Consolidated Reform: A Responsive Parliament

FiveParadox

Governor General
Dec 20, 2005
5,875
43
48
Vancouver, BC
Consolidated Reform
A Responsive Parliament

:arrow: Introduction

The House of Commons, the Senate, and the Queen; the three components of the Parliament Assembled of Canada. The law begins and ends here: laws are thought-up and enacted in its Victorian chambers, and the arbitration of the Supreme Court can be overruled here; in most sense of the phrase, the Parliament of Canada is both the Alpha and the Omega of the rule of law in Canada.

However, some would argue that democracy in Canada has grown stale — that, perhaps, the institutions of Parliament are no longer representative of the modern population of Canada. Perhaps they are correct; the institution was founded in a very different time, and perhaps the founders of this great Dominion may have neglected to build adaptivity into the system at its adoption. And so, the responsibility to create that adaptivity is that of the citizens.

Over the weeks and months here at Canadian Content, I have suggested many ideas for reforming the system here in Canada to make it more responsive to the needs of the citizens' thirst for democratic reform, while respecting and celebrating our history and heritage. Combining these ideas, and throwing in some new ones, I present to you, the membership, Consolidated Reform: A Responsive Parliament.

:arrow: The Monarchy and the Governor General

An issue of contention with many in Canada is the status of the Queen, and that of her representative in Canada; where there is no contention, there tends to be apathy. We shoud, as Canadians, recognize the past while embracing the needs of the future. Our head of state is Her Majesty Elizabeth II, the Queen of Canada, and I have no intention of arguing otherwise — that is not the intention of these consolidated suggestions. Rather, my suggestions endeavour to be operative sans amendment to the Constitution Acts (an interesting, but creative, task indeed).

The Governor General of Canada, the representative of the Sovereign (the Sovereign, independent of his or her Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), is the last defence that we as Canadians have against the tyranny of the majority and the oppression (God forbid) of our elected, and proxy-elected, representatives. Our governors general are the one line of defence we have against prime ministers who would attempt to reign over Canada from the olive green-drabbed Commons chamber, high-jacking the institution and oppressing the dissenting voices.

However, governors general are appointed, in practice, at the prerogative of the Prime Minister; perhaps citizens in 1867 thought this practice to be a wise one. However, today, I would argue that such an important appointment should be considered at a length longer than that of any given prime minister. And so, this brings me to my first suggestion of many, that would require no amendments to the Constitution Act, 1982 or any of its former incarnations.

Christopher ([i said:
FiveParadox[/i])]Suggestion #1
Suggestion in relation to the appointment of governors general

The Queen of Canada should not agree to sign the appointment of a Governor General of Canada, wherever possible, unless she receives a recommendation for that nominee from both the Prime Minister of Canada and the Speaker of the Senate of Canada.

In this way, the Prime Minister would continue to be responsible for bringing forth nominees to assume the role of Her Majesty's representative; however, with this suggestion, that nominee would have to be considered and accepted by the Senate of Canada¹. If both the Prime Minister and the Senate agreed on the merits of a nomination, then the Speaker of the Senate would send a message to Her Majesty to inform her that the Senate also recommends the appointment and, subsequently, the Queen would then grant her consent to that person to represent her in Canada.

¹ It is assumed, in this suggestion, that my Senate reform suggestions are in effect.
My suggestion would not require a change to the text of the constitution (which would, in modern-day Canada, be a grueling process), while it would more effectively grant the Governor General a mandate to use his or her reserve powers, in appropriate circumstances, as opposed to acting exclusively on the advice of the ever-partisan Prime Minister; we could have governors general who would be equipped to act in the best interest of Canada, rather than in the best interest of a party.

The appointment of the Lieutenant-Governors of the Provinces could be made more effective through adopting the same suggestion, but where the Legislative Assembly would consider the appointment as opposed to the Senate of Canada, and where the Governor General would make the appointment, as opposed to the Queen.

My second suggestion would be to remove the authority of Her Majesty the Queen to veto legislation enacted within two years on her own initiative (a prerogative which she currently possesses as per our constitution); rather, I would suggest that there be a method to ensure that the rejection of any legislation should be for a truly urgent and legitimate reason.

Christopher ([i said:
FiveParadox[/i])]Suggestion #2
Effecting the veto of a piece of legislation from the Statutes of Canada

Her Majesty the Queen of Canada may veto any piece of legislation that has been enacted within two years, if she is advised to do so by seven or more of her lieutenant-governors, representing at least two-thirds of the population of Canada, and the Governor General of Canada.

