If and when Iran gets the nukes, that simple. Iran has a secret alliance with, believe it or not, the Argentine military, this is underground State terrorism, as the military still rule that nation from the shadows, i.e. in terms of dictating the nation's foreign policies. Back in 1992 and 1994, there is evidence about it, it was the Argentine Army which provided Hezbollah to blow respectively the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the DAIA Jewish social center in the same city. Plus Iran has a mutual defense agreement with now quasi-Communist Venezuela; at the latter the presence of Hezbollah being now prominent. Now, as a free-lance investigative journalist I have, from sources I wish no name, intelligence about Argentina already having a small, low-yield nuclear weapon stockpile; the Iran-Argentina master plan seemingly being to possibly wage a two-front nuclear war against both Israel and the West (i.e., the United States in the Caribbean, and Great Britain at the Falklands. Think about it: until M. Vanunu came up with evidence about Israel having the nukes, the Western governments kept silent about it. Now, my conclusion, it is the same with Argentina. Yet, the Argentine military being true followers of Herr Adolf Hitler (look at what they did back in the Seventies) would kill anyone who even though doing what Vanunu did; back in Argentina, the threat with death extends to one's family, relatives and, the joke goes, even one's dogs and cats if the need arises. I have never been in Argentina's nuclear weapon facilities; neither have I pictures about it; just intelligence. I am going to post what I wrote about it; it will not come up right as pasted, yet it will be legible.
Defeat at the Falklands led theArgentine military to re-evaluate their strategies, as it can be read in the inthe following 1982 CIA document, released in 2005:
The CIA had evidence that Argentinawas endeavoring to carry out a nuclear weapon program through assistance fromvarious sources, including, but not limited to, the Soviet Union. Because the former West Germany mostobviously would not support the use of its technology for the production ofnuclear weapons in Argentina, various ways to develop these weapons had to besought; what follows is only the information released by the CIA –there may befar more relevant, yet classified, evidence about a concrete nuclear weaponprogram further developed by Argentina: “Argentina is acquiring otherfacilities and material that are unsafeguarded and could be used in a nuclearweapons program…There are ways Argentina could produce plutonium…Should Germanydeny reprocessing, Argentina could move to a second alternative, which would beto acquire plutonium through an unsafeguarded approach. That would require the completion of aplanned research reactor and would probably take at least five to six years,once construction of the reactor begins. As a third alternative, Argentina could choose to divert fuel fromoperating power reactors, either clandestinely or in open violation ofsafeguards, and thereby acquire a nuclear explosive capability in four to fiveyears” (excerpts from http://www.foia.ucia.gov/). Thesame declassified reports also warns that, “Official resentment will probablysoften over time, but it is highly questionable that the United States will bein an effective position to retard or influence the chances for a nuclear testlater in the decade if Argentina is able to produce plutonium in a newunsafewarded research reactor.”
The question arises of whether or not the CIA’s prediction thatArgentina could eventually develop a nuclear weapon program materialized; forthere is a wide technological know-how gap between being able to processplutonium and having the expertise it takes to develop actual nuclearweapons. The Soviets, to begin with,were against nuclear proliferation; their nuclear weapons were very advancedfor that time; they wouldn’t sell out their secrets, least of all to anuntrustworthy nation like Argentina. Unlike Sweden, for instance, Argentina does not specialize in research;it was French expertise in missile technology only which allowed Argentine Navypilots to wreck havoc with the British fleet during the Falklands War. True, from the Seventies Argentina wastraining top nuclear physicists in its Balseiro Institute; yet as a cultureArgentina is not the proper milieu for research development, particularlyregarding the advanced research it took, back then, to develop a nuclear weaponcapability.
