Mass'Debator
Posts: 4,284 
Location: Atlantic Canada
Location: Atlantic Canada
May 30th, 2008, 11:14 AM
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNew...0530?hub=World
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNew...0530?hub=World
Quote:
LONDON -- When British military leaders set up a special task force in 1969 to study how best to use deception to achieve their battlefield aims, they turned their attention to the tactics used by the Israelis -- not the Americans.
Formerly classified documents released Friday by the National Archives show that many officers felt the Americans didn't have a knack for deceiving the enemy. Americans were judged to be so open and friendly that they lacked cunning.
The so-called Defense Deception Advisory Group studied in detail the way Israel's military and political leaders used a complex series of intertwined deceptions to fool their Arab enemies about the Jewish state's intentions and its military capabilities.
The British found, for example, that the Israelis confused their adversaries by setting up fake soldiers -- actual mannequins in battle dress were used -- near one border crossing to make their enemies think an attack was coming, forcing them to deploy troops to defend the area.
"The British are impressed to see how those techniques could be used in a modern era," said Mark Dunton, contemporary history specialist at the National Archives. "Their anxiety is that unless Britain kept its thinking fresh on this, they would lose their expertise, and the Israeli tactics are seen as ingenious and clever."
The three-year study was prompted by the fear that Britain's vaunted ability to deceive enemies at key points in battle was fading because of the long period of relative peace that followed World War II.
Fearing Britain was growing soft, officers thought they could learn from the battle-hardened Israelis. The template was the Six-Day War in 1967 in which Israel seized large amounts of land from Jordan, Syria and Egypt in a lightning-fast confrontation that left Arab nations reeling.
After Egypt blocked the strategic Straits of Tiran and expelled UN forces from the Sinai Desert, Israel launched pre-emptive strikes on June 5, 1967, against Egyptian and Syrian air forces, destroying them on the ground. In six days of one-sided battles, Israeli forces captured the West Bank, Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Jordan, Syria and Egypt.
In an unsigned, top secret military document, that war was cited as "an example of how deception can be employed in the modern era and in such a way that the enemy decision making process is placed at a severe disadvantage."
The documents describe how Israel implemented a sophisticated, pre-planned deception strategy that included statements made by its political leaders and top diplomats during the tense prewar period.
This included the well-known decision to send many Israeli soldiers on their regular weekend home leave to convince the enemy to lower its guard just before hostilities began.
An April 10, 1972, document credits the Israelis with using a variety of strategies to confuse and demoralize their enemies, including:
"It made it easier for Israel to go through the north," he said. "In general this has been known, but not many details have come out."
The British were much less impressed with the American approach, even though the task force made an extensive tour of U.S. military bases and met with senior American commanders to discuss how best to use deception.
A "Top Secret UK Eyes Only" document from June 1, 1972, states that radical differences in the national character make it unlikely that American officers will be able to use deception to their strategic advantage.
"For the British, on the other hand, it could be said that the inclination to deceive is already available as a national asset," the report states, adding that every British citizen uses guile "as a way of life."
Formerly classified documents released Friday by the National Archives show that many officers felt the Americans didn't have a knack for deceiving the enemy. Americans were judged to be so open and friendly that they lacked cunning.
The so-called Defense Deception Advisory Group studied in detail the way Israel's military and political leaders used a complex series of intertwined deceptions to fool their Arab enemies about the Jewish state's intentions and its military capabilities.
The British found, for example, that the Israelis confused their adversaries by setting up fake soldiers -- actual mannequins in battle dress were used -- near one border crossing to make their enemies think an attack was coming, forcing them to deploy troops to defend the area.
"The British are impressed to see how those techniques could be used in a modern era," said Mark Dunton, contemporary history specialist at the National Archives. "Their anxiety is that unless Britain kept its thinking fresh on this, they would lose their expertise, and the Israeli tactics are seen as ingenious and clever."
The three-year study was prompted by the fear that Britain's vaunted ability to deceive enemies at key points in battle was fading because of the long period of relative peace that followed World War II.
Fearing Britain was growing soft, officers thought they could learn from the battle-hardened Israelis. The template was the Six-Day War in 1967 in which Israel seized large amounts of land from Jordan, Syria and Egypt in a lightning-fast confrontation that left Arab nations reeling.
After Egypt blocked the strategic Straits of Tiran and expelled UN forces from the Sinai Desert, Israel launched pre-emptive strikes on June 5, 1967, against Egyptian and Syrian air forces, destroying them on the ground. In six days of one-sided battles, Israeli forces captured the West Bank, Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and Sinai from Jordan, Syria and Egypt.