Obviously, the recommendation of a lieutenant-governor would be given upon a majority-accepted address from His or Her Honour's legislative assembly; however, the advice of the Governor General would be independent of the House of Commons and the Senate, and therefore he or she would rather have the decision as to whether or not the provinces' plight to veto an Act is urgent enough to consider proceeding to Her Majesty rather than through the legislative avenues of Parliament. This could, in effect, be used to save the population of Canada from an Act passed by an oppressive Government.
I would not attempt to remove the right of the Queen to veto legislation, but rather to change the convention by which she would effect any veto, because my suggestion "as-is" would not require changing the text of the constitution, and therefore is a considerably less-arduous change to enforce.

:arrow: The Sober Second Chamber: The Senate

The Senate of Canada has come under attack recently for rumours and misconceptions that it has outlived its usefulness; this is not true. Without the Senate providing research to the House of Commons, much of the reports from which the House bases its decisions and gathers evidence would cease to exist. The elected lower chamber does not have the time nor the longevity to conduct long-term and hardcore research.

Another important feature of the Senate is the memory of the red chamber. While some may jokingly say that by memory I refer to the amnesia and Alzheimer's of our elder statesmen, no; I am referring to the long-term core values of the Senate. You see, our second chamber should be a stable one; unlike the House of Commons, which can go from one extreme to the other in a matter of one election, we should have a second chamber that evolves, slowly, to sustain the longer-term goals of Canada and to protect us from the "see-saw" effect seen in the United States (one government undoes the work of its predecessor, rinse and repeat ad nauseum).

However, it should be recognized that the current process of appointing senators (another prerogative of the Prime Minister alone) should be reformed; and for this, I would suggest that perhaps we remove the power of the Prime Minister to appoint senators on his own, and instead require him to co-operate with the province from which the Senator is to represent.

Christopher ([i said:
FiveParadox[/i])]Suggestion #3
Appointing senators to the Upper Chamber

The Governor General of Canada should, wherever possible, only summon a person to the Senate where she is advised to do so by both the Prime Minister and the Lieutenant-Governor from the province which the Senator is to represent. Again, the advice of the Lieutenant-Governor would represent the opinion of his or her legislative assembly.

If there is a disagreement between the Prime Minister and the province, and such a disagreement persists for one year, then the Governor General may (unless both parties wish to continue negotiations) appoint whatever person the legislative assembly consents, to the Senate immediately in order to ensure that the province is effectively represented.

After a senator has served in the red chamber for a period of thirteen years, then the Governor General may deem that to be sufficient cause to dismiss the Senator-in-question, and to inform the Prime Minister and the Lieutenant-Governor of that province of the new vacancy. In times of insurrection, emergency or apprehended war, the Senate may vote to address the Governor General and ask her to freeze the Senate; at which point, for the duration of the urgent circumstances, no senators would be appointed to the Senate and no senators would be dismissed (except for those who turn seventy-five).
This suggestion which would, as mentioned throughout these suggestions, not require changes to the constitution, could ensure that our Senate is representative of the provinces which they are supposed to represent; the last paragraph in the suggestion would be to ensure that during an emergency, the membership of the Senate would not decrease to an amount so as to threaten adequate levels of debate.

:arrow: The House of Chaos — Er, Commons

That brings me to the most active component of the Parliament Assembled, the House of Commons. Since the Prime Minister of Canada typically sits here, changes to his office are going to be suggesting under this section, too. Many citizens have reservations about the first-past-the-post system; with changes to electoral legislation, however, these concerns could perhaps be remedied.

Christopher ([i said:
FiveParadox[/i])]Suggestion #4
Creating a combination of FPTP and listed members

The current representation of each province is to be reduced to two-thirds of their current numbers of seats; ridings are going to need to be expanded in order for this to work properly. These two-thirds are to continue to be elected under the first-past-the-post system, so that each citizen can have an incumbent Member of Parliament to address with their concerns.

The remaining one-third of members are to be elected not by riding votes, but by aggregate votes; these seats are to be used to cushion the House with the party seats necessary to make the composition of the House most closely match the wishes of the electorate as possible. For example, if the Green Party earns five percent of the votes nation-wide, then the Green Party would be given five percent of the total amount of seats in the House (or whatever number can be most closely represented with the amount of seats remaining); therefore, if the Green party had earned 5% of the vote, then they would be given 15 seats.

Listed members (members appointed to the remaining one-third of the seats) are to be decided on, according to party, by the leader of the parties-in-question, and are to be submitted to the Chief Electoral Officer after the election (the members-in-question would then be acclaimed, rather than elected). Listed members, even if they are in the governing party, however, are not permitted to take a minister's portfolio.