THE ARGENTINA-APARTHEID SOUTHAFRICA CONNECTION
Enter here South Africa. In “The unspoken alliance-Israel’s secretrelationship with Apartheid South Africa,” by Sasha Polakow-Suransky, theauthor traces the Nazi influences of the Afrikaner movement to the Europeaneducation of white South Africans; for instance the notion of the nation as avolk sustained by ethnic bonds; plus Hitler’s idealization of the Volk. 1939 found the South African parliament divided between those in favorof the Allies and those in favor of Nazi Germany; the pro-Allies faction barelyprevailed, thus South Africa fought on the Allied side early in 1940. For not only was South Africa divided alongracial lines –Indian, black, and white; whites were also divided along languagelines –English speakers against the Dutch-speaking Afrikaners. During World War Two, the pro-British SouthAfrican government was besieged by problems posed by the Afrikaner nationalistorganization Ossewabrandwag, a true Nazi Africaner front whose stormtroopersperpetrated industrial sabotage, bank robberies and incitations for SouthAfrica to switch alliances in favor of Nazi Germany. The above organization even plotted tooverthow the South African government in order to turn the nation into an allyof Hitler; in fact, the apartheid became state policy even before the war ended(1944). After the war, an Afrikanergovernment began to run South Africa; Christian nationalism, white supremacy,and vicious racism were its basic white South African identity tenets. Eventually, an early Ossewa Brandwag leader,Balthazar Johannes Vorster, became the ideologue behind the brutal repressionof the black opposition in that nation; later on becoming South Africa’s primeminister. Sasha Polakow-Suransky assertsthat, by the late Seventies, the South African government was secretly buildinglow-yield nuclear weapons; yet it further planned to develop more powerfulnuclear devices. The above author pointsout that, back in the Eighties, “The U.S. government feared that South Africa’swhite minority regime, driven by a siege mentality and militant anticommunism,might resort to the nuclear option when faced with Soviet proxies on itsborders” (op. Cit., page 7). The authoralso interprets the apartheid’s attitude toward nuclearizing in terms ofconcealment: “For the South Africans…the Israeli model of nuclear ambiguity coupledwith covert weaponization was enticing” (Op. Cit., page 51). The IAEA first inspected South Africa’s inlate 1991; it kept carrying out inspections for several years. In their article “Nuclear verification in SouthAfrica,” Adolf von Baeckmann, Garry Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos give anaccount of South Africa’s nuclear weaponprogram, pointing out that “South Africa had been operating a number of nuclearfacilities, of unique indigenous origin, that previously had not been subjectto safeguards.” I quote again: “It wasdetermined that the magnitude of the "apparent discrepancy" in theuranium-235 balance associated with the Y-plant was such that –having regard tothe normal uncertainties expected be involved in the plant historical operatingand accounting records –it was reasonable to conclude that the uranium-235balance of the HEU, LEU, and depleted uranium produced by the pilot enrichmentplant was consistent with the uranium feed. Assessment of the production capacity of the pilot enrichment plant, onthe basis of operating records and supporting technical data provided to theIAEA team by the AEC, indicated that it was reasonable to conclude that theamounts of HEU which could have been produced by the plant were consistent withthe amounts declared in the initial report;” then adding that “The IAEA is notin possession of any information suggesting the existence of any undeclaredfacilities connected with the programme” (42 IAEA Bulletin, 1/1995-NationalReports). However, Polakow-Suransky suggeststhat the number of nuclear bombs South Africa claimed to possess by 1989,seven, is misleading; then pointing out the likelihood that “over twenty bombswere produced as well as more than one hundred nuclear artillery shells. The absence of these weapons is attributedeither to stockpiling by right-wing Afrikaners or transfer to Israel forstorage” (Op. Cit., page 222-223). In“Spying on the bomb-American nuclear intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran andNorth Korea,” Jeffrey T. Richelson points out how difficult is to have totalcertainty about the implicacies of a nation’s secret nuclear weapon program;then quoting a U.S. official around 1993 as saying, “you can never prove anegative…you are left at bottom with taking someone’s word for it’ (Op. Cit.,page 180). I quote Richelson: “The lastdeclassified word from the U.S. intelligence community on the subject is an INRreport on December 19, 1993, SouthAfrica: Nuclear Case Closed? Itnoted that [President Frederik Willem] de Klerk’s March [1993] claims –thatSouth African had manufactured six gun-assembled nuclear weapons and hadplanned to complete a seventh weapon using highly enriched uranium as well ashaving done preliminary work on implosion and advanced-weapons designs –wereconsistent with information available to the United States” (Ibidem, page398). The problem