Brussels is not prepared for what might hit it if Britain's Tories get into power

Blackleaf

Hall of Fame Member
Oct 9, 2004
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It's not just plucky little Republic of Ireland which can give the EU a kick in the knackers, as it did recently when it voted against the EU Constitution.

Britain, the EU's second-biggest member state, and the most anti-EU of the lot, will probably give the Eurocrats a lot more to worry about if the Europhobe Conservative Party wins the 2010 General Election, as seems likely.

Europe’s Tory nightmare

Jul 10th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Brussels is not prepared for what might hit it if Britain’s Conservative Party wins the next election



Illustration by Peter Schrank



A COMPLACENT calm reigns in Brussels a month after Irish voters rejected the Lisbon treaty. Eurocrats seem persuaded that Lisbon can be salvaged quickly if other countries are pushed to keep ratifying it, so that an isolated Ireland feels bound to hold a second vote. The maddest optimists have started talking of a new Irish referendum next March, allowing Lisbon to come into force before the European elections in June 2009.

Madder still are hotheads in the federalist camp who seem to yearn for Ireland to rule out a second vote. For they too have a plan ready: a two-speed Europe, with Ireland “invited” to move out of the way into the slow lane. Oddly, there is little debate about a third possibility that is surely more likely than either of these. What will EU leaders do if Ireland’s prime minister tells them this autumn that he is not ruling out another vote, but wants to delay? There is a recession, he might note, and the polls are iffy (say 49% for a yes); we rush this at our peril.


Tory leader David Cameron: With the Government doing so badly, Cameron is likely to become Prime Minister in 2010 - something which the EU should worry about

Here is another thought to dampen the confidence of the Brussels set. If opinion polls are to be believed, the Conservatives will form the next British government by the spring of 2010. As a Tory victory draws closer, two things may happen: the Irish will become harder to isolate; and talk of a two-speed Europe will become more dangerous and destabilising for the EU. In truth, for the two-speed Europe camp, little Ireland is barely a prize. But pushing a sullen Britain into an outer circle would clear the way for all sorts of Euro-integration. Such federalists have their mirror-opposites in Britain. Eurosceptic hardliners dream that Britain could negotiate a nice free-trade pact with the EU, like a giant Norway or Switzerland (but without as much fish or cheese). The odds are still against Britain walking out. But the country has changed in ways that Brussels underestimates. A cool-headed majority on both sides would surely regret it if Britain accidentally fell out of the union, without proper debate.

Today’s Conservatives would form the most Eurosceptic government since Britain joined the club in 1973. Unlike previous Tory bosses, David Cameron does not have to accommodate pro-Europeans in the party, let alone in his inner circle (just three Tory members of Parliament voted with the government on the Lisbon Treaty in March, and all were over 60). It is true that Mr Cameron does not want to “bang on” about Europe, alienating voters whose distaste for the EU is matched only by their desire never to hear anything about it. Indeed, the EU is unlikely to be one of Mr Cameron’s top three campaign themes. But once elected, a Conservative government is sure to pick some fights.

In the European Parliament, the Tories are committed to severing their formal link with the other main centre-right parties in the European People’s Party, and to set up a new formation of more sceptical parties, taking in allies from the ex-communist east. Pro-European Tories fret that they will fail to find such allies and end up on the independent benches, denied the influence enjoyed by those in formal groups. But voters could not care less about influence in Strasbourg (in one poll, 88% of Britons could not name their members in the European Parliament).

On the Lisbon treaty, a new British government will face one of three scenarios. In the first, seen as easiest by the Conservatives, they come to office to find Lisbon abandoned, because the Irish have convinced other countries that they cannot hold a second vote.

Even this may not be plain sailing. Other governments might start “cherry-picking” bits of Lisbon that can be implemented without a new treaty—including pushing ahead with scrapping national vetoes on some areas of cross-border justice, police and immigration policy. There would be calls to give greater legal force to the charter of fundamental rights, a sweeping catalogue of social and civil rights. Mr Cameron would swiftly find himself in the familiar territory of British opt-outs. As it happens, Lisbon offered Britain hefty opt-outs on both justice and the charter, which might well be offered again—but the Conservatives have already dismissed these as inadequate.

In a second scenario, Lisbon has not been ratified by all 27 countries when a Conservative government takes office. Outsiders assume this would be tricky for the Tory high command, forcing a knotty European dilemma onto their agenda. But insiders say it is quite simple: Mr Cameron would hold a referendum and campaign for voters to reject the treaty. Britain would then withdraw its ratification and Lisbon would be dead. One stunned EU diplomat says that “nuclear is not a strong enough word” to describe this option, and hopes that the Tories do not mean it. Conservatives say that they sincerely want Lisbon stopped.

Vote and be damned?

It is a third scenario that is the trickiest: one in which all 27 countries have ratified Lisbon, including Ireland, so that it is already in force as the union’s rulebook when the Tories come to power. Anti-EU absolutists would push Mr Cameron to hold a referendum anyway, as a prelude to Britain renegotiating the treaty. Mr Cameron and his shadow foreign secretary, William Hague, have already promised that if they come to office to find the treaty in force, they will “not let matters rest there”.

This assertion is a bluff. A post-ratification referendum would be a legal nightmare, with open-ended political consequences, and Tory leaders know it. More likely, they will push for something else: a repatriation of powers from Brussels in the field of social and employment laws (ie, more opt-outs). Though awkward, this might be doable given enough political will. But everything has a price in Brussels: Britain could end up losing over the EU budget, say, or its access to the single market might be compromised (it is not a level playing-field, rivals would grumble).

