EU: The Downward Spiral
February 14, 2006 22 42 GMT
Summary
Economic growth in the European Union lagged U.S. growth in 2005. Not only did the discrepancy widen the wealth gap between the world's largest economic pillars, but it was also the 15th consecutive year of such relatively poor European performance. And it will be far from the last. Europe's political and cultural traditions have locked it into a deepening spiral of lower wealth and decreasing influence.
...
It is a simple issue of capital allocation. In a free market system, the money goes wherever its holders believe they can receive the greatest payback. In a social welfare model, development is diverted toward national goals, such as full employment, free higher education, penetration into or maintenance of a specific industry, or supporting an allied government, even if the money would be more profitably invested elsewhere. Though this reallocation might achieve a "national goal," it comes at the opportunity cost of lost growth.
All states find this trade-off acceptable at some level.
...
First of all, many European states did not have the benefit of a baby boomer generation after World War II, or at least not one as large as the U.S. boom. Not only does this mean Europe is not coming off a boomer-fueled financial high, but there is no echo generation of the boomers in Europe as there is in the United States. On the west side of the pond, the boomers' kids -- Generation Y -- will eventually be able to step into their parents' shoes. Europe has no similar demographic. The European Commission now estimates that by 2050, Europe's working age population will fall by 48 million while its number of retirees will increase by 58 million. Combined with longer life spans, the commission expects the current retiree-to-worker ratio to fall from 1-to-4 to 1-to-2.
Second, Europe's balance sheet is far more out of whack than the balance sheet of the United States. This goes beyond the changing ratio of retirees-to-workers, merging with the culture of reliance on the state previously discussed. In simplest terms, the net effect is a younger retirement age, which means Europeans tend to end their period of being net creditors before their American counterparts.
The result is higher pension costs for the economy as a whole. Already, Denmark (one of Europe's better-managed economies) and Italy (one of Europe's worst-managed economies) spend more than 10 percent of gross domestic product every year on pension outlays, nearly three times the level absorbed in the United States. The implications for state finances, particularly in a culture where the state is expected to shoulder most burdens, are as dire as they are clear.
...
Economically, its is not so much that slow growth will become the norm, but more that slow growth will become the best-case scenario. Already, the European Commission believes that Europe's "ideal" growth rate, assuming all cylinders are firing, is only 2.2 percent. The Continent has only achieved this level once in five years, and even then only barely. By 2010, the commission expects that ideal number to dip to 1.9 percent, and to continue its steady downward slide in the years thereafter.
National budgets also are already deeply affected. Italy, Germany and France's chronic budget deficits are chronic for a reason: Tax income cannot compensate for state expenses. As the pension disconnect widens, this will become the norm across Europe. There also is a reason why the dollar, despite deep U.S. budget and trade deficits, remains the global currency: the euro alternative is based on economies flirting ever closer with economic insolvency. Frits Bolkestein, a former EU commissioner, went so far as to say that the combination of state involvement in the economy and demographic pressures jeopardizes the euro itself. Stratfor agrees for these reasons and more.
...
Strategic Forecasting ($)