at issue was no longerSouth Africa’s defunct nuclear weapon program, but nuclear proliferation. In “The age of deception-Nuclear diplomacy intreacherous times,” Mohamed Elbaradei acknowledges that South Africa did notstop being a nuclear proliferation risk after it totally denuclearized by 1993;as Elbaradei mentions a factory in the mining town of Vanderbijlpark, SouthAfrica, as being a part of the “nuclear jihadist” A.Q. Kahn’s network: “InSeptember 2004, South African police, acting on a tip-off in conjunction withSouth African counterproliferation offials and IAEA inspectors, converged onthe factory. The systems [for unraniumenrichment, minus the centrifuges] had been dismantled piece by piece and placedinto containers, ready for shipment. Therevelation of this expensive operation in South Africa was particularlysurprising to nuclear experts. SouthAfrica had, after all, long ago relinquished its nuclear weapons programs” (Op.Cit., pages 170-1). In “The nuclearexpress-A political history of the bomb and its proliferation,” Thomas C. Reedand Danny B. Stillman conveyed the same preoccupation regarding South Africajust after the Apartheid: “Several thousand nuclear scientists and engineers,concerned about their secrity within an ANC-ruled democracy, had begun to lookelsewhere. Revelations by the Lybians adecade later identified at least two South African firms as villains in theintended nuclear weaponization of Lybia. The Krish Engineering Company, managed by Gerhard Wisser, and Trade Fin,owned by Johan Meyer, were two primesuppliers of centrifugue feed stations for Qaddafi’s nuclear program. Their involvement was confirmed in Germancountrooms a decade later. The southerntip of Africa is not a good neighborhood. The availability of uramium and the presence of underemployed nuclearmercenaries, both eagerly sought by radical Muslim states awash withpetrodollars, has drawn a warm of bad actors to the back streets ofJohannesburg. As the old saying goes,“Idle hands do the Devil’s work” (Op. Cit., page 184).
It must be remembered that theAfrikaners’ leaders were retired generals, who by 1993 had organized aparamilitary force ready to fight a civil war against black Africans in orderto create a volkstaat, this is a White, separate state. In “The fall of Apartheid-The inside storyfrom Smuts to Mbeki,” Robert Harvey points out that by 1991 the AfrikanerResistance Movement (AWB), “the most prominent of some 80 splinter groups[sported] some 150,000 weapons between them” (Op. Cit., page 233). As late as 1994, the Africaner Volksfront ledby General Constand Viljoen championed a white-only, independent orsemi-independent homeland where Afrikaner would be the only officiallanguage. Such had doubtless generatedenthusiasm among the Argentine military. In fact, ever since 1976, Argentina kept a close relationship withApartheid South Africa. By the late Seventies, Argentina placed a then unknown Navylieutenant as a military attaché to its embassy in South Africa, CaptainAlfredo Astíz; whom was later on called the “blond angel of death,” owing tothe sharp contrast between his benign appearance and true personality of anneo-Nazi torturer and assasin during Argentina’s “dirty war” (1976-1982);“angel” because, as a rarity among Argentine military men, Astíz is ablue-eyed, natural blond. It is a Latintheme originated in the time of the Roman Empire; as the Romans invadingEngland called the English ‘angels” because, unlike the Latins, they weremainly blond; and fair was considered an attribute of angels. Interestingly enough, among theoverwhelmingly dark-haired Argentine military officers, a blue-eyed naturalblond, Captain Astíz, was selected to be the nation’s military attaché inApartheid South Africa; military-to-military, a good match for Whitesupremacists there. Whatever Astíz, agood English speaker, learned from Apartheid supremacists will probably neverbe known; yet it can be assumed that he established meaningful contacts withthe South African military, which in turn doubtless had relevant contacts withthe white supremacist Afrikaners. Polakow-Suransky suggests that blackmailing the West was a relevant aimof South Africa’s nuclearization; for in impoverished Africa the advancedmissile technology affluent South Africa could easily import more than sufficedfrom deterrence purposes. Yet nukes areweapons of mass destruction, which the apartheid could have used against BlackAfricans; such is the destructiveness of a nuclear attack that its damage tohuman life is calculable through a novel unit of measurement, themegadeath. In the end, reason prevailedin South Africa, nonetheless because of strong international pressure; thusSouth Africa denuclearized, which seems to be the end of the story. Around 1987, then, Captain Astíz, alreadysentenced in absence for the French justice and wanted by Sweden as well, tooka “mystery trip” to South Africa. AsAstíz was too notorious to miss, the Argentine media asked him what the purposeof his trip to Pretoria was; as nobody ever in Argentina thinks of South Africaas a tourist destination: the trip is just too expensive, and the place notnearly as pleasant as Florida or the Caribbean. Astíz answered that it was a “vacation” trip only. Yet nobody