In today’s Middle East summit between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Jordan’s King Abdullah II, incremental progress concerning a process that could lead to increased financing for the Palestinian Authority and a gradual lifting of Israeli security measures in the West Bank is possible. No major breakthroughs are likely. There is the risk that the incremental progress could well prove somewhat unsatisfactory for some of the parties who come into the summit with large expectations.
A quick look at some of the major issues follows:
• Final Settlement Talks: Jordan’s King Abdullah was looking for the Sharm el-Sheikh summit to provide an expedited path toward final settlement talks. Jordan’s Petra-JNA news service reported, “‘During the summit, His Majesty King Abdullah II would ask Prime Minister Olmert to implement obligations required from Israel to forge ahead in the peace process and start political negotiations on final status issues,’ the sources said on eve of the summit.” Israel is likely to focus on near-term issues that would aim to shore up President Abbas’ standing, provide a framework for increased assistance and reduced security measures in the West Bank, and maintain the isolation of Hamas. Israel will likely assert that until these immediate matters are resolved, it is far premature to engage in the riskier final settlement process.
• Palestinian Prisoners: Palestinian President Mahoud Abbas was reportedly interested in seeking the release of “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners (Fatah members) from Israel, including Fatah-Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti. While such a release could contain a visible success for President Abbas, the demand for Barghouti’s release is likely a bid by President Abbas to overreach in attempting to transform his weakened position into bargaining leverage. While Israel may agree for some prisoner releases, particularly those nearing the end of their sentences and those who don’t have “blood on their hands,” Barghouti’s release is unlikely. Even if Prime Minister Olmert were to agree to such terms—and the Sunday Times reported that he was sympathetic to doing so—that agreement would likely lead to the collapse of his fragile governing coalition and would, in the end, be blocked. Consequently, Prime Minister Olmert could agree to give consideration to doing so in the future while avoiding efforts to release him immediately.
• Immediate Removal of West Bank security measures: While President Abbas will likely seek a widespread removal of Israeli security measures in the West Bank, Israel will likely take a slower approach. The sides might agree on a framework that would lead to increased withdrawals based on the performance of the Palestinian government with respect to security. There is a real danger that Hamas could attempt to launch attacks from the West Bank to undermine prospects of Israel’s reducing the West Bank’s security measures. President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert should try to reach an agreement that would address this scenario, particularly allowing for joint cooperation against such attacks. Such a joint cooperation agreement could, in time, build confidence among both sides as they target a common threat. Such increased confidence could, in turn, accelerate the reduction of Israeli security measures in the West Bank.
• Weapons transfers: President Abbas is likely to seek significant transfers of weapons to Fatah. Israel could well seek to accommodate this request to a large extent given the threat posed by Hamas. President Abbas could also seek Egyptian and Jordanian training for his forces. King Abdullah, President Mubarak, and Prime Minister Olmert probably won’t have major objections. Indeed, with the U.S.-led training effort under Keith Dayton having proved largely ineffective in the Gaza Strip, Egyptian and Jordanian training could become especially attractive.
• Finances: Prior to the summit, the international community and Israel agreed to provide increased assistance to President Abbas’ government. The existing agreement will be highlighted and criteria by which Israel would release additional funds could be set forth. Discussions will likely seek to curb the flow of funds to Hamas, though a mechanism for assisting the Gaza Strip through Fatah and international organizations, could be introduced.
• Settlement Activity: Although the Palestinian, Jordanian, and Egyptian leadership will likely seek a complete freeze of settlement activity, agreement will likely be limited to removing settlement outposts and slowing settlement expansion.
• Reaffirmation of Madrid Quartet’s Criteria: Prime Minister Olmert is likely to ask President Abbas to reaffirm his commitment to the Madrid Quartet’s criteria (recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and respect for existing agreements). He is also likely to ask for the disarming of the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade. President Abbas will likely meet both requests. He has previously embraced the Madrid Quartet’s formula. Fatah has recently called for the disarming of militia groups, including the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Bridgade.
