With this next post, I endeavour to further consolidate my proposals so far; as readers of this forum may now about be at this point, my proposals for reform avoid, wherever possible, any amending of the constitutional framework of Canada, rather amending the conventions and traditions by which the Government is run.
Introduction
The
Constitution Act, 1867, as anyone who has read the Act would know, makes several references to the Queen, and her executive power. It is important that Canadians not construe the Constitution as vesting this power
directly in the Queen; while she would, technically speaking, have the authority to act on behalf of Canada against the will of the Prime Minister and his or her Cabinet, this has never been done.
Reforming the Senate of Canada
The only provision of the
Constitution Act, 1867 that pertains directly to the actual act of appointing a Senator is Section 24, which reads:
Section 24 said:
(24) The Governor General shall from Time to Time, in the Queen's Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, summon qualified Persons to the Senate; and, subject to the Provisions of this Act, every Person so summoned shall become and be a Member of the Senate and a Senator.
While the Act does set certain requirements for the appointment of a Senator, the Act in no way implies that it should be the sole prerogative of the Prime Minister to appoint Senators; this is entirely out of tradition and convention, the likes of which are, in modern terms, outdated and obsolete.
Without actually amending this Section (which would be opening a "can of worms"), citizens of Canada could push for Members of Parliament to pass a motion in the House of Commons, calling on the Prime Minister and his or her Government of the day, to establish a new precedent and convention by which Senators would be appointed (obviously, this convention could not be made "binding," but the Canadian system of governance by convention leads me to believe that once established, the Government would avoid deviation from the policy):
A Member of Parliament would move —
that, in the opinion of this House, the convention by which Senators are appointed no longer acts in the best interest of Canadians, and that the current practice impedes the effectiveness of the Senate; and that this House do call upon the Governor General to no longer accept the advice of the Prime Minister in appointing a Senator, unless Her Excellency receives the same such advice from the Lieutenant Governor of the concerned Province; and that this House do authorize the Governor General to act in exigent circumstances to resolve a dispute between the Lieutenant Governor and the Prime Minister.
If such a motion were passed, then any Senate appointment would be required to be attemped by the method that I proposed earlier and, if the seat in the Senate were to remain vacant for an unacceptably long period of time, then the Governor General will be authorized, at his or her discretion, to enforce a reasonable compromise between the concerned Legislature and the Prime Minister. This would not require any amendment of the Constitution.
Reforming the House of Commons of Canada
Now, reforming the Lower Chamber would be considerably more difficult. To that end, Constitutional change would be unavoidable. I have no doubt that we will see reform in the Senate long before we see reform in the lesser of the two Houses.
Firstly, if suggestions of a "mixed" system are entertained — that is, a combination of the current first-past-the-post system and a party list system, then Section 41 of the Constitution will need to be amended or repealed outright; the Provinces will no longer have a set number of Members in the House of Commons, since listed Members could come from any Province at the beckon of the party.
Section 37 said:
(41) The House of Commons shall, subject to the Provisions of this Act, consist of two hundred and ninety-five members of whom ninety-nine shall be elected for Ontario, seventy-five for Quebec, eleven for Nova Scotia, ten for New Brunswick, fourteen for Manitoba, thirty-two for British Columbia, four for Prince Edward Island, twenty-six for Alberta, fourteen for Saskatchewan, seven for Newfoundland, one for the Yukon Territory and two for the Northwest Territories.
Please Note The numbers in this Section are not constant; they are adjusted, from time to time, subject to the provisions of the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act.
As you can see, Section 37 would no longer be correct, and would have to be amended; and furthermore, if a Member is "appointed" to the House of Commons through a party list, then would that Member be deemed to "represent" any specific electoral district or Province? If not, then Section 51A could pose a problem.
Section 51A said:
(51A) Notwithstanding anything in this Act a province shall always be entitled to a number of members in the House of Commons not less than the number of senators representing such province.
So, if we reduce the number of seats given to a Province by default through the first-past-the-post sytem, and no Members appointed to the Commons through the party list represent that Province, then would some listed Members need to be removed from the Commons and replaced with Members from the Province in question in order to abide by our constitutional framework? Actually, looking at it now, Section 51.2 would pose similar questions.
Reform of the Commons is a "sticky" issue. If the House of Commons were to be reformed to better "represent" the people, then constituencies would still be required to exist; but then, where do we find a place for listed members? Would they be "shoed into" an empty existing constituency? Or would we broaden the constituencies, and give several electoral districts more than one Member? Or, stranger yet, would listed Members not be responsible to any particular district?
This poses another problem; who are listed Members accountable to? Members who are elected by the first-past-the-post system must worry about their performance and representation of their constituents in the House of Commons; listed Members would have little such pressure. Listed Members would
never vote against party lines, because they would be guaranteed to be out of a job. However, they would not hesitate to vote against the will of a majority of Canadians to that end.
On the other hand, "FPTP" members would be more likely to vote with the majority of Canadians than would listed members, since they would be accountable to the electorate, and would need to seek re-election in their own right. This raises another interesting question; could a Member be both listed, and run in a riding? If a Member loses in their riding, might they still be appointed to the House of Commons by a party list? This could be an interesting practice in terms of keeping key Ministers, and even the Prime Minister, in the Commons, even if otherwise defeated.
A total proportional representation system would be disastrous. People would no longer have on particular Member to go to, and Members wishing to be elected would only have to vote with a majority of Canadians, completely ignoring the other forty-nine percent. I fear that such a House could become dysfunctional.
Then again, we are quickly learning that a pure first-past-the-post regional representation system has several glitches and dysfunctions of its own. The advantages are clear, however; Members are accountable to a specific group of people, and citizens have one specific Member whom they can address with their issues and concerns.
The only realistic idea of reform in the Commons that I could support would be maintaining a majority of the members under a first-past-the-post system, and appointing a minimal amount of members, no more than perhaps eighty or ninety, as being appointed through a party list. I would propose that Members not be allowed to run in an electoral district,
and be present on a party list at the same time. I would also propose that any Member appointed to the House of Commons through such a party list be, by convention, not eligible to hold a portfolio as a Minister of the Crown.
Even such a moderate, possibly less-than-moderate, proposal however, would require extensive changes. Firstly, the
Canada Elections Act would need to be
overhauled. The
Constitution Act, 1867 would need to be amended. The
Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act would
also need to be amended. These are only key pieces of legislation; several more minor legislative measures would also need to be enacted, amended, or repealed.
This could be quite difficult to implement, and would likely be quite controversial in the House of Commons. It could take several sessions, or possibly several Parliaments, to complete the work that would be required to make the kinds of even moderate changes that Canadians as a whole would ask for.
Legitimacy of Members of the House of Commons
There is no doubt that Members elected through the FPTP system are entirely legitimate, and have every right to represent their constituents. However, what place would list-appointed Members have within that same House? Canadians might be outraged if an appointed Member were to hold the balance of power on a controversial or critical piece of legislation. If appointed Members were deemed responsible for the defeat of a Government, the legitimacy of the non-confidence motion could also be thrown into question. Appointed Members would lack accountability.
Really, if we begin allowing Members to be appointed from a list, likely by the more prominent Members of the party, or by the Prime Minister or Party Leader him or herself, then wouldn't list-appointed Members be no more mandated and legitimate than our
current Senators?
My two cents. Actually, looking at the scrollbar here, looks more like one hundred eighty dollars ... and two cents.
Note Edited to revise content and to correct multiple typos.