in Argentina bought that;journalists were puzzled by Astíz’ trip; I heard no “conspiracy theories” aboutit, though. Israel, Pretoria’s once onlyally, had imposed sanctions against South Africa in 1987; thus by that time theapartheid was completely isolated, and basically doomed. I am raising these issues as a hint forprofessional researchers and/or writers to possibly tackle it as a matter ofinvestigation. Argentina’s nuclearprogram, in fact, had a Nazi bent from the beginning. In “Nazis on the run-How Hitler’s henchmenfled justice,” Gerald Steinacher wrote about General Perón’s active recruitmentof Nazi scientists and technicians: “Argentina’s attempt to join the circle ofnuclear powers with the help of German scientist Ronald Richter, for example,was a total fiasco. Although Perón hadinvested huge sums in the program, he had been pursuing an unrealisticgoal. Argentina had technically overreacheditself” (Op. Cit., page 223). Argentinaendeavored to correct the same problem by creating the nuclear advancedresearch institute Instituto Balseiro in San Carlos de Bariloche, Province ofRío Negro, which by the late seventies was enrolling the brightest Physicsstudents in the nation, this is for nuclear research. Even so, Argentina has never succeeded atcreating both a culture and a technological environment conducive to advancedresearch, the way for instance Sweden has done it; whenever it overreaches,technologically speaking, it resorts to the import of high-tech goods. Thus Argentina’s infamous dealings with theSoviets, and perhaps similar dealings with nuclear Apartheid South Africa. In fact, in “The age of deception-Nucleardiplomacy in treacherous times,” Mohamed Elbaradei points out that Argentinawas one among several nations which had the “now-how” before Iran began toattempt the processing of highly enriched uranium. Future declassification of CIA documents willreveal the full truth about the matter. Nuclear weapon stockpiling by right-wingAfrikaners would have been worrisome enough; yet a strong neo-Nazi core to theAfrikaners, maybe even within the mililtary, might have been sympathetic topassing on the torch to Argentina as well.
While pointing out how drug trafficking corruptentire societies, the author Dirck Chase Elredge had warned that North Koreamight want to foster its nuclear weapon program through drug trafficking ifneeded: “Other rogue countries present and future would have no compunctionsabout acquiring money through drug trafficking to enhance their nuclearambitions. The huge profit margin ofillicit drugs has the pontential to finance nuclear terrorism even as itfinances social pathologies here at home” (Op. Cit., page 52). It is exactly what the Argentine military from the shadows do; plus Hezbollah, the latter sharing intelligence with Al Qaeda, thus there is now a continuum terrorism-drug trafficking-organized crime at issue.
A great analysis; just add Argentina as savages as well, in the sense that there is underground State terrorism in both nations. Back in 1992, after I fled Argentina, I tried to get political asylum in Canada. I was met by a 'nice' Immigration, female officer who had just returned from a trip to Argentina. She was incensed: "Are telling me that you endured political persecution in a nice democracy like Argentina? Am I going to believe that? Now way, I just came back from Argentina, it's such a sweet nation, nice houses," blah, blah. Thus I crossed the border back to the United States and got political asylum here. No hard feelings toward Canada; just to make a point at how deceitful Argentina's Orwellian democracy, or "democracy," happens to be. Close allies of the freaky Iranians, which in turn are fueling Venezuela's resentment against the United States; along with Argentina trying to entice Cuba into extending its national-defense of a "Caribbean Vietnam" against the United States, if attacks, into a wider, Pan-Latin American "Latin American Vietnam" policy. I have been years both investigating and writing about these matters. One has to be a dissident in Argentina to know what they, as true heirs of Hitler, are willing to do to whoever "crosses" the evil Argentine military; it makes the East German Stasi pale in comparison; anything from character assassination to, believe it or not, organized sexual depredation of dissident's female significant others. We have a huge problem not being dealt with, indeed; particularly because Nice Good President Obama seems to abide by something called Postcolonial thought; according to which the West is evil and has to cave in to the Third World's whims. Then freaky nations like Argentina and Iran taking advantage of Obama's appeasement drive. I do not know much about Canada, but here in the States people take freedom for granted. Whenever nuclear weapons in the wrong hands in real life mean a possibility of nuclear terrorism. What about if Argentina does have the nukes? Only governments have evidence about it; yet they may be waiting for the United States to take the lead about confronting Argentina on that matter. As for myself, I have contacted U.S. conservative think-tanks about these matters; giving them all the evidence I could gather against Argentina as a concealed evildoer.