No listed member would be permitted to serve more than two terms; after the expiration of their second term, they would be required to run and be elected in a riding in order to continue to sit in the House of Commons.
This way, any party that earns a reasonable amount of support from the electorate would receive representation in the House of Commons — and it would also ensure that unelected members would not have the authority to assume the role of a Minister of the Crown, where they could potentially abuse their portfolio without fear of reprisal from the electorate.

:arrow: Conclusion (whew!)

Sorry for the boring read; you are probably either at this point because you skipped to the end (after you saw the size of the scrollbar and started to cry, of course). Or, you are at this point because my colours blinded you, so you started spamming the Page Down button in a futile effort to escape them (alas, there is no escape!).

I hope that my suggestions seem reasonable to you; and I hope that you have some sort of constructive feedback or criticism, on how we can effect some true change in our democracy (without amending our almost-unamendable constitution), and how my suggestion can (or cannot, whatever your opinion may be) help along in this change.

P.S., I truly am sorry for the long read; and, in advance, anti-monarchy arguments are not welcome in this thread because as I stated dozens, if not hundreds of thousands of times in this article, that these suggestions are meant to work without amending the constitution, which would need to be crumpled up and tossed into the Windows® XP Recycle Bin to do.
 

Lotuslander

Electoral Member
Jan 30, 2006
158
0
16
Vancouver
Five Paradox wrote:

My suggestion would not require a change to the text of the constitution (which would, in modern-day Canada, be a grueling process), while it would more effectively grant the Governor General a mandate to use his or her reserve powers, in appropriate circumstances, as opposed to acting exclusively on the advice of the ever-partisan Prime Minister; we could have governors general who would be equipped to act in the best interest of Canada, rather than in the best interest of a party.

The appointment of the Lieutenant-Governors of the Provinces could be made more effective through adopting the same suggestion, but where the Legislative Assembly would consider the appointment as opposed to the Senate of Canada, and where the Governor General would make the appointment, as opposed to the Queen.

First off, a good post with some interesting ideas. Though I must disagree with aspects of both of the above paragraphs. Firstly, I think all GGs have been remarkabley non-partisan (recently) and I don't think any would put party above country, nor be afraid to use the reserve powers if the situation warrented. Secondly, we need GGs who act on the adbvice of the PM except in extraordinary circumstances. The reserve powers are just that used only in very dangerous and uncertain times. It is even more important in uncertain times that a GG does act on the wishes of his of her Prime Minister as this is the essence of democracy in this country. If for some reason there was a consitutional criss with no government then, the GG could act in the best interests of this country but, until then our democracy requires that the GG obey the will of the people as expressed through Parliament. Similarly if a PM was in such disrepute that the GG revoked his or her commission then it would be the Crown's prerogative to appoint a new government but, convention woudl dictate that the new administration woudl only be temporary in nature.

Secondly, GG has sole responsibilty for the appointment of LT. Govs not the Queen, this has always been the case. Originally the GG was the British Government's representative in Canada as well as the Crown's. Similarly the Lt. Govs were the federal representatives in the Provinces as well as the Crown's. It was not until the late 19th century when a case went before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (from New Brunswick if I recall correctly) that Lt. Govs retained the same rights and obligations to represent the Crown provincially as the GG did federally.

As for the appointment or vetting by the Legislature for Lt.Govs. Federally, I can understand what you are trying to achieve and I think it could work surprisingly well as the Senate is not partisan, or not as partisan as the House of Commons. Perhaps more importantly because Governments are made from the party with the most seats in the Commons the Senate has an air of neutrality in this hypothetical situation. The same can not be said provincially. the Legislatures are mostly controlled by majority governments so in effect you would have the Premier of the Province appointing the Lt.Gov, which I think is detracting from what you are trying to achieve (though I don't want to put words in your mouth). I realsie this would be a joint decision but, by having the Legislature vote you are effectively giving that body a veto over the appointment. Also think of what would happen in Quebec if the PQ was in power, they would never call for a vote and so the office would remain vacant, even a Liberal gov't in Quebec would find it difficult to manouever such a situation and every five years it woudl re-awaken the consitutional debate in that province.

As for Listed members-I am opposed to any term limits as I find the concept undemocratic, vote the bums out I say if you don't like them-More importantly though in most countries with list systems or PR the list is selected before the election. This is because viewing the list is an important tool for voters to decide who they will vote for. The order of the list can tell a voter much about the internal dynamics of a party (who is on the inside of the leadership and who is falling out of favour) and lets the voter know who they are voting for when they cast their ballot.
 

