Circumstances differ in Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories, according to Muslih, and extremist groups there reflect these differences. The Lebanese group Hezbollah (which originally called itself Islamic Jihad) was initially motivated by the deprived social and political status of the Shia community in Lebanon as well as by the 1979 success of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Until the death of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, one of the group's main goals was to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon. Thereafter, this motive changed and like the Palestinian groups—Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad—became a national liberation movement principally interested in fighting Israeli occupation in Lebanon and extending help to the Palestinian Intifada whenever possible. Hezbollah since the late 1980s has recognized the legitimacy of the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic Lebanese state, and has transformed itself into a political party that has won representation in the Lebanese parliament.
Muslih stressed that there are nuanced differences between Hezbollah and Hamas with respect to peace with Israel. For example, in its statements and published literature Hezbollah calls for the total liberation of all original Mandate Palestine, as well as for the recovery of the Shab'a Farms area, which it claims belongs to Lebanon, and the return of the Golan to Syria. However, the Palestinian group Hamas, according to Muslih, is predisposed to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with Jerusalem as its capital, although Hamas views such a solution to be a hudna (truce) and not necessarily a final peace with the Jewish state. Like Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad insists on the total liberation of Mandate Palestine—what today is Israel and the Palestinian territories.
According to Muslih, it is significant that, like the Muslim Brotherhood in its early days, Hamas has been willing to co-exist with the Palestinian Authority, and on several occasions has talked about accepting a cease-fire with Israel. In other words, unlike Sayyid Qutb, who wrote that Egypt and the Arab world were in a state of Dar al-Harb (the "realm of war" where governments must be overthrown because they are non-Islamic and societies must be rebuilt from scratch along Islamic lines), Hamas does not consider the Palestinian territories to be in Dar al-Harb. Qutb also wrote that the Koran is a "sword" that has universal application to fight infidels everywhere, but Hamas literature does not reflect this perspective. Instead, although mobilized in the name of Islam and as off-shoots of the Muslim Brotherhood, both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad remain almost exclusively focused on the national struggle between the Palestinians and the Israelis and on the liberation of Palestinian territory from Israeli occupation.
It is not surprising then that, from a theological point of view, the literature and the statements of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad do not expound jihad as a religious concept to the same degree as the literature produced by the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. According to Muslih, the writings of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are not preoccupied, as were those by Sayyid Qutb, with fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) or with an in-depth analysis of theological and governance questions.
While Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas have important ties to Iran, both remain within the Sunni Islamic tradition, argued Muslih. Yet Islamic Jihad is closer ideologically to Iran than Hamas because the latter established more direct relations with Tehran when Israel deported some 400 Hamas members and sympathizers into Marj al-Zuhur, in southern Lebanon, in December 1992 and Iran came to their political and financial aid. Overall, the marji'iyya (frame of reference) of Hamas is very close to that of the global Muslim Brotherhood, while that of Palestinian Islamic Jihad is deeply influenced by the marji'iyya of Iran. Moreover, Hamas remains privately much more critical of Iran's Shia traditions than Palestinian Islamic Jihad. (Sunni and Shia Islam are the two main branches of Islam, with Sunni Muslims being in the majority.)
Compared to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, according to Muslih, Hezbollah remains ideologically closer to Iran, because Hezbollah has its roots in Lebanon's Shia community. Iran, along with rich Lebanese and non-Lebanese Shia families, is the greatest source of funds for Hezbollah. Iran reportedly also provides unspecified amounts of funding for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
