http://home.comcast.net/~markconrad/Sinkiang.htm
From “Yellow Russia” to the East Turkestan Republic.
By Pavel Aptekar’.
The Sinkiang[1] problem in Sino-Russian relations arose as early as the 1870s when native Muslims under the leadership of Yaqub-Beg effectively threw off Chinese control from a large area and proclaimed the formation of their own sovereign state. Under these circumstances the Manchu [Ch’ing, Qing] Dynasty was forced to turn to Russia and request help. Russia did not refuse and cossacks and regular army units were sent into Sinkiang where they put down Yaqub-Beg’s movement. In spite of the apparent ease of the occupation that promised a sure retention of this province, Russia transferred it to China in accordance with the St.-Petersburg treaty of 1881.
It appears that the situation in Sinkiang worried Russia even after the withdrawal of its forces, as seemingly ubiquitous representatives of the British empire were trying to penetrate this region, too.
Therefore Russian consulates were established in a number of Sinkiang towns and there were often visits to the territory by officials of various ranks. Thus, in 1885 came Lieutenant Bronislav Grombchevskii acting as an official for special tasks under the governor-general of Turkestan, and two years later a doctor of the Siberian Military District, N.L. Zeland, visited this Chinese territory in connection with a suspected plague epidemic.
Their travel notes characterize Sinkiang life rather clearly. On reading them, the reasons for the inhabitants’ frequent demonstrations against their Chinese rulers become apparent:
The Chinese do not make the slightest effort to learn the language of their subject Sarts (Uzbeks – P.A.) and as a principle the officials consider such knowledge as degrading… The greater part of the blame for the frequent uprisings and disorders lies with the Chinese themselves, who do not try to learn about the people’s needs but on the contrary drive them to discontent.”[2] There were plenty of reasons for this discontent. Primary was the extremely difficult material situation of both peasants and townspeople. In Zeland’s opinion, crafts and industry were in deep stagnancy if not actually in decline. The overwhelming majority of the population was illiterate. We may add that the officials and officers administering this vast region were, in the opinion of the local population, a particularly loutish bunch even for Chinese.
In this traveler’s opinion, the Sinkiang inhabitants themselves possessed many positive traits, the chief of which he counted as exceptional industriousness, patience, and sense honor. At the same time, negative characteristics of the Sinkiang people were “…deficient bodily hygiene; a weakness for hallucinogenic substances, and sexual degeneracy.”[3]
But it was Chinese soldiers who earned the most condemnation from the military doctor and the official for special tasks. Many of their notes agree:
Looking back at the Chinese regime as observed over the course of almost four months’ stay in Kashgaria, I am convinced that Chinese unit commanders purposely make the differences between authorized and actual personnel strengths as great as possible, with the extra funds received from the treasury going into the commander’s pockets...” “In the army the higher ranks feather their nests at the expense of the lowest. For example, the commander of a lyanza (a unit approximately equal to a battalion – P.A.) receives money to supply his command and so counts on paper two or three times as many soldiers as are actually present, with the sum for the fictional part going into his pocket… Often soldiers are not even given what they have already earned. Thus the hollow state of the forces which the commanders pretend not to see…”[4] “The poor quality of the Chinese soldiers is due in large part to their material situation which forces them to engage in petty commerce in their free time and even robbery, all at the expense of local merchants. Soldiers ‘ask’ for goods that please them and if they are refused brutally beat those who have ‘insulted’ them.
A description of the appearance of Chinese soldiery is very interesting. “Officers and soldiers dress like grandmothers… by their dress one could not know their profession. On their heads they wear dark-blue kerchiefs tied in a manner similar to our peasant women. A queue falls down in back…”[5]
Both writers rated the fighting ability of the Chinese forces as very low. Grombchevskii could not help smiling when he saw the cavalry using not only horses, but hinnies and donkeys as well. The lieutenant was also very surprised that the weapons in Chinese army units were practically never cleaned and even before a parade attention was given only to maintaining a bright exterior. Target practice was held only once a year. A description of training in one lyanza is simply amusing: “All movements were executed at a voiced command uniformly and in good order. In this, while carrying out an assault the entire line comically hopped forward and the defenders sat down. All this was more reminiscent of dancing circus clowns than the training of troops.”[6]
In the opinion of both writers China’s rule over Sinkiang was very unstable overall, and in the province there was a strong attraction to Russia occasioned by the relative order maintained during the period of Russian military control. Nevertheless the tsarist government did not undertake the occupation of Sinkiang in spite of China’s very weak situation around the turn of the century, preferring to be represented there by merchants and agents of large trading companies who sometimes also carried out intelligence missions.
This region continued to draw the attention of the rulers of the new Soviet Russia immediately after the end of the civil war in so much as several thousand soldiers, officers, and refugees belonging to the anti-Bolshevik army of A.I. Dutov were in the Sinkiang territory. In general, Chinese relations with them were benevolently neutral with the exception of a short period in October-November 1920 when Baron R. Ungern, leader of the “Asiatic Division,” attacked Ugra, the capital of Mongolia. But his assault was repulsed by Chinese forces that outnumbered him several times over. At that time a wave of persecutions swept over China including Sinkiang, and in some places Chinese authorities permitted Red Army units to even cross the border to capture the interned remnants of the Southern and Orenburg armies. However, neither the Chinese nor the Reds were able to disarm participants of the west Siberian peasant uprising who had entered Sinkiang in March of 1921.
At the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s basmachi guerillas and ordinary peasants from Kazakhstan and Central Asia who had fled the Soviet Union and famine resulting from collectivization found refuge within the Sinkiang territory. The Soviet government’s anxiety was also occasioned by Japanese agents penetrating northwest China, and this new source of tension of the long frontier with Sinkiang led to thoughts on how to avert a situation similar to the one in Manchuria.
In truth the Chinese central authorities only controlled the situation in Sinkiang to a very limited extent and could not effectively influence the course of events. In this situation the Sinkiang governor (tupan),[7] Sheng Shih-ts'ai,[8] who had seized control in April 1933, had to orient his politics toward his powerful northern neighbor. The local authorities’ own forces were often too weak to deal with the growing strength of the Muslim popular movement. Chinese soldiers often scattered when attacked by enemy units. Under these circumstances the sole combat-capable formation in Sheng Shih-ts'ai’s hands was a Russian regiment of former White Guards under the command of Colonel Pappengut which in spite of its small size more than once, thanks to its training and discipline, defeated superior forces of Muslim horsemen.
However, at the end of 1933, when the Chinese 36th Division (most of whose soldiers were Dungun, which is to say Muslim Chinese) entered Sinkiang as a result of its conflict with the central government, the tupan’s position became critical. The Russian regiment, supported by local Chinese, was able to retain the Sinkiang capital, Urumchi, with difficulty, but there was no possibility of controlling the rest of the territory.
On 12 January 1934 the commander of the 36th Division, Ma Zhongying (Russian Ma-Chzu-In) began a siege of Urumchi. In the last days of January, however, the situation of the blockaded Sinkiang capital was significantly improved when Ma Zhongying had to move large forces against unidentified “Altai men” [“altaitsy”] advancing along the Chuguchak road. On 8-9 February the “Altai men” inflicted a defeat on units of the 36th Division and on 11 February the blockade was lifted.[9]
The question arises—where did this help to the besieged Sinkiang capital come from? In truth, the tupan did not control any significant forces in the province.
The answer is simple—the reinforcements came from the north, from the USSR.
