump to conclusions, just follow the reasoning — my problem is difficult enough as it is), it becomes mathematically impossible for you to blame someone or something else as the cause for what you know you have done simply because you know that no one is blaming you. Being constantly criticized by the standards that prevailed man was compelled, as a motion in the direction of satisfaction, to be dishonest with everyone, including himself, while refusing to accept that which was his responsibility. He blamed various factors or causes for the many things he desired to do that were considered wrong, because he didn’t like being in the wrong. But the very moment the dethronement of free will makes it known that no one henceforth will be held responsible for what he does since his will is not free, regardless of what is done, and there will be no more criticism or blame regardless of his actions, man is also prevented from making someone else the scapegoat for what he does, prevented from excusing or justifying his own actions since he is not being given an opportunity to do so, which compels him, completely beyond control, but of his own free will or desire, not only to assume full responsibility [when he says 'full responsibility' he only means that he cannot shift what he knows is his responsibility (what he did) to something else when no one is holding him responsible] for everything he does, but to be absolutely honest with himself and others. How is it humanly possible for you to desire lying to me or to yourself when your actions are not being judged or blamed, in other words, when you are not being given an opportunity to lie, and how is it possible for you to make any effort to shift your responsibility when no one holds you responsible? In the world of free will man was able to absolve his conscience in a world of right and wrong and get away with murder the very things our new knowledge that man’s will is not free positively prevents.

It should be obvious that all your judgments of what is right and wrong in human conduct are based upon an ethical standard such as the Ten Commandments which came into existence out of God’s will, as did everything else, and consequently you have come to believe through a fallacious association of symbols that these words which judge the actions of others are accurate.

And as such responsibility is not a moot point because you yourself admit to the notion that the one who acts is by necessity responsible for that act. If you concede that all that is required for responsibility of an action item is identifying the agent that committed the act, then you must stay true to the claim that responsibility must be compatible with determinism in order for it to have merit.

That's just the point. Even if everyone knew that this person was the one who was responsible for the act (the one who did it), the world knows he was not responsible because he is under a compulsion to do everything he does. Here is the other side of the equation, which is key: He knows before the act is committed, he is not under a compulsion to do anything he doesn't want to do, for over this he has absolute control. And when it fully dawns on him that should he go ahead with this act, no one will ever blame him for what they now know was beyond his control because his will is not free, he is compelled to relinquish this desire to hurt another because, under these conditions, he cannot find the necessary justification to do so.

The only way to do that is to use the presupposition that Moore came to. But that, then again, brings you back to the logical fallacy outlined by Chisholm. I suggest you read through it again.

There is no logical fallacy. You need to read and reread the two-sided equation to understand that the advance knowledge that from here on in no one will be blamed by anyone anywhere for striking a first blow prevents the very justification he must have in order to follow through with the act.

 

[mentalfloss]

The only reason he mentioned responsibility was to distinguish the classical definition from his proposed definition. In the classical definition we can use the excuse that something made me to do it, even though I didn't want to. With Lessans' definition, if someone does something to hurt someone, he can't use the excuse that something made him do it, because of the fact that nothing in this world can make you do anything unless you want to do it. You are not hurting anyone by typing, therefore blame doesn't come into the picture. Blame only comes into the picture when we believe someone did something wrong (i.e. something that hurt someone) that is then worthy of blame and judgment. Lessans writes:

The true nature of responsibility is as you have already said it and is as follows.

1.) Responsibility is the ability to account an action to an agent.
2.) Moral responsibility is the ability to account some good or bad action to an agent.

Moral responsibility is a subset of responsibility. In other words, whether or not the action is good or bad or nice or mean, it is an action. The affirmation of that action with an agent (regardless if it is moral) still constitutes responsibility. None of your post disagrees with that proposition.

In fact you bolded the part where Lessans confirms that 'full responsibility' is attributable to the act that is committed. And that same agent, in this case, could acknowledge his own 'full responsibility' without being blamed or praised.

So, none of that denies the fact that responsibility must be shown to be compatible with determinism. And I don't find your thesis of 'compulsion' as a means for this compatibility to be convincing at all.

That's just the point. Even if everyone knew that this person was the one who was responsible for the act (the one who did it), the world knows he was not responsible because he is under a compulsion to do everything he does.

Not only is the definition of responsibility obviously paradoxical here - it is clear that compulsion does not mandate one's actions. Firstly, the agent is either responsible or not responsible for the act, he cannot be both. And secondly, 'compulsion' or 'desire' requires an objective metric in order to hold the kind of inevitable sway that you attribute it to have.

No, the individual who is at least conscious of the options available to them always has the innate ability to willfully choose any of those possibilities and that they could have done otherwise does not mandate that they would have done otherwise. And regardless of whether 'compulsion' can be used as an excuse for ridding blame, that individual must take full responsibility for the action that was done - for good, worse, or irrelevent.

 

[Dexter Sinister]

He has much more than anecdone and speculation because these principles are universal and they work.

That simply doesn't follow, he has not established either that they're universal or that they work, he supports those claims only with anecdote and speculation.

The reason people get so upset about the thought of determinism is because it was assumed that if we stopped blaming man for doing those things considered wrong, he would take advantage of this knowledge at every turn. But this is not the case.

