Time Magazine
If you are a firm believer in the war in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates' grim assessment last month of what lies in store for the U.S. might have made you shudder. "If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose, because nobody in the world has that kind of time, patience and money, to be honest," he said.
But if you are a defense contractor who has enjoyed a decade of bottomless Pentagon funding, it was Gates' comments about a struggle much closer to home that are keeping you up at night. "The spigot of defense spending that opened on 9/11 is closing," he said. "With two major campaigns ongoing, the economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on this department."
Gates, the U.S.'s 22nd Defense Secretary, has declared a low-key war against the military services and the way they develop and buy the weapons they use to defend the nation. Up until now, he has done that mostly by jawboning: The U.S. can't "eliminate national-security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything," Gates says in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs. That futile quest has led to weapons that "have grown ever more baroque, have become ever more costly, are taking longer to build and are being fielded in ever dwindling quantities."
But his war of words is about to become very real. As he prepares a budget for next year, Gates must decide the fate of a number of fantastically expensive weapons programs the military services say they need. He can't fund them all--and might be wise to take a knife to them all. In this, Gates has little choice: the military's annual budget has finished growing, and the billions it once imagined it might spend on future weapons have evaporated. So cuts--and big ones--are coming, and Gates will be the man who makes them.
Though Gates was hired by George W. Bush to clean up the mismanaged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gates' greatest legacy may come in what he calls a "strategic reshaping" that better outfits the U.S. military to wage coming wars. Future weapons buys must "be driven more by the actual capabilities of potential adversaries," Gates told Congress a few weeks ago, "and less by what is technologically feasible given unlimited time and resources." Pentagon procurement, he said, is plagued by a "risk-averse culture, a litigious process, parochial interests, excessive and changing requirements, budget churn and instability and sometimes adversarial relationships within the Department of Defense."
If you are a firm believer in the war in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates' grim assessment last month of what lies in store for the U.S. might have made you shudder. "If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose, because nobody in the world has that kind of time, patience and money, to be honest," he said.
But if you are a defense contractor who has enjoyed a decade of bottomless Pentagon funding, it was Gates' comments about a struggle much closer to home that are keeping you up at night. "The spigot of defense spending that opened on 9/11 is closing," he said. "With two major campaigns ongoing, the economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on this department."
Gates, the U.S.'s 22nd Defense Secretary, has declared a low-key war against the military services and the way they develop and buy the weapons they use to defend the nation. Up until now, he has done that mostly by jawboning: The U.S. can't "eliminate national-security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything," Gates says in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs. That futile quest has led to weapons that "have grown ever more baroque, have become ever more costly, are taking longer to build and are being fielded in ever dwindling quantities."
But his war of words is about to become very real. As he prepares a budget for next year, Gates must decide the fate of a number of fantastically expensive weapons programs the military services say they need. He can't fund them all--and might be wise to take a knife to them all. In this, Gates has little choice: the military's annual budget has finished growing, and the billions it once imagined it might spend on future weapons have evaporated. So cuts--and big ones--are coming, and Gates will be the man who makes them.
Though Gates was hired by George W. Bush to clean up the mismanaged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gates' greatest legacy may come in what he calls a "strategic reshaping" that better outfits the U.S. military to wage coming wars. Future weapons buys must "be driven more by the actual capabilities of potential adversaries," Gates told Congress a few weeks ago, "and less by what is technologically feasible given unlimited time and resources." Pentagon procurement, he said, is plagued by a "risk-averse culture, a litigious process, parochial interests, excessive and changing requirements, budget churn and instability and sometimes adversarial relationships within the Department of Defense."
