With former British Prime Minister Tony Blair having been appointed the Madrid Quartet’s Middle East envoy, some might suggest that he should use his clout and contacts to push for a final settlement of the historic Israel-Palestinian dispute. That would likely be a fruitless exercise that would only exacerbate divisions once the bold expectations for such an outcome are quashed by the realities of that difficult dispute. Instead, Blair’s focus should be on achieving a modest interim agreement that promotes increased co-existence, replenishes trust, and gives peace a chance to incubate.
Without some experience at co-existence and meaningful success in rebuilding trust, peace cannot have a chance to blossom. Without effort to regain some of the lost ground from the Oslo process to create a new understanding of co-existence, such an outcome is unlikely. In contrast, the more one attempts to impose absolute conditions, sweeping demands, or artificial deadlines for a final settlement on either side, the more persistent the status quo will become. The status quo, because it sharpens differences between Israelis and Palestinians, only builds a case that co-existence between the two peoples is not possible. Until that stalemate is broken, peace will not be possible. A modest step—precisely because it is the only chance that the parties might take in the wake of the collapse of the Oslo process—is perhaps the only practical approach that could chip away at that stalemate.
The 1975 Sinai disengagement agreement reached between Egypt and Israel offers a reasonable model. This agreement required that Israel withdraw from a small portion of the Sinai Peninsula. It also declared that the conflict between the two parties “shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means” and mandated that both countries “undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against the other.” It provided that “nonmilitary cargoes” headed for or originating in Israel be permitted to pass through the Suez Canal. It elaborately spelled out the terms of redeployment for both sides’ armed forces, set armaments limits in designated areas, and created an early-warning arrangement in the Sinai Peninsula. Finally, its language noted, “This agreement is regarded by the parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.”
An Israel-Palestinian interim arrangement could reaffirm, not in the preamble, but in its opening articles (as was the case with the Sinai agreement), that both parties agree that their historic dispute can only be settled by peaceful means and pledge that they will refrain from the threat or use of force against one another. Under such an arrangement, the Palestinians would be required to make a serious good faith effort to apprehend and prosecute those who threaten or carry out attacks against Israelis. The Palestinian leadership would also work to dismantle all armed militias outside the security forces, something President Abbas has already pledged to do. In return, Israel would remove its security restrictions and armed forces from agreed portions of the West Bank. It would also bar new settlement construction in those areas. Any existing Israeli settlers would be offered the choice of returning to Israel with reasonable relocation compensation or falling under Palestinian jurisdiction. The Madrid Quartet would monitor implementation of the agreement.
In some ways, such an agreement should prove less demanding than the 1975 Sinai disengagement agreement. In that earlier agreement, Israel gave up areas that had strategic military significance at a time it doubted Egyptian verbal commitments. It also relinquished the Abu Rudeis oilfield that met 50% of its daily oil consumption needs.
Many would likely be disappointed with the limited nature such an interim accord with the Palestinians. They would find the failure to pursue a sweeping final settlement unsatisfactory. That was exactly the reaction to the “step-by-step” diplomacy undertaken between Egypt and Israel. At that time, Princeton University Professor of International Affairs Richard Ullman warned that such a framework “can only postpone, but not avoid, the moment of impasse between Israel and its Arab enemies.” What Professor Ullman overlooked was that breaking the diplomacy into small steps helped the two sides to accumulate practical real world experience in reducing tensions, working together, and fulfilling commitments to one another. That process incubated the trust necessary to forge ahead to the more difficult final settlement issues. Without such trust, Israel would likely have remained unwilling to cede substantial territory in exchange for revocable promises.
Given the failure of the Oslo process and the turbulent post-Oslo process period, little could be more important or urgent than for the parties to regain an opportunity to demonstrate good faith and, from that experience, rebuild the trust that had been depleted in recent years. If successful, a new opening for a more ambitious peace agreement could be created.
Following the signing of the September 1975 Sinai Agreement, then Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres explained, “I will say that a gate was opened. There is a horizon somewhere far away. And between the gate and the horizon there is a very long way to go, which is unmarked and unknown to both sides.” Less than four years later, Egypt and Israel had traversed that “unmarked and unknown” frontier to reach a peace agreement that lasts to this day.