That's not correct either. It often IS the case that people will do wrong things if they believe they can get away with them.

 

[peacegirl]

The true nature of responsibility is as you have already said it and is as follows.

1.) Responsibility is the ability to account an action to an agent.
2.) Moral responsibility is the ability to account some good or bad action to an agent.

Moral responsibility is a subset of responsibility. In other words, whether or not the action is good or bad or nice or mean, it is an action. The affirmation of that action with an agent (regardless if it is moral) still constitutes responsibility. None of your post disagrees with that proposition.

Right, this discovery shows that just because you are determined to do certain things does not get you off the hook of responsibility. But the only way this can occur is when you are not being blamed. It is a paradox, but it is not a contradiction.

In fact you bolded the part where Lessans confirms that 'full responsibility' is attributable to the act that is committed. And that same agent, in this case, could acknowledge his own 'full responsibility' without being blamed or praised.

Where does praise come into this? When we're praised for something, we don't try to come up with excuses. It's only when we're being blamed for doing something that we need to rationalize our behavior. Moreover, this is not about the agent 'could' acknowledge his own 'full responsibility'. He has no choice but to assume full responsibility when no one is judging or blaming his behavior.

So, none of that denies the fact that responsibility must be shown to be compatible with determinism. And I don't find your thesis of 'compulsion' as a means for this compatibility to be convincing at all.

How is responsibility not compatible with determinism? You have no choice but to assume responsibility for your actions when you know in advance that you will NOT be blamed [because you cannot shift that which is your responsibility]. When you know you WILL be blamed, you have the opportunity to shift that which is your responsibility. Show me an example where the two don't go together.

Not only is the definition of responsibility obviously paradoxical here - it is clear that compulsion does not mandate one's actions. Firstly, the agent is either responsible or not responsible for the act, he cannot be both. And secondly, 'compulsion' or 'desire' requires an objective metric in order to hold the kind of inevitable sway that you attribute it to have.

There is no metric that is necessary to hold any kind of inevitable sway. The sway I hold is absolute in that compulsion is the movement away from that which dissatisfies, otherwise you wouldn't move at all because you would be satisfied. We seem to be going backwards. If you don't get the proof of 'greater satisfaction', we can't move on to the two-sided equation, because you will say that the premise is wrong.

No, the individual who is at least conscious of the options available to them always has the innate ability to willfully choose any of those possibilities and that they could have done otherwise does not mandate that they would have done otherwise.

Yes it does mandate that he would have done otherwise, but only when the environmental conditions force his hand. The individual can willfully choose [it is his will doing the choosing] any one of those possibilities depending on which choice is the most preferable. There is no need for a metric to calculate all of the variables that would lead him to choose one thing over another. It's unimportant because most choices don't involve someone getting hurt. The only thing that matters is that, under the changed conditions, he would not desire to strike a first blow. Once again, regardless of the factors that influence a person's choices, he can only go in one direction, which is toward greater satisfaction. In other words, it is impossible for him to move in the direction of dissatisfaction when a better alternative is available. I am surprised that we're now back at square one.

And regardless of whether 'compulsion' can be used as an excuse for ridding blame, that individual must take full responsibility for the action that was done - for good, worse, or irrelevent.

An excuse? How can 'compulsion' be used as an excuse for ridding blame when no one is asking for an excuse? I hope you don't give up, but you have a long ways to go. I think what is happening is that you and others are so well-versed in this topic, that it's difficult for you to see Lessans' perspective. I hope in time you will be able to let go of the old definition (temporarily) to embrace the new because they are not compatible and you will continue to have a problem with this knowledge if you don't.

That simply doesn't follow, he has not established either that they're universal or that they work, he supports those claims only with anecdote and speculation.

That's not correct either. It often IS the case that people will do wrong things if they believe they can get away with them.

No, he supports his claims with astute observation and sound reasoning. And if that doesn't satisfy you then just remember that in order to move forward there must be some kind of a priori justification that will allow the discussion to continue. Otherwise, you will keep saying that this is not proven, and game will be over. Believe me, this invariable law of our nature does work for the very reason that it is an invariable law. It it wasn't, then all bets would be off.

 

[Dexter Sinister]

How is responsibility not compatible with determinism? You have no choice but to assume responsibility for your actions when you know in advance that you will NOT be blamed [because you cannot shift that which is your responsibility]. When you know you WILL be blamed, you have the opportunity to shift that which is your responsibility. Show me an example where the two don't go together.

That strikes me as completely illogical. Knowing you'll be blamed doesn't give you the opportunity to shift responsibility, it just creates a motive to try. If you won't be blamed, there are no consequences for whatever wrong things you do, you can deny all responsibility. Suppose I choose to poison all the cats in my neighbourhood, for instance (and I hope we can agree that would be a wrong thing to do), because they kill the birds I like to attract to my yard, dig up my flower beds, and crap in my garden. If doing so has no negative consequences for me, and I would derive great personal satisfaction from seeing an end to the damage they do, what would prevent me from doing it? Lessans' lessons seem to me a recipe for extreme solipsism, not a better world.

No, he supports his claims with astute observation and sound reasoning.

Evidently what you perceive as astute observation and sound reasoning look to me like anecdote and speculation.