Defeat at the Falklands led theArgentine military to re-evaluate their strategies, as it can be read in the inthe following 1982 CIA document, released in 2005:
file:///C:/Users/ADULT/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image002.jpg
The CIA had evidence that Argentinawas endeavoring to carry out a nuclear weapon program through assistance fromvarious sources, including, but not limited to, the Soviet Union. Because the former West Germany mostobviously would not support the use of its technology for the production ofnuclear weapons in Argentina, various ways to develop these weapons had to besought; what follows is only the information released by the CIA –there may befar more relevant, yet classified, evidence about a concrete nuclear weaponprogram further developed by Argentina: “Argentina is acquiring otherfacilities and material that are unsafeguarded and could be used in a nuclearweapons program…There are ways Argentina could produce plutonium…Should Germanydeny reprocessing, Argentina could move to a second alternative, which would beto acquire plutonium through an unsafeguarded approach. That would require the completion of aplanned research reactor and would probably take at least five to six years,once construction of the reactor begins. As a third alternative, Argentina could choose to divert fuel fromoperating power reactors, either clandestinely or in open violation ofsafeguards, and thereby acquire a nuclear explosive capability in four to fiveyears” (excerpts from http://www.foia.ucia.gov/). Thesame declassified reports also warns that, “Official resentment will probablysoften over time, but it is highly questionable that the United States will bein an effective position to retard or influence the chances for a nuclear testlater in the decade if Argentina is able to produce plutonium in a newunsafewarded research reactor.”
The question arises of whether or not the CIA’s prediction thatArgentina could eventually develop a nuclear weapon program materialized; forthere is a wide technological know-how gap between being able to processplutonium and having the expertise it takes to develop actual nuclearweapons. The Soviets, to begin with,were against nuclear proliferation; their nuclear weapons were very advancedfor that time; they wouldn’t sell out their secrets, least of all to anuntrustworthy nation like Argentina. Unlike Sweden, for instance, Argentina does not specialize in research;it was French expertise in missile technology only which allowed Argentine Navypilots to wreck havoc with the British fleet during the Falklands War. True, from the Seventies Argentina wastraining top nuclear physicists in its Balseiro Institute; yet as a cultureArgentina is not the proper milieu for research development, particularlyregarding the advanced research it took, back then, to develop a nuclear weaponcapability.
