On May 22, 2007, The Guardian reported that some U.S. officials have asserted that Iran is covertly building a relationship with Al Qaeda and other Sunni insurgents aimed at launching a summer offensive to thwart the possibility of progress from the ongoing U.S. troop surge. In the face of such an offensive, the U.S. officials argue, Iran believes Congressional support for a continued U.S. presence in Iraq would collapse. Then, the U.S. troops would be withdrawn. Following the U.S. withdrawal, Iran would have succeeded in its proxy war against the United States and would be in a position to dominate the broken Iraqi state and project its growing power beyond Iraq’s borders. Even as they argued for such a scenario, the U.S. officials failed to offer specific and credible evidence of such an emerging relationship. In the absence of such evidence, historic experience, the region’s dynamics, and Iran’s national interest, all argue against an Iran-Al Qaeda relationship.
First, Al Qaeda views Iran's Shia-led theocracy as a “heretic regime.” Its leaders have repeatedly assailed Shia Islam as illegitimate. These fundamental differences make such a relationship highly unlikely except under extraordinary circumstances that would allow the two parties to put aside their basic conflict. The U.S. troop surge, with uncertain prospects, does not constitute such a situation.
Second, Iran might well benefit from a continuation of the present indecisive situation in Iraq. After all, if the U.S. is tied down there, the appetite among the American public for any additional military action would be low. Furthermore, such a situation would limit the feasibility of military options against Iran. The proximity of substantial U.S. manpower that could be targeted under any Iranian retaliation would allow Iran to increase its ability to deter the risk of U.S. military action. As such, the current instability and presence of U.S. troops in Iraq may give Iran an “insurance policy” of sorts against U.S. military strikes there.
Third, the present instability in Iraq has increased geopolitical risks throughout the Middle East. Such heightened risk is profitable for Iran. This elevated risk has translated into a premium on crude oil prices. With revenue from the sale of crude oil amounting to 80% of Iranian export income, Iran benefits substantially from higher crude oil prices. Therefore, a continuation of "managed chaos” in Iraq may well be preferable, at this time, to a decisive outcome as far as Iranian interests are concerned.
Fourth, in a number of regions in Iraq, Sunnis have turned on Al Qaeda. This fairly recent development would preclude a grand Iranian-Al Qaeda-Sunni front. The sectarian rivalry between Iraq’s Shia and Sunnis would also undermine prospects for Shia-led Iran to build an alliance with Sunnis who are fighting with Iraqi Shia.
Fifth, Iran recognizes that it is a rising power in the Middle East. It sees its rise as unstoppable. Hence, it has assumed a tough position against the international community's call for it to cease its nuclear enrichment activities. Given that it sees its future dominance as inevitable—something the U.S. troop surge won’t alter—it is in a position where it can afford to be patient. In contrast, the U.S., facing rising domestic discontent over the situation in Iraq, has no such luxury for patience. Iran understands this. As a result, Iran sees no need to take rash steps that could inflict major damage on its interests. An alliance with Al Qaeda would greatly complicate its long-term interests, as it could drive the Middle East’s Sunni-led states into a true military alliance that could be arrayed against it.
Sixth, Iran already believes U.S. diplomatic and military credibility has been damaged and continues to wane. The various Iraqi insurgencies currently enjoy a decisive cost advantage over the United States. For about $2 billion or less a year, their guerrilla warfare has effectively stalemated the U.S., which is currently spending $100 billion per year. Such a cost disparity, especially as the U.S. has borrowed the funds, has long-term adverse implications. The opportunity costs are also substantial. The reality that the U.S. military has no meaningful answer for decentralized insurgent warfare has not escaped Iran’s attention. Iran's media often highlights it. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad confidently predicts that the U.S., facing just such retaliation from Iran within and outside the Middle East in the event of its attacking Iranian nuclear facilities, will not attack his country. Based on this calculation, Iran continues to push ahead with its nuclear program in defiance of the UN Security Council.
In the end, some U.S. officials may actually be paving the way to “explain” what might prove to be a lack of progress from the troop surge. In doing so, they may well be exploiting old urban myths that Osama Bin Laden had found safe haven in southwest Iran following the Taliban’s loss of power in Afghanistan. Currently, Iran has no need to violate its ideological, political, and historical positions concerning Al Qaeda. It also has no compelling need to risk its regional interests by entering into a compact with Al Qaeda that could generate the formation of a regional anti-Iran alliance.