FiveParadox

Governor General
Dec 20, 2005
5,875
43
48
Vancouver, BC
Lotuslander said:
First off, a good post with some interesting ideas. Though I must disagree with aspects of both of the above paragraphs. Firstly, I think all GGs have been remarkabley non-partisan (recently) and I don't think any would put party above country, nor be afraid to use the reserve powers if the situation warrented. Secondly, we need GGs who act on the adbvice of the PM except in extraordinary circumstances. The reserve powers are just that used only in very dangerous and uncertain times. It is even more important in uncertain times that a GG does act on the wishes of his of her Prime Minister as this is the essence of democracy in this country. If for some reason there was a consitutional criss with no government then, the GG could act in the best interests of this country but, until then our democracy requires that the GG obey the will of the people as expressed through Parliament. Similarly if a PM was in such disrepute that the GG revoked his or her commission then it would be the Crown's prerogative to appoint a new government but, convention woudl dictate that the new administration woudl only be temporary in nature.
I actually agree entirely. However, debates on this forum have shown me how little respect some people have for the office of the Governor General of Canada, and how little use they think the office serves the nation. I tried to come up with some kind of compromise whereby I could keep some of the "essence" of the office while making the offices of the Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor more "democratic" (I shudder at the thought, to be honest; these offices are not, and never were intended to be, democratic). Many people seem to dislike the idea of knowing that a nonpartisan and unelected Governor General reserves the kinds of powers she does (although, personally, I find it comforting).

Lotuslander said:
Secondly, GG has sole responsibilty for the appointment of LT. Govs not the Queen, this has always been the case. Originally the GG was the British Government's representative in Canada as well as the Crown's. Similarly the Lt. Govs were the federal representatives in the Provinces as well as the Crown's. It was not until the late 19th century when a case went before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (from New Brunswick if I recall correctly) that Lt. Govs retained the same rights and obligations to represent the Crown provincially as the GG did federally.
Again, we agree; however, highlighting the importance of the Governor General and her role in Canada seems to elicit bad responses from many Canadians I have spoken to. Many people seem to misunderstand the role of the representatives, thinking that they are some sort of plush versions of a President; that's not the case, though, and I was trying to shuffle the Crown in Canada to convey a less "absolute" position.

Lotuslander said:
As for the appointment or vetting by the Legislature for Lt.Govs. Federally, I can understand what you are trying to achieve and I think it could work surprisingly well as the Senate is not partisan, or not as partisan as the House of Commons. Perhaps more importantly because Governments are made from the party with the most seats in the Commons the Senate has an air of neutrality in this hypothetical situation. The same can not be said provincially. the Legislatures are mostly controlled by majority governments so in effect you would have the Premier of the Province appointing the Lt.Gov, which I think is detracting from what you are trying to achieve (though I don't want to put words in your mouth). I realsie this would be a joint decision but, by having the Legislature vote you are effectively giving that body a veto over the appointment. Also think of what would happen in Quebec if the PQ was in power, they would never call for a vote and so the office would remain vacant, even a Liberal gov't in Quebec would find it difficult to manouever such a situation and every five years it woudl re-awaken the consitutional debate in that province.
Perhaps the proposal could then be re-worked so that while both the Prime Minister and the legislative assembly would discuss the appointment, the "veto" power over the appointment would remain at the hands of the Prime Minister (i.e., after a period of six months of debate, or something like that, the Prime Minister could make the appointment, with the Governor General's consent of course, notwithstanding the objection of the legislature).

Lotuslander said:
As for Listed members-I am opposed to any term limits as I find the concept undemocratic, vote the bums out I say if you don't like them-More importantly though in most countries with list systems or PR the list is selected before the election. This is because viewing the list is an important tool for voters to decide who they will vote for. The order of the list can tell a voter much about the internal dynamics of a party (who is on the inside of the leadership and who is falling out of favour) and lets the voter know who they are voting for when they cast their ballot.
Just ask Finder — my position is that we should continue to run things under first-past-the-post, as we are now. However, apparently it's not democratic enough. Personally, I think it works just fine; we have a balance between competing interests, and stable governance. Other than moderate reforms to the Senate (I vehemently oppose all of abolishment, direct-election, or proposals to dissolve the Senate at the end of each Parliament), I am a pretty conservative person in terms of our Parliamentary institution (very small-c conservative; I mean, I like most of it the way it is).