THE ARGENTINA-APARTHEID SOUTHAFRICA CONNECTION
Enter here South Africa. In “The unspoken alliance-Israel’s secretrelationship with Apartheid South Africa,” by Sasha Polakow-Suransky, theauthor traces the Nazi influences of the Afrikaner movement to the Europeaneducation of white South Africans; for instance the notion of the nation as avolk sustained by ethnic bonds; plus Hitler’s idealization of the Volk. 1939 found the South African parliament divided between those in favorof the Allies and those in favor of Nazi Germany; the pro-Allies faction barelyprevailed, thus South Africa fought on the Allied side early in 1940. For not only was South Africa divided alongracial lines –Indian, black, and white; whites were also divided along languagelines –English speakers against the Dutch-speaking Afrikaners. During World War Two, the pro-British SouthAfrican government was besieged by problems posed by the Afrikaner nationalistorganization Ossewabrandwag, a true Nazi Africaner front whose stormtroopersperpetrated industrial sabotage, bank robberies and incitations for SouthAfrica to switch alliances in favor of Nazi Germany. The above organization even plotted tooverthow the South African government in order to turn the nation into an allyof Hitler; in fact, the apartheid became state policy even before the war ended(1944). After the war, an Afrikanergovernment began to run South Africa; Christian nationalism, white supremacy,and vicious racism were its basic white South African identity tenets. Eventually, an early Ossewa Brandwag leader,Balthazar Johannes Vorster, became the ideologue behind the brutal repressionof the black opposition in that nation; later on becoming South Africa’s primeminister. Sasha Polakow-Suransky assertsthat, by the late Seventies, the South African government was secretly buildinglow-yield nuclear weapons; yet it further planned to develop more powerfulnuclear devices. The above author pointsout that, back in the Eighties, “The U.S. government feared that South Africa’swhite minority regime, driven by a siege mentality and militant anticommunism,might resort to the nuclear option when faced with Soviet proxies on itsborders” (op. Cit., page 7). The authoralso interprets the apartheid’s attitude toward nuclearizing in terms ofconcealment: “For the South Africans…the Israeli model of nuclear ambiguity coupledwith covert weaponization was enticing” (Op. Cit., page 51). The IAEA first inspected South Africa’s inlate 1991; it kept carrying out inspections for several years. In their article “Nuclear verification in SouthAfrica,” Adolf von Baeckmann, Garry Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos give anaccount of South Africa’s nuclear weaponprogram, pointing out that “South Africa had been operating a number of nuclearfacilities, of unique indigenous origin, that previously had not been subjectto safeguards.” I quote again: “It wasdetermined that the magnitude of the "apparent discrepancy" in theuranium-235 balance associated with the Y-plant was such that –having regard tothe normal uncertainties expected be involved in the plant historical operatingand accounting records –it was reasonable to conclude that the uranium-235balance of the HEU, LEU, and depleted uranium produced by the pilot enrichmentplant was consistent with the uranium feed. Assessment of the production capacity of the pilot enrichment plant, onthe basis of operating records and supporting technical data provided to theIAEA team by the AEC, indicated that it was reasonable to conclude that theamounts of HEU which could have been produced by the plant were consistent withthe amounts declared in the initial report;” then adding that “The IAEA is notin possession of any information suggesting the existence of any undeclaredfacilities connected with the programme” (42 IAEA Bulletin, 1/1995-NationalReports). However, Polakow-Suransky suggeststhat the number of nuclear bombs South Africa claimed to possess by 1989,seven, is misleading; then pointing out the likelihood that “over twenty bombswere produced as well as more than one hundred nuclear artillery shells. The absence of these weapons is attributedeither to stockpiling by right-wing Afrikaners or transfer to Israel forstorage” (Op. Cit., page 222-223). In“Spying on the bomb-American nuclear intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran andNorth Korea,” Jeffrey T. Richelson points out how difficult is to have totalcertainty about the implicacies of a nation’s secret nuclear weapon program;then quoting a U.S. official around 1993 as saying, “you can never prove anegative…you are left at bottom with taking someone’s word for it’ (Op. Cit.,page 180). I quote Richelson: “The lastdeclassified word from the U.S. intelligence community on the subject is an INRreport on December 19, 1993, SouthAfrica: Nuclear Case Closed? Itnoted that [President Frederik Willem] de Klerk’s March [1993] claims –thatSouth African had manufactured six gun-assembled nuclear weapons and hadplanned to complete a seventh weapon using highly enriched uranium as well ashaving done preliminary work on implosion and advanced-weapons designs –wereconsistent with information available to the United States” (Ibidem, page398). The problem at issue was no longerSouth Africa’s defunct nuclear weapon program, but nuclear proliferation. In “The age of deception-Nuclear diplomacy intreacherous times,” Mohamed Elbaradei acknowledges that South Africa did notstop being a nuclear proliferation risk after it totally denuclearized by 1993;as Elbaradei mentions a factory in the mining town of Vanderbijlpark, SouthAfrica, as being a part of the “nuclear jihadist” A.Q. Kahn’s network: “InSeptember 2004, South African police, acting on a tip-off in conjunction withSouth African counterproliferation offials and IAEA inspectors, converged onthe factory. The systems [for unraniumenrichment, minus the centrifuges] had been dismantled piece by piece and placedinto containers, ready for shipment. Therevelation of this expensive operation in South Africa was particularlysurprising to nuclear experts. SouthAfrica had, after all, long ago relinquished its nuclear weapons programs” (Op.Cit., pages 170-1). In “The nuclearexpress-A political history of the bomb and its proliferation,” Thomas C. Reedand Danny B. Stillman conveyed the same preoccupation regarding South Africajust after the Apartheid: “Several thousand nuclear scientists and engineers,concerned about their secrity within an ANC-ruled democracy, had begun to lookelsewhere. Revelations by the Lybians adecade later identified at least two South African firms as villains in theintended nuclear weaponization of Lybia. The Krish Engineering Company, managed by Gerhard Wisser, and Trade Fin,owned by Johan Meyer, were two primesuppliers of centrifugue feed stations for Qaddafi’s nuclear program. Their involvement was confirmed in Germancountrooms a decade later. The southerntip of Africa is not a good neighborhood. The availability of uramium and the presence of underemployed nuclearmercenaries, both eagerly sought by radical Muslim states awash withpetrodollars, has drawn a warm of bad actors to the back streets ofJohannesburg. As the old saying goes,“Idle hands do the Devil’s work” (Op. Cit., page 184).