Europe faces a time of instability, in which Britain and other players do not have the measure of each other. That makes the calm that reigns in Brussels more than complacent: it is baffling.

economist.com
 

scratch

Senate Member
May 20, 2008
5,658
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It's not just plucky little Republic of Ireland which can give the EU a kick in the knackers, as it did recently when it voted against the EU Constitution.

Britain, the EU's second-biggest member state, and the most anti-EU of the lot, will probably give the Eurocrats a lot more to worry about if the Europhobe Conservative Party wins the 2010 General Election, as seems likely.

Europe’s Tory nightmare

Jul 10th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Brussels is not prepared for what might hit it if Britain’s Conservative Party wins the next election



Illustration by Peter Schrank



A COMPLACENT calm reigns in Brussels a month after Irish voters rejected the Lisbon treaty. Eurocrats seem persuaded that Lisbon can be salvaged quickly if other countries are pushed to keep ratifying it, so that an isolated Ireland feels bound to hold a second vote. The maddest optimists have started talking of a new Irish referendum next March, allowing Lisbon to come into force before the European elections in June 2009.

Madder still are hotheads in the federalist camp who seem to yearn for Ireland to rule out a second vote. For they too have a plan ready: a two-speed Europe, with Ireland “invited” to move out of the way into the slow lane. Oddly, there is little debate about a third possibility that is surely more likely than either of these. What will EU leaders do if Ireland’s prime minister tells them this autumn that he is not ruling out another vote, but wants to delay? There is a recession, he might note, and the polls are iffy (say 49% for a yes); we rush this at our peril.


Tory leader David Cameron: With the Government doing so badly, Cameron is likely to become Prime Minister in 2010 - something which the EU should worry about

Here is another thought to dampen the confidence of the Brussels set. If opinion polls are to be believed, the Conservatives will form the next British government by the spring of 2010. As a Tory victory draws closer, two things may happen: the Irish will become harder to isolate; and talk of a two-speed Europe will become more dangerous and destabilising for the EU. In truth, for the two-speed Europe camp, little Ireland is barely a prize. But pushing a sullen Britain into an outer circle would clear the way for all sorts of Euro-integration. Such federalists have their mirror-opposites in Britain. Eurosceptic hardliners dream that Britain could negotiate a nice free-trade pact with the EU, like a giant Norway or Switzerland (but without as much fish or cheese). The odds are still against Britain walking out. But the country has changed in ways that Brussels underestimates. A cool-headed majority on both sides would surely regret it if Britain accidentally fell out of the union, without proper debate.

Today’s Conservatives would form the most Eurosceptic government since Britain joined the club in 1973. Unlike previous Tory bosses, David Cameron does not have to accommodate pro-Europeans in the party, let alone in his inner circle (just three Tory members of Parliament voted with the government on the Lisbon Treaty in March, and all were over 60). It is true that Mr Cameron does not want to “bang on” about Europe, alienating voters whose distaste for the EU is matched only by their desire never to hear anything about it. Indeed, the EU is unlikely to be one of Mr Cameron’s top three campaign themes. But once elected, a Conservative government is sure to pick some fights.

In the European Parliament, the Tories are committed to severing their formal link with the other main centre-right parties in the European People’s Party, and to set up a new formation of more sceptical parties, taking in allies from the ex-communist east. Pro-European Tories fret that they will fail to find such allies and end up on the independent benches, denied the influence enjoyed by those in formal groups. But voters could not care less about influence in Strasbourg (in one poll, 88% of Britons could not name their members in the European Parliament).

On the Lisbon treaty, a new British government will face one of three scenarios. In the first, seen as easiest by the Conservatives, they come to office to find Lisbon abandoned, because the Irish have convinced other countries that they cannot hold a second vote.

Even this may not be plain sailing. Other governments might start “cherry-picking” bits of Lisbon that can be implemented without a new treaty—including pushing ahead with scrapping national vetoes on some areas of cross-border justice, police and immigration policy. There would be calls to give greater legal force to the charter of fundamental rights, a sweeping catalogue of social and civil rights. Mr Cameron would swiftly find himself in the familiar territory of British opt-outs. As it happens, Lisbon offered Britain hefty opt-outs on both justice and the charter, which might well be offered again—but the Conservatives have already dismissed these as inadequate.

In a second scenario, Lisbon has not been ratified by all 27 countries when a Conservative government takes office. Outsiders assume this would be tricky for the Tory high command, forcing a knotty European dilemma onto their agenda. But insiders say it is quite simple: Mr Cameron would hold a referendum and campaign for voters to reject the treaty. Britain would then withdraw its ratification and Lisbon would be dead. One stunned EU diplomat says that “nuclear is not a strong enough word” to describe this option, and hopes that the Tories do not mean it. Conservatives say that they sincerely want Lisbon stopped.

Vote and be damned?

It is a third scenario that is the trickiest: one in which all 27 countries have ratified Lisbon, including Ireland, so that it is already in force as the union’s rulebook when the Tories come to power. Anti-EU absolutists would push Mr Cameron to hold a referendum anyway, as a prelude to Britain renegotiating the treaty. Mr Cameron and his shadow foreign secretary, William Hague, have already promised that if they come to office to find the treaty in force, they will “not let matters rest there”.

This assertion is a bluff. A post-ratification referendum would be a legal nightmare, with open-ended political consequences, and Tory leaders know it. More likely, they will push for something else: a repatriation of powers from Brussels in the field of social and employment laws (ie, more opt-outs). Though awkward, this might be doable given enough political will. But everything has a price in Brussels: Britain could end up losing over the EU budget, say, or its access to the single market might be compromised (it is not a level playing-field, rivals would grumble).

Europe faces a time of instability, in which Britain and other players do not have the measure of each other. That makes the calm that reigns in Brussels more than complacent: it is baffling.

economist.com

What can you do....Brits or 'Roos always gumming up the works!