The Democratic Buffer

[FiveParadox]

I originally posted this [original] essay on Ranters Roost.

The Democratic Buffer
Peace, Order and Good Government

Christopher Girodat​

Some prominent Canadians in recent times have suggested that there is a democratic deficit, of sorts, in relation to the democratic government of the nation; it has been suggested that there is some sort of critical problem that must be corrected in order for democracy in Canada to continue to function. However, this may not be the case—in fact, correcting this apparent "problem" could be a monumental step toward the destabilization of Confederation, and the end of Canada.

Canada's institutions of government were constructed and configured, keeping in mind two important factors: (a) The Canadian population must have the right to be represented in the decision-making process, and; (b) peace and order must at all times prevail, even at the expense of the will of the majority. In crafting our system of government, the Fathers of Confederation were certainly aware that majorities could sometimes be incorrect—and in the decades and centuries after Canada's creation, we have seen that this can sometimes be deathly so.

The Prime Minister
From First-Among-Equals to Dictator

The Westminster system, upon which our own system of government is based, was one where the prime minister was intended to administer the nation as a "first-among-equals". Ministers were to have the freedom to rule over their own departments, in consultation with the Cabinet, and the prime minister would hold the Cabinet together and advise the Crown. Instead, in recent years, the prime minister has become the sole decision-making authority in the nation—prime ministers have come to supercede Parliament and Cabinet, their own ministers often acting not as decision-makers, but now merely government spokespersons.

The prime minister has come to be the Alpha and the Omega of governance—long gone are the days where a Cabinet revolt could have unseated the head of government. Gone are the days where a prime minister was obligated to work with his or her ministers to govern the nation, instead of our current ministry micromanagement on the part of the prime ministership. The prime minister was never intended to have this much power—which is why the hounding calls for a purely democratic process have put the very relevence of Cabinet and Parliament increasingly into question.

Many decades ago, it was the governing caucus that elected their prime minister—the prime ministership was a decision of the government, rather than of the party. On the surface, this may have seemed undemocratic—party members wouldn't have been able to vote for their party leader. However, in fact, this undemocratic process is what ensured that democracy in Cabinet and Parliament could flourish—a prime minister had to work for the government, rather than as the government. The prime minister couldn't silence government members—if he or she lost the support of the caucus, then the Cabinet could revolt and force a prime minister to resign as quickly as he or she had come. Unfortunately, this is no longer the case—the prime minister now holds the caucus and Cabinet in shackles and chains. Dissent is never tolerated—one man or woman can control hundreds of Members of Parliament.

This unhealthy phenomenon is due to the democratic process, thrust upon a decision that was never meant to be left to the masses. The legitimacy of a majority endorsement of the prime minister has meant that ministers and government members have no choice but to submit to one person. Caucus can be held hostage by the prime minister. It's unfortunate—and dangerous—that forcing a democratic process upon a functional system has in fact allowed the prime minister to overrule a supposedly-democratic caucus—and holding a majority of seats, a prime minister can overrule Parliament entirely. Because of democracy, our democratic Parliament is in peril.

The Senate of Canada
From Our Defenders to Our Downfall

When our Fathers of Confederation were discussing how the government of our new Canada was to be constructed, they spent more time discussing the new Senate than any other subject. Knowing that they had given the House of Commons—the dominating democratic House of Parliament—extraordinary power, they decided to safeguard the interests of Canadians by creating a second House of Parliament. This Upper House was the Senate, and they deliberately chose not to elect the members of this second chamber—rather, senators would be appointed. In this way, democracy in Parliament would be tempered to allow for the decisions of the majority to be checked, reviewed and studied before they would be implemented.

The Senate can do anything that the House of Commons can do: The Senate can create bills (even money bills, under certain circumstances, contrary to popular belief), amend them, and even outright reject bills from the House of Commons—in fact, the Senate can even throw a government's budget out of Parliament, and the Commons can do nothing to force senators to comply. One may be unfamiliar with these facts, since the Senate rarely exercises its parliamentary muscles and dominates the Commons agenda—and for good reason. The Senate is meant only to use its powers when the interests of the Canadian people are at risk—and it has done so in the past.