In short, the speculation that Iran and Al Qaeda are forging an alliance aimed at launching a summer offensive in Iraq is badly flawed. Rather, the absence of a political settlement within Iraq, specifically the creation of an Iraqi government for all Iraqis vs. the present sectarian one, is what is continuing to build pressures for a continuation, if not an intensification, of violence down the road.
First, Al Qaeda views Iran's Shia-led theocracy as a “heretic regime.” Its leaders have repeatedly assailed Shia Islam as illegitimate. These fundamental differences make such a relationship highly unlikely except under extraordinary circumstances that would allow the two parties to put aside their basic conflict. The U.S. troop surge, with uncertain prospects, does not constitute such a situation.
Second, Iran might well benefit from a continuation of the present indecisive situation in Iraq. After all, if the U.S. is tied down there, the appetite among the American public for any additional military action would be low. Furthermore, such a situation would limit the feasibility of military options against Iran. The proximity of substantial U.S. manpower that could be targeted under any Iranian retaliation would allow Iran to increase its ability to deter the risk of U.S. military action. As such, the current instability and presence of U.S. troops in Iraq may give Iran an “insurance policy” of sorts against U.S. military strikes there.
Third, the present instability in Iraq has increased geopolitical risks throughout the Middle East. Such heightened risk is profitable for Iran. This elevated risk has translated into a premium on crude oil prices. With revenue from the sale of crude oil amounting to 80% of Iranian export income, Iran benefits substantially from higher crude oil prices. Therefore, a continuation of "managed chaos” in Iraq may well be preferable, at this time, to a decisive outcome as far as Iranian interests are concerned.
Fourth, in a number of regions in Iraq, Sunnis have turned on Al Qaeda. This fairly recent development would preclude a grand Iranian-Al Qaeda-Sunni front. The sectarian rivalry between Iraq’s Shia and Sunnis would also undermine prospects for Shia-led Iran to build an alliance with Sunnis who are fighting with Iraqi Shia.
Fifth, Iran recognizes that it is a rising power in the Middle East. It sees its rise as unstoppable. Hence, it has assumed a tough position against the international community's call for it to cease its nuclear enrichment activities. Given that it sees its future dominance as inevitable—something the U.S. troop surge won’t alter—it is in a position where it can afford to be patient. In contrast, the U.S., facing rising domestic discontent over the situation in Iraq, has no such luxury for patience. Iran understands this. As a result, Iran sees no need to take rash steps that could inflict major damage on its interests. An alliance with Al Qaeda would greatly complicate its long-term interests, as it could drive the Middle East’s Sunni-led states into a true military alliance that could be arrayed against it.
Sixth, Iran already believes U.S. diplomatic and military credibility has been damaged and continues to wane. The various Iraqi insurgencies currently enjoy a decisive cost advantage over the United States. For about $2 billion or less a year, their guerrilla warfare has effectively stalemated the U.S., which is currently spending $100 billion per year. Such a cost disparity, especially as the U.S. has borrowed the funds, has long-term adverse implications. The opportunity costs are also substantial. The reality that the U.S. military has no meaningful answer for decentralized insurgent warfare has not escaped Iran’s attention. Iran's media often highlights it. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad confidently predicts that the U.S., facing just such retaliation from Iran within and outside the Middle East in the event of its attacking Iranian nuclear facilities, will not attack his country. Based on this calculation, Iran continues to push ahead with its nuclear program in defiance of the UN Security Council.
In the end, some U.S. officials may actually be paving the way to “explain” what might prove to be a lack of progress from the troop surge. In doing so, they may well be exploiting old urban myths that Osama Bin Laden had found safe haven in southwest Iran following the Taliban’s loss of power in Afghanistan. Currently, Iran has no need to violate its ideological, political, and historical positions concerning Al Qaeda. It also has no compelling need to risk its regional interests by entering into a compact with Al Qaeda that could generate the formation of a regional anti-Iran alliance.
In short, the speculation that Iran and Al Qaeda are forging an alliance aimed at launching a summer offensive in Iraq is badly flawed. Rather, the absence of a political settlement within Iraq, specifically the creation of an Iraqi government for all Iraqis vs. the present sectarian one, is what is continuing to build pressures for a continuation, if not an intensification, of violence down the road.
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