It must be remembered that theAfrikaners’ leaders were retired generals, who by 1993 had organized aparamilitary force ready to fight a civil war against black Africans in orderto create a volkstaat, this is a White, separate state. In “The fall of Apartheid-The inside storyfrom Smuts to Mbeki,” Robert Harvey points out that by 1991 the AfrikanerResistance Movement (AWB), “the most prominent of some 80 splinter groups[sported] some 150,000 weapons between them” (Op. Cit., page 233). As late as 1994, the Africaner Volksfront ledby General Constand Viljoen championed a white-only, independent orsemi-independent homeland where Afrikaner would be the only officiallanguage. Such had doubtless generatedenthusiasm among the Argentine military. In fact, ever since 1976, Argentina kept a close relationship withApartheid South Africa. By the late Seventies, Argentina placed a then unknown Navylieutenant as a military attaché to its embassy in South Africa, CaptainAlfredo Astíz; whom was later on called the “blond angel of death,” owing tothe sharp contrast between his benign appearance and true personality of anneo-Nazi torturer and assasin during Argentina’s “dirty war” (1976-1982);“angel” because, as a rarity among Argentine military men, Astíz is ablue-eyed, natural blond. It is a Latintheme originated in the time of the Roman Empire; as the Romans invadingEngland called the English ‘angels” because, unlike the Latins, they weremainly blond; and fair was considered an attribute of angels. Interestingly enough, among theoverwhelmingly dark-haired Argentine military officers, a blue-eyed naturalblond, Captain Astíz, was selected to be the nation’s military attaché inApartheid South Africa; military-to-military, a good match for Whitesupremacists there. Whatever Astíz, agood English speaker, learned from Apartheid supremacists will probably neverbe known; yet it can be assumed that he established meaningful contacts withthe South African military, which in turn doubtless had relevant contacts withthe white supremacist Afrikaners. Polakow-Suransky suggests that blackmailing the West was a relevant aimof South Africa’s nuclearization; for in impoverished Africa the advancedmissile technology affluent South Africa could easily import more than sufficedfrom deterrence purposes. Yet nukes areweapons of mass destruction, which the apartheid could have used against BlackAfricans; such is the destructiveness of a nuclear attack that its damage tohuman life is calculable through a novel unit of measurement, themegadeath. In the end, reason prevailedin South Africa, nonetheless because of strong international pressure; thusSouth Africa denuclearized, which seems to be the end of the story. Around 1987, then, Captain Astíz, alreadysentenced in absence for the French justice and wanted by Sweden as well, tooka “mystery trip” to South Africa. AsAstíz was too notorious to miss, the Argentine media asked him what the purposeof his trip to Pretoria was; as nobody ever in Argentina thinks of South Africaas a tourist destination: the trip is just too expensive, and the place notnearly as pleasant as Florida or the Caribbean. Astíz answered that it was a “vacation” trip only. Yet nobody in Argentina bought that;journalists were puzzled by Astíz’ trip; I heard no “conspiracy theories” aboutit, though. Israel, Pretoria’s once onlyally, had imposed sanctions against South Africa in 1987; thus by that time theapartheid was completely isolated, and basically doomed. I am raising these issues as a hint forprofessional researchers and/or writers to possibly tackle it as a matter ofinvestigation. Argentina’s nuclearprogram, in fact, had a Nazi bent from the beginning. In “Nazis on the run-How Hitler’s henchmenfled justice,” Gerald Steinacher wrote about General Perón’s active recruitmentof Nazi scientists and technicians: “Argentina’s attempt to join the circle ofnuclear powers with the help of German scientist Ronald Richter, for example,was a total fiasco. Although Perón hadinvested huge sums in the program, he had been pursuing an unrealisticgoal. Argentina had technically overreacheditself” (Op. Cit., page 223). Argentinaendeavored to correct the same problem by creating the nuclear