For now, if the proverbial gate that had been slammed shut by Intifada can be re-opened, that development will mark vital progress. Furthermore, if the new experiment in co-existence yields positive results, the prospect for a fuller peace will have been revived. If Prime Minister Blair can achieve such an outcome, he will have made an invaluable contribution in his role as the Madrid Quartet’s Envoy.
Without some experience at co-existence and meaningful success in rebuilding trust, peace cannot have a chance to blossom. Without effort to regain some of the lost ground from the Oslo process to create a new understanding of co-existence, such an outcome is unlikely. In contrast, the more one attempts to impose absolute conditions, sweeping demands, or artificial deadlines for a final settlement on either side, the more persistent the status quo will become. The status quo, because it sharpens differences between Israelis and Palestinians, only builds a case that co-existence between the two peoples is not possible. Until that stalemate is broken, peace will not be possible. A modest step—precisely because it is the only chance that the parties might take in the wake of the collapse of the Oslo process—is perhaps the only practical approach that could chip away at that stalemate.
The 1975 Sinai disengagement agreement reached between Egypt and Israel offers a reasonable model. This agreement required that Israel withdraw from a small portion of the Sinai Peninsula. It also declared that the conflict between the two parties “shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means” and mandated that both countries “undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against the other.” It provided that “nonmilitary cargoes” headed for or originating in Israel be permitted to pass through the Suez Canal. It elaborately spelled out the terms of redeployment for both sides’ armed forces, set armaments limits in designated areas, and created an early-warning arrangement in the Sinai Peninsula. Finally, its language noted, “This agreement is regarded by the parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.”
An Israel-Palestinian interim arrangement could reaffirm, not in the preamble, but in its opening articles (as was the case with the Sinai agreement), that both parties agree that their historic dispute can only be settled by peaceful means and pledge that they will refrain from the threat or use of force against one another. Under such an arrangement, the Palestinians would be required to make a serious good faith effort to apprehend and prosecute those who threaten or carry out attacks against Israelis. The Palestinian leadership would also work to dismantle all armed militias outside the security forces, something President Abbas has already pledged to do. In return, Israel would remove its security restrictions and armed forces from agreed portions of the West Bank. It would also bar new settlement construction in those areas. Any existing Israeli settlers would be offered the choice of returning to Israel with reasonable relocation compensation or falling under Palestinian jurisdiction. The Madrid Quartet would monitor implementation of the agreement.
In some ways, such an agreement should prove less demanding than the 1975 Sinai disengagement agreement. In that earlier agreement, Israel gave up areas that had strategic military significance at a time it doubted Egyptian verbal commitments. It also relinquished the Abu Rudeis oilfield that met 50% of its daily oil consumption needs.
Many would likely be disappointed with the limited nature such an interim accord with the Palestinians. They would find the failure to pursue a sweeping final settlement unsatisfactory. That was exactly the reaction to the “step-by-step” diplomacy undertaken between Egypt and Israel. At that time, Princeton University Professor of International Affairs Richard Ullman warned that such a framework “can only postpone, but not avoid, the moment of impasse between Israel and its Arab enemies.” What Professor Ullman overlooked was that breaking the diplomacy into small steps helped the two sides to accumulate practical real world experience in reducing tensions, working together, and fulfilling commitments to one another. That process incubated the trust necessary to forge ahead to the more difficult final settlement issues. Without such trust, Israel would likely have remained unwilling to cede substantial territory in exchange for revocable promises.
Given the failure of the Oslo process and the turbulent post-Oslo process period, little could be more important or urgent than for the parties to regain an opportunity to demonstrate good faith and, from that experience, rebuild the trust that had been depleted in recent years. If successful, a new opening for a more ambitious peace agreement could be created.
Following the signing of the September 1975 Sinai Agreement, then Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres explained, “I will say that a gate was opened. There is a horizon somewhere far away. And between the gate and the horizon there is a very long way to go, which is unmarked and unknown to both sides.” Less than four years later, Egypt and Israel had traversed that “unmarked and unknown” frontier to reach a peace agreement that lasts to this day.
For now, if the proverbial gate that had been slammed shut by Intifada can be re-opened, that development will mark vital progress. Furthermore, if the new experiment in co-existence yields positive results, the prospect for a fuller peace will have been revived. If Prime Minister Blair can achieve such an outcome, he will have made an invaluable contribution in his role as the Madrid Quartet’s Envoy.