All said, the Sharm el-Sheikh summit will likely lead to some incremental progress and an understanding of what would be required to move farther ahead. It will likely also shore up President Abbas’ government. However, it is not likely to lead to an agreement that would bring about near-term final settlement negotiations.
A quick look at some of the major issues follows:
• Final Settlement Talks: Jordan’s King Abdullah was looking for the Sharm el-Sheikh summit to provide an expedited path toward final settlement talks. Jordan’s Petra-JNA news service reported, “‘During the summit, His Majesty King Abdullah II would ask Prime Minister Olmert to implement obligations required from Israel to forge ahead in the peace process and start political negotiations on final status issues,’ the sources said on eve of the summit.” Israel is likely to focus on near-term issues that would aim to shore up President Abbas’ standing, provide a framework for increased assistance and reduced security measures in the West Bank, and maintain the isolation of Hamas. Israel will likely assert that until these immediate matters are resolved, it is far premature to engage in the riskier final settlement process.
• Palestinian Prisoners: Palestinian President Mahoud Abbas was reportedly interested in seeking the release of “hundreds” of Palestinian prisoners (Fatah members) from Israel, including Fatah-Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti. While such a release could contain a visible success for President Abbas, the demand for Barghouti’s release is likely a bid by President Abbas to overreach in attempting to transform his weakened position into bargaining leverage. While Israel may agree for some prisoner releases, particularly those nearing the end of their sentences and those who don’t have “blood on their hands,” Barghouti’s release is unlikely. Even if Prime Minister Olmert were to agree to such terms—and the Sunday Times reported that he was sympathetic to doing so—that agreement would likely lead to the collapse of his fragile governing coalition and would, in the end, be blocked. Consequently, Prime Minister Olmert could agree to give consideration to doing so in the future while avoiding efforts to release him immediately.
• Immediate Removal of West Bank security measures: While President Abbas will likely seek a widespread removal of Israeli security measures in the West Bank, Israel will likely take a slower approach. The sides might agree on a framework that would lead to increased withdrawals based on the performance of the Palestinian government with respect to security. There is a real danger that Hamas could attempt to launch attacks from the West Bank to undermine prospects of Israel’s reducing the West Bank’s security measures. President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert should try to reach an agreement that would address this scenario, particularly allowing for joint cooperation against such attacks. Such a joint cooperation agreement could, in time, build confidence among both sides as they target a common threat. Such increased confidence could, in turn, accelerate the reduction of Israeli security measures in the West Bank.
• Weapons transfers: President Abbas is likely to seek significant transfers of weapons to Fatah. Israel could well seek to accommodate this request to a large extent given the threat posed by Hamas. President Abbas could also seek Egyptian and Jordanian training for his forces. King Abdullah, President Mubarak, and Prime Minister Olmert probably won’t have major objections. Indeed, with the U.S.-led training effort under Keith Dayton having proved largely ineffective in the Gaza Strip, Egyptian and Jordanian training could become especially attractive.
• Finances: Prior to the summit, the international community and Israel agreed to provide increased assistance to President Abbas’ government. The existing agreement will be highlighted and criteria by which Israel would release additional funds could be set forth. Discussions will likely seek to curb the flow of funds to Hamas, though a mechanism for assisting the Gaza Strip through Fatah and international organizations, could be introduced.
• Settlement Activity: Although the Palestinian, Jordanian, and Egyptian leadership will likely seek a complete freeze of settlement activity, agreement will likely be limited to removing settlement outposts and slowing settlement expansion.
• Reaffirmation of Madrid Quartet’s Criteria: Prime Minister Olmert is likely to ask President Abbas to reaffirm his commitment to the Madrid Quartet’s criteria (recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, and respect for existing agreements). He is also likely to ask for the disarming of the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade. President Abbas will likely meet both requests. He has previously embraced the Madrid Quartet’s formula. Fatah has recently called for the disarming of militia groups, including the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Bridgade.
All said, the Sharm el-Sheikh summit will likely lead to some incremental progress and an understanding of what would be required to move farther ahead. It will likely also shore up President Abbas’ government. However, it is not likely to lead to an agreement that would bring about near-term final settlement negotiations.