I was just reading this article on Unrestricted Warfare (Unrestricted Warfare - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia), a book written by two PLA Colonels in 1999. Its main focus is on 'alternative warfare', or war off of the battlefield, including economic warfare, 'lawfare' (Lawfare - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia), an other non-military means of achieving national objectives.
Some of the ideas in the book are not that new. Economic wars have occurred a number of times between Canada and the US on occasion in the form of trade wars, for example, or in a more military sense, when Nazi Germany was forging US dollars and British Pounds, or when the Hezbollah began printing US dollars when the US interfered in Lebanese affairs. Though lawfare is a new concept of sorts, it's really just a spin off of propaganda or psychological warfare, aimed at making the enemy look bad in the eyes of the public, or, in the case of international lawfare, of the world.
Though many of the concepts in the book are not that new, what does seem to be new is the systematic exploration of them in a book as a means of alternative warfare (in Nazi Germany and Lebanon, for example, conventional warfare was still going on at the same time, and in the case of trade wars between Canada and the US, it wasn't really thought of as a war in the real sense, but just an interest in protecting jobs, and proxy wars still involve head on military conflict between representatives). This book seems to view these strategies as a possible means of waging wars without having to resort to conventional warfare at all if the cards are played right.
The concept of lawfare, though just an extension of psyops or hearts and minds campaigns, is unique in its attempt to use international law against the opponent, either to embarrass it, delegitimize it, or portray it as an international thug in the eyes of the world, thus undermining any attempt on its part to gain support from allies, to forge new alliances, or to gain support from its own general public. This is far different from what happened to the US in Iraq, where the US really just shot itself in the foot. The book seems to suggest that a country could adopt a systematic strategy to delegitimize its opponent by purposely trying to portray that nation as acting outside the realm of international law, and so sway public opinion in its favour, possibly even in the enemy state itself. If we consider how the US' illegal war in Iraq did indeed undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of may and did indeed weaken the NATO alliance,though this was of the US' own doing, we can see how under the right circumstances, lawfare could be an effective weapon in a nations arsenal to supplement other forms of non-militaristic warfare (trade sanctions, propaganda warfare, etc.).
Interestingly enough, the book also argues that the US seems to see military strategy only through the limited lenses of technological superiority on the battlefield. I wonder how Canada fares in terms of off-battlefield war strategy.
Some of the ideas in the book are not that new. Economic wars have occurred a number of times between Canada and the US on occasion in the form of trade wars, for example, or in a more military sense, when Nazi Germany was forging US dollars and British Pounds, or when the Hezbollah began printing US dollars when the US interfered in Lebanese affairs. Though lawfare is a new concept of sorts, it's really just a spin off of propaganda or psychological warfare, aimed at making the enemy look bad in the eyes of the public, or, in the case of international lawfare, of the world.
Though many of the concepts in the book are not that new, what does seem to be new is the systematic exploration of them in a book as a means of alternative warfare (in Nazi Germany and Lebanon, for example, conventional warfare was still going on at the same time, and in the case of trade wars between Canada and the US, it wasn't really thought of as a war in the real sense, but just an interest in protecting jobs, and proxy wars still involve head on military conflict between representatives). This book seems to view these strategies as a possible means of waging wars without having to resort to conventional warfare at all if the cards are played right.
The concept of lawfare, though just an extension of psyops or hearts and minds campaigns, is unique in its attempt to use international law against the opponent, either to embarrass it, delegitimize it, or portray it as an international thug in the eyes of the world, thus undermining any attempt on its part to gain support from allies, to forge new alliances, or to gain support from its own general public. This is far different from what happened to the US in Iraq, where the US really just shot itself in the foot. The book seems to suggest that a country could adopt a systematic strategy to delegitimize its opponent by purposely trying to portray that nation as acting outside the realm of international law, and so sway public opinion in its favour, possibly even in the enemy state itself. If we consider how the US' illegal war in Iraq did indeed undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of may and did indeed weaken the NATO alliance,though this was of the US' own doing, we can see how under the right circumstances, lawfare could be an effective weapon in a nations arsenal to supplement other forms of non-militaristic warfare (trade sanctions, propaganda warfare, etc.).
Interestingly enough, the book also argues that the US seems to see military strategy only through the limited lenses of technological superiority on the battlefield. I wonder how Canada fares in terms of off-battlefield war strategy.