In an unsigned, top secret military document, that war was cited as "an example of how deception can be employed in the modern era and in such a way that the enemy decision making process is placed at a severe disadvantage."
The documents describe how Israel implemented a sophisticated, pre-planned deception strategy that included statements made by its political leaders and top diplomats during the tense prewar period.
This included the well-known decision to send many Israeli soldiers on their regular weekend home leave to convince the enemy to lower its guard just before hostilities began.
An April 10, 1972, document credits the Israelis with using a variety of strategies to confuse and demoralize their enemies, including:
- Maintaining strict secrecy about modern bombs in their arsenal, leading Arab nations to believe Israel had only World War II type bombs, and misleading the enemy about new systems.
- The use of Israeli intelligence agents who spoke Arabic well to take part in Egyptian military radio communications, giving them vital information about Egypt's military plans.
- The ability to delay information about the capture of key Arab towns, thus luring Arab patrols into devastating ambushes.
- The use of Israelis who spoke Arabic with an Egyptian accent to man the control tower at a captured airfield so that Egyptian military pilots would land their planes and be captured.
- The use of small deployments of tanks and torpedo boats to coax the enemy into defending borders where no real attack was planned.
"It made it easier for Israel to go through the north," he said. "In general this has been known, but not many details have come out."
The British were much less impressed with the American approach, even though the task force made an extensive tour of U.S. military bases and met with senior American commanders to discuss how best to use deception.
A "Top Secret UK Eyes Only" document from June 1, 1972, states that radical differences in the national character make it unlikely that American officers will be able to use deception to their strategic advantage.
"For the British, on the other hand, it could be said that the inclination to deceive is already available as a national asset," the report states, adding that every British citizen uses guile "as a way of life."
Grossly Underrated
Posts: 6,283
Location: In the bush somewhere near Sudbury
Location: In the bush somewhere near Sudbury
May 30th, 2008, 01:11 PM
This isn't really new. In 1956, as Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, Britain coaxed Isreal into picking a fight. That way, Britain could step in against its friend in defense of Israel - and keep the Canal open for British shipping.
This isn't really new. In 1956, as Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, Britain coaxed Isreal into picking a fight. That way, Britain could step in against its friend in defense of Israel - and keep the Canal open for British shipping.
Council Member
Posts: 1,679
May 30th, 2008, 03:36 PM
How things have changed.
Lebanon/Israel 2006
How things have changed.
Lebanon/Israel 2006
Quote:
Zar'it-Shtula incident
The Zar'it-Shtula incident was a cross-border attack committed by Lebanon-based Hezbollah special forces on an Israeli military patrol on 12 July 2006 on Israeli territory. The operation was originally named "Freedom for Samir Al-Quntar and his brothers" by Hezbollah, but it was shortened to "Operation Truthful Promise".[1] Using rockets fired on several Israeli towns as a diversion, Hezbollah militants crossed from Lebanon into Israel [2] and ambushed two Israeli Army vehicles, killing three Israeli soldiers and capturing two. Hezbollah demanded the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel in exchange for the release of the abducted soldiers. Israel refused and launched a large-scale military campaign across Lebanon in response to the Hezbollah incursion. This marked the start of the 2006 Lebanon War.