Appointed senators can sit as whichever party they choose, with or without the consent of the party-in-question: Liberal senators can oppose a Liberal government's agenda, just as Conservative senators can vote against a Conservative budget—without the career-ending consequences that Members of Parliament would face for doing so. The influence of the prime minister is curbed in the Upper House, which ensures that government bills receive an honest review and study. The Senate often passes legislation which it opposes, keeping in mind that they should normally bow to the democratic will of the Commons—most of the time.

The low turnover rate of the Senate membership ensures that a phenomenon known as institutional memory is maintained in the Upper House—something which the House of Commons sorely lacks. The long-term tenure of senators ensures that the best and the brightest in Canada would be willing to give up their positions elsewhere to serve the nation as a parliamentarian—the Senate is one of an exquisite and expert membership. If Senators are one day elected, however—as per the present direction of recent governing parties—this membership will cease to exist, and we will be left with nothing more than a second House of partisanship and career politicians.

With elections in the Senate, party nominations would become as important as they are in the Commons—the independence of the second House of Parliament would be irrepairably damaged. Moreover, with an elected mandate, senators would be ever-so-willing to exercise the extraordinary parliamentary powers at their disposal. With no method set forth in the Constitution Acts, 1867–1982 to break a deadlock between the Houses—other than a rarely-used conference of the Houses—giving both equal Houses an elected mandate would be disastrous for our parliamentary democracy. Feuding between the Houses would result in little legislation passed—and in the case of money bills, the Senate could throw the public works of the nation into disarray.

The Governor General
From Final Safeguard to Partisan Menace

The Governor General of Canada is the de facto head of state in our constitutional-monarchical form of government. He or she exercises a majority of the constitutional powers of Her Majesty the Queen—and even if Canada were to one day break ties from the Queen as the de jure head of state, the very nature of the Canadian constitution and our institutions would demand that a governor general continue in Her Majesty's stead. Normally, the prerogatives of the Crown are exercised on the advice of the prime minister; however, there are certain reserved powers which the governor general has the power—and the duty—to exercise alone, in order to protect democracy.

A governor general may refuse a request from the prime minister to dissolve Parliament; he or she could also force a general election against the prime minister's will. In fact, a governor general could even outright dismiss the prime minister, and invite someone from an entirely different party to govern the nation instead, without ever calling an election. Governors general have rarely exercised these powers in the past; in fact, only one governor general in our short history since Confederation, has ever exercised his right to refuse to dissolve Parliament. Nonetheless, these powers are alive and well—and they can be called upon, if a prime minister ever attempts to abuse the powers and authority of the prime ministership to oppress the people.

However, the very nature of the governor generalship demands that the appointment be as non-partisan as possible; nonetheless, there are misguided calls for governors general to be elected through a partisan electoral campaign and vote. In terms of a governor general, should it matter where one is situated on the political spectrum, so long as he or she can be trusted to exercise the governor general's constitutional powers appropriately and in the interest of Canada? Governors general must remain above the political debate and atmosphere of the day, and this principle would be betrayed and shattered if elections were to pervade the institution. We must ensure that governors general do not become allied with their party members in Parliament—otherwise, we could stumble upon a crisis that could have the eleven Crowns tear Canada apart at the constitutional seams.

Concluding
A Buffer From the Dangers of Democracy

While democratic principles play a central role in our system of parliamentary democracy, many of these principles are given life with an undemocratic base—if we are to ensure that our democratic institutions continue to flourish and function properly, we must be prepared to embrace our uniquely-Canadian tempered democracy. We must be prepared to back away from the pure democracy that so many now mistakenly demand—for doing away with our undemocratic institutions would be doing away with the checks and balances to which the government must submit. The future of Confederation may well rest upon accepting that while the goal of governance should be democratic government, democracy on all sides isn't necessarily the way to get there.

 

[Kreskin]

Good article Five.

 

[FiveParadox]

Thanks, Kreskin.

I believe in what I write quite strongly (hence my fervent opposition to an elected Senate of Canada, an elected Supreme Court of Canada, an elected Governorship General of Canada, amongst other institutions). On another note, I don’t suppose there’s any way whereby we can prevent text inside quotes from being italicised?