advancedresearch institute Instituto Balseiro in San Carlos de Bariloche, Province ofRío Negro, which by the late seventies was enrolling the brightest Physicsstudents in the nation, this is for nuclear research. Even so, Argentina has never succeeded atcreating both a culture and a technological environment conducive to advancedresearch, the way for instance Sweden has done it; whenever it overreaches,technologically speaking, it resorts to the import of high-tech goods. Thus Argentina’s infamous dealings with theSoviets, and perhaps similar dealings with nuclear Apartheid South Africa. In fact, in “The age of deception-Nucleardiplomacy in treacherous times,” Mohamed Elbaradei points out that Argentinawas one among several nations which had the “now-how” before Iran began toattempt the processing of highly enriched uranium. Future declassification of CIA documents willreveal the full truth about the matter. Nuclear weapon stockpiling by right-wingAfrikaners would have been worrisome enough; yet a strong neo-Nazi core to theAfrikaners, maybe even within the mililtary, might have been sympathetic topassing on the torch to Argentina as well.
While pointing out how drug trafficking corruptentire societies, the author Dirck Chase Elredge had warned that North Koreamight want to foster its nuclear weapon program through drug trafficking ifneeded: “Other rogue countries present and future would have no compunctionsabout acquiring money through drug trafficking to enhance their nuclearambitions. The huge profit margin ofillicit drugs has the pontential to finance nuclear terrorism even as itfinances social pathologies here at home” (Op. Cit., page 52). It is exactly what the Argentine military from the shadows do; plus Hezbollah, the latter sharing intelligence with Al Qaeda, thus there is now a continuum terrorism-drug trafficking-organized crime at issue.
A great analysis; just add Argentina as savages as well, in the sense that there is underground State terrorism in both nations. Back in 1992, after I fled Argentina, I tried to get political asylum in Canada. I was met by a 'nice' Immigration, female officer who had just returned from a trip to Argentina. She was incensed: "Are telling me that you endured political persecution in a nice democracy like Argentina? Am I going to believe that? Now way, I just came back from Argentina, it's such a sweet nation, nice houses," blah, blah. Thus I crossed the border back to the United States and got political asylum here. No hard feelings toward Canada; just to make a point at how deceitful Argentina's Orwellian democracy, or "democracy," happens to be. Close allies of the freaky Iranians, which in turn are fueling Venezuela's resentment against the United States; along with Argentina trying to entice Cuba into extending its national-defense of a "Caribbean Vietnam" against the United States, if attacks, into a wider, Pan-Latin American "Latin American Vietnam" policy. I have been years both investigating and writing about these matters. One has to be a dissident in Argentina to know what they, as true heirs of Hitler, are willing to do to whoever "crosses" the evil Argentine military; it makes the East German Stasi pale in comparison; anything from character assassination to, believe it or not, organized sexual depredation of dissident's female significant others. We have a huge problem not being dealt with, indeed; particularly because Nice Good President Obama seems to abide by something called Postcolonial thought; according to which the West is evil and has to cave in to the Third World's whims. Then freaky nations like Argentina and Iran taking advantage of Obama's appeasement drive. I do not know much about Canada, but here in the States people take freedom for granted. Whenever nuclear weapons in the wrong hands in real life mean a possibility of nuclear terrorism. What about if Argentina does have the nukes? Only governments have evidence about it; yet they may be waiting for the United States to take the lead about confronting Argentina on that matter. As for myself, I have contacted U.S. conservative think-tanks about these matters; giving them all the evidence I could gather against Argentina as a concealed evildoer.