In the months leading up to the attack, Lt. Col. Ishai Efroni reported seeing increased activity across the fenceline, including more brazen Hezbollah patrols. He had repeatedly seen burden-laden donkeys, which he had believed were being led by innocent farmers, but after the incident suspected were laden with arms and equipment. After a rocket attack on May 28, the colonel, who at 41 had spent much of his career along the northern border, "got the feeling something had changed."[3]
Hezbollah had carved a hollow from the underbrush, just above the Israeli border patrol track. The "camp was stocked with food, water, radios, rifles, antitank missiles and diagrams detailing the insignia and size of Israeli military units."[3]
At around 9:00 a.m. local time (06:00 UTC), on 12 July 2006, Hezbollah initiated a diversionary Katyusha rocket and mortar attack on Israeli military positions and border villages, including Zar'it and Shlomi.[4][5][6][7][8][9]
A ground contingent of Hezbollah fighters crossed the border into Israeli territory and attacked two Israeli armoured Humvees patrolling on the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border between the villages of Zar'it and Shtula (Shetula). The attackers took advantage of a "dead zone" in the border fence not visible from any of the IDF lookout posts and may have used a wheeled ladder to climb the fence.[4] After hiding in a wadi on the Israeli side of the fence they attacked with a combination of pre-positioned explosives and anti-tank missiles. The team knocked out the trailing Humvee, killing three soldiers inside, and captured two soldiers from the first vehicle.[3] "Another soldier was seriously wounded, another lightly wounded and a third suffered a shrapnel scratch." The entire incident took no more than 10 minutes.[4]
A total of seven army posts "reported taking fire at the same time, coordinated attacks that knocked out surveillance cameras." The attack had knocked out command communications with the convoy. Twenty minutes passed until Staff Sgts. Ehud Goldwasser, 31, and Eldad Regev, 26, were confirmed to be missing from the first vehicle, while the gunmen "fled through olive orchards to the Lebanese border village of Aita al-Shaab."[3]
Lt. Col. Ishai Efroni, deputy commander of the Baram Brigade, sent a Merkava Mark II tank, an armored personnel carrier and a helicopter in pursuit.[3] Crossing into Lebanon,[10] they headed down a dirt track lined with Lebanese border defenses.[3] When it "unexpectedly veered onto the road near a known Hezbollah post" the resulting blast was "enormous, killing the four soldiers inside instantly."[3][11] A fifth soldier died during an ensuing firefight while attempting to recover their bodies.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zar'it-Shtula_incident
The Zar'it-Shtula incident was a cross-border attack committed by Lebanon-based Hezbollah special forces on an Israeli military patrol on 12 July 2006 on Israeli territory. The operation was originally named "Freedom for Samir Al-Quntar and his brothers" by Hezbollah, but it was shortened to "Operation Truthful Promise".[1] Using rockets fired on several Israeli towns as a diversion, Hezbollah militants crossed from Lebanon into Israel [2] and ambushed two Israeli Army vehicles, killing three Israeli soldiers and capturing two. Hezbollah demanded the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel in exchange for the release of the abducted soldiers. Israel refused and launched a large-scale military campaign across Lebanon in response to the Hezbollah incursion. This marked the start of the 2006 Lebanon War.
In the months leading up to the attack, Lt. Col. Ishai Efroni reported seeing increased activity across the fenceline, including more brazen Hezbollah patrols. He had repeatedly seen burden-laden donkeys, which he had believed were being led by innocent farmers, but after the incident suspected were laden with arms and equipment. After a rocket attack on May 28, the colonel, who at 41 had spent much of his career along the northern border, "got the feeling something had changed."[3]
Hezbollah had carved a hollow from the underbrush, just above the Israeli border patrol track. The "camp was stocked with food, water, radios, rifles, antitank missiles and diagrams detailing the insignia and size of Israeli military units."[3]
At around 9:00 a.m. local time (06:00 UTC), on 12 July 2006, Hezbollah initiated a diversionary Katyusha rocket and mortar attack on Israeli military positions and border villages, including Zar'it and Shlomi.[4][5][6][7][8][9]
A ground contingent of Hezbollah fighters crossed the border into Israeli territory and attacked two Israeli armoured Humvees patrolling on the Israeli side of the Israel-Lebanon border between the villages of Zar'it and Shtula (Shetula). The attackers took advantage of a "dead zone" in the border fence not visible from any of the IDF lookout posts and may have used a wheeled ladder to climb the fence.[4] After hiding in a wadi on the Israeli side of the fence they attacked with a combination of pre-positioned explosives and anti-tank missiles. The team knocked out the trailing Humvee, killing three soldiers inside, and captured two soldiers from the first vehicle.[3] "Another soldier was seriously wounded, another lightly wounded and a third suffered a shrapnel scratch." The entire incident took no more than 10 minutes.[4]
A total of seven army posts "reported taking fire at the same time, coordinated attacks that knocked out surveillance cameras." The attack had knocked out command communications with the convoy. Twenty minutes passed until Staff Sgts. Ehud Goldwasser, 31, and Eldad Regev, 26, were confirmed to be missing from the first vehicle, while the gunmen "fled through olive orchards to the Lebanese border village of Aita al-Shaab."[3]
Lt. Col. Ishai Efroni, deputy commander of the Baram Brigade, sent a Merkava Mark II tank, an armored personnel carrier and a helicopter in pursuit.[3] Crossing into Lebanon,[10] they headed down a dirt track lined with Lebanese border defenses.[3] When it "unexpectedly veered onto the road near a known Hezbollah post" the resulting blast was "enormous, killing the four soldiers inside instantly."[3][11] A fifth soldier died during an ensuing firefight while attempting to recover their bodies.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zar'it-